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Character Weakness, Partisan Bias, and Presidential Evaluation

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This article draws upon research on negativity bias and motivated reasoning to develop a theory explaining how and why partisan bias moderates the relationship between impressions of character weakness and evaluations of presidential candidates. Impressions of character weakness exist at the aggregate level, which center on the perceptions of the public as a whole, and the idiographic level, which center on individual differences in perceptions. The theory predicts the more strongly people identify with the opposition party of a presidential candidate, the stronger the relationship between impressions of character weakness and candidate evaluations. Analysis of 1984–1996 National Election Study data provides partial support for the theory. The results show partisan opponents rely more on perceptions of character weakness than partisan supporters when evaluating presidential incumbents and salient nonincumbents in the aggregate level models and that partisanship does not promote reliance on perceptions of character weakness in the idiographic level models.

The impact of personality impressions on presidential candidate evaluations is well established, but is it the same for all citizens? More specifically, do citizens rely equally on impressions of a candidate's character weakness when evaluating him? Impressions of character weakness exist at the aggregate level, which center on the perceptions of the public as a whole, and the idiographic level, which center on individual differences in perceptions (Klein 1991, 1996). Nearly all models of candidate evaluation implicitly assume the impact these impressions have on evaluations is the same for a candidate's staunchest partisan allies and bitterest partisan foes (e.g., Funk 1999, 712–716; Kinder 1986, 251–252; Rahn et al. 1990, 141–145). I challenge this perspective by developing and testing a theory of presidential candidate evaluation that centers on the conditioning impact of party identification on the use of character weakness impressions of opposition party nominees. Drawing on work on negativity bias and motivated reasoning, I posit the more strongly people identify with the opposition party of a presidential candidate, the stronger the relationship between impressions of his character weakness and evaluations of his candidacy. My analysis of 1984–1996 National Election Study data reveals partisan bias promotes reliance on impressions of character weakness for incumbent evaluations and, to a lesser extent, nonincumbent evaluations at the aggregate level, and that partisanship does not affect the use of such impressions at the idiographic level.

Trait Impressions, Character Weakness, and Partisan Motivation

Public opinion scholars have demonstrated that the four principal dimensions of presidential personality are competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy (Funk 1996; Kinder 1986). Impressions of competence represent

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judgments about a candidate's knowledge and experience; leadership impressions are perceptions about the ability to serve effectively; integrity impressions are based on judgments about morality and trustworthiness; and empathy impressions reflect perceptions about compassion and warmth. These traits affect candidate evaluations (Funk 1999; Kinder 1986), but it is unclear how such effects vary within and across candidates.

One variable likely to influence the impact trait impressions have on candidate evaluations is trait valence. The propensity for negative attributes and traits to weigh more heavily on information processing and decision making than equally extreme, positive counterparts is known as negativity bias (Fiske 1980; Skowronski and Carlston 1989). Why do negative traits weigh so heavily in the evaluative calculus of citizens? The "figure-ground" explanation holds this happens because negative information stands out against a generally positive perceptual background. Most people are satisfied with life, thus the impact of negative information is accentuated relative to positive information because it contrasts sharply against this positive background (Klein 1996; Lau 1985).

Social psychological research investigates how differences in valence along the same underlying attribute influence information processing and judgment. For example, studies show that cues regarding immorality have a stronger impact on impression formation than cues about morality (De Bruin and Van Lange 2000; Reeder and Coovert 1986). Research also explores how differences in valence across traits affect global evaluations (De Bruin and Van Lange 2000; Martijn et al. 1992). Studies show that the integration of impressions of two distinct and equally extreme attributes, one positive and one negative, leads to a more negative global impression of a target than would be expected if these were weighted equally. Martijn et al. (1992) find when subjects are asked to evaluate someone described as immoral and competent, or moral and incompetent, global evaluations of the target are negative.

How should negativity bias moderate the impact traits have on presidential candidate evaluations? Klein (1991, 413–414) posits that there are at least two possibilities. First, negativity bias may affect the evaluation process the same way for everyone. In this scenario the character weakness for a candidate is the trait on which the public as a whole rates him the lowest. If the electorate regards integrity as Bill Clinton's character weakness, negativity bias is present if this trait has a greater average impact on Clinton evaluations than competence, leadership, and empathy. This is the aggregate-level conceptualization of negativity bias. The second approach takes individual differences in perceptions as the starting point, whereby a

character weakness is any trait on which a person rates a candidate negatively. Thus, for a given candidate, impressions of character weakness vary across individuals. Assume one person believes that Clinton is competent and untrustworthy; another trusts him, but doubts his competence. Negativity bias is present if integrity weighs more heavily on evaluation for the person who thinks Clinton lacks integrity than for the person who thinks he possesses it, and if competence more strongly influences evaluation for the person who thinks Clinton is incompetent than for the person who thinks he is competent. This is the idiographic-level conceptualization of negativity bias.

Klein's analyses (1991, 1996) of 1984–1992 NES data show both types of negativity bias affect presidential candidate evaluations. Her studies contribute greatly to our understanding of how citizens use traits to evaluate presidential candidates, but there are two important questions she does not address which are relevant for my study. First, she relies on the full NES battery of discrete trait items rather than combining subsets into multiple indicators of competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy, so it is unclear if negativity bias exists for these broader trait dimensions. Second, she assumes the negativity effect is constant across the partisan spectrum, which is a questionable assumption.

I now explain why party identification, which is defined as a personal, affective attachment to a political party that biases political perception in a manner consistent with the party label (Campbell et al. 1960), should moderate the relationship between impressions of character weakness and candidate evaluations. Research on motivated reasoning suggests the desire to reach particular conclusions biases information processing in a manner consistent with latent directional goals (Baumeister and Newman 1994; Fischle 2000; Klein and Kunda 1992; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2000; Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987). When people are motivated to arrive at a particular conclusion about something, they cannot believe whatever they want to about it because there are pressures to maintain "an illusion of objectivity" (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987, 302). People feel compelled to support their conclusions in a manner that would strike a neutral observer as defensible. They accomplish this by constructing "seemingly rational justifications" for these conclusions (Klein and Kunda 1992, 146). Motivation biases how information is gathered, evaluated, and integrated into a summary judgment (Baumeister and Newman 1994; Klein and Kunda 1992; Kunda 1990).

In the case of evaluating presidential candidates, Democrats are likely motivated to render poor judgments about Republican nominees just as Republicans

are for Democratic candidates. Although motivated to reach such conclusions, partisans are inhibited from doing so directly by the need to maintain the appearance of objectivity. Partisanship can indirectly facilitate this by biasing information processing as follows. First, the partisan opponents of a candidate will more readily seek out than the candidate's co-partisans damaging personality information to justify a negative evaluation (Sweeney and Gruber 1984). Next, when such information reaches a candidate's opponents they elevate its importance to the evaluative task, while supporters discount its significance (Fischle 2000; Stoker 1993). That is, partisans assess and, if necessary, reassess the importance of character weakness for candidate evaluation in a manner consistent with their underlying motivation. Given these information-processing mechanisms, perceptions of character weakness should be especially salient when partisans evaluate opposition party candidates. Thus, the partisan opponents of a presidential candidate should rely more heavily than his co-partisans on impressions of character weakness when evaluating him. Partisanship should not promote reliance on other traits because these do not serve the directional goal.

Data, Measurement, and Operational Hypotheses

My data come from the 1984–1996 NES surveys. Candidate evaluations are measured using the post-election feeling thermometer scores for the major party nominees.¹ All variables have been rescaled on a 0–1 range, and thus, with the exceptions of the constituent and multiplicative coefficients described below, the regression coefficient for each independent variable represents the effect that movement across its full range has on the candidate evaluation variable.

Research shows that sociotropic assessments, domestic and foreign policy preferences, traits, and party identification influence evaluations of presidential candidates (Kinder and Sears 1985). Sociotropic assessments are respondents' retrospective judgments about how national economic conditions have changed in the recent past (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981). This variable is measured by summing responses to questions asking people how

much they believe the national economy has improved or worsened and how much easier or harder it has become to find work.² Higher scores reflect more positive assessments, thus this variable should be positively related to incumbent party and inversely related to challenger party evaluations.

Government services is an additive scale based on responses to items on government spending on social services and how far the government should go to ensure that everyone has a job.³ Aid to blacks is measured by asking respondents about the degree to which the government should do more to improve the social and economic conditions of blacks, except for the 1988 NES in which an item on federal spending on blacks is used. Next, the foreign policy variable for 1984 and 1988 is measured with an additive scale based on responses to questions about defense spending and U.S. posture toward Russia. In 1992 this variable is measured with a scale based on responses to the defense spending item, the degree to which the U.S. should maintain power through defense spending, and an item on U.S. willingness to use military force. In 1996 the scale is based on answers to the defense spending and willingness to use force items.⁴ The policy preference variables are coded from the most liberal/dovish to the most conservative/hawkish response and should be positively related to Republican and negatively related to Democratic candidate evaluations.

Competence is measured using an additive scale based on answers to questions asking how well the words "intelligent" and "knowledgeable" describe a candidate. Leadership is measured using the "provides strong leadership" and "inspiring" items. Integrity is based on responses to the "morality" and "honest" items except for 1984, in which the "morality" and "decent" items are summed. Empathy is based on the "compassionate" and "really cares about people like you" items. Higher values reflect more favorable impressions, thus the traits should be positively related to candidate evaluations. This coding applies only to the aggregate-level models. The idiographic-level models require an alternative operationalization, which will be described below. Finally, party identification is measured using the seven-point scale and is coded from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1).

²Tau $c = .49$ for the 1984 items, $.33$ for 1988, and $.42$ for 1992. The employment item was not included in the 1996 NES.

³Pearson $r = .37$ for 1984, $.32$ for 1988, $.35$ for 1992, and $.43$ for 1996.

⁴Pearson $r = .34$ for 1984, $.29$ for 1988, Cronbach $\alpha = .68$ for 1992, and Pearson $r = .26$ for 1996.

¹The "intelligent" and "compassionate" trait items described below were not included for Dole in the 1996 NES, which, for reasons that will become apparent, precludes testing of the idiographic model of negativity bias. In light of this it was necessary to exclude the Dole case from the empirical analyses.

The Aggregate Model of Negativity Bias An Operational Definition of Character Weakness

In the aggregate conceptualization of negativity bias, the character weakness for a candidate is the trait on which the public as a whole rates him the lowest. Given this definition and the importance of partisanship to my argument, I classify a trait as a character weakness if two conditions are met. First, the mean of one trait must be lower than the means of the other traits among a presidential candidate's partisan opponents.⁵ If this condition is met then a consensus exists among the candidate's opponents about his weakest trait in relative terms. Second, a trait satisfying the first condition must fall in the bottom or negative half of the scale (mean < .50). If the second condition is met, then the partisan opponents of a presidential candidate view him as lacking in some aspect of character in an absolute sense.

Table 1 reports the trait means for each candidate among strong Democrats, strong Republicans, and the entire sample. The Reagan₈₄ data illustrate how a character weakness is identified. Among strong Democrats the empathy mean of .30 is less than the competence (.57), leadership (.42), and integrity (.57) means, and it falls in the bottom half of the scale, indicating that strong Democrats view Reagan as possessing a character weakness in a relative and absolute sense. Thus, empathy can be classified as Reagan's character weakness. When these conditions are applied to the other candidates, the following conclusions emerge. Leadership is the character weakness for Mondale₈₄ and Dukakis₈₈. Bush₈₈ has no character weakness.⁶ Empathy is the character weakness for Bush₉₂. Finally, integrity is the character weakness for Clinton in 1992 and 1996.⁷

Statistical Results

If partisanship motivates people to selectively integrate perceptions of character weakness when constructing evaluations of opposition party candidates, then the following results should obtain. First, the more strongly

⁵Trait means are always lower among a candidate's partisan opponents than among his supporters.

⁶For Bush₈₈ the leadership mean (.35) is lower than the empathy mean (.37) among strong Democrats, but this difference may reflect sampling error as the 95 percent confidence intervals overlap.

⁷The aggregate model of negativity bias posits that candidate evaluations will be more heavily influenced by the character weakness variable than by the other trait variables. To check this I regressed each candidate evaluation variable on the controls, the traits, and party identification, and found that the magnitude of the character weakness coefficient exceeds those of the other traits

people identify with the Democratic Party, the more heavily they should rely on impressions of the character weakness of Republican nominees to judge their candidacies. Operationally, the character weakness \times party identification term should be negative and significant in the Republican candidate evaluation models. Second, the more closely people identify with the Republican Party, the more they should rely on the character weakness of Democratic nominees when evaluating them. Operationally, the character weakness \times party identification term should be positive and significant in the Democratic candidate evaluation models. For strong Democrats the predicted impact character weakness has on candidate evaluations is given by the regression coefficient for the constituent character weakness variable. That is, the coefficient represents the estimated impact the perceived character flaw has on candidate evaluations when party identification = 0, which corresponds to the strong Democrat category. For strong Republicans the estimated impact of character weakness on candidate evaluations is simply the sum of the constituent character weakness coefficient and the character weakness \times party identification coefficient, because strong Republicans equal 1 on party identification.

Next, party identification should not promote reliance on the remaining traits; therefore, all other trait \times party identification terms should be statistically insignificant. Note that the constituent party identification variable does not represent a main effect. Instead, it represents the impact party identification has on candidate evaluations when the trait variables equal zero (Friedrich 1982). These terms are of limited importance and hence will be ignored. Finally, I report F ratios to test if adding the multiplicative terms to a baseline additive model leads to a statistically significant increase in the R² value.

Table 2 contains the estimates for the 1984 and 1988 candidates. Given that Reagan's weakness is empathy, the empathy \times party identification coefficient should be negative and significant and all remaining trait \times party identification terms insignificant. This is precisely what the estimates reveal. The negative and significant empathy \times party identification coefficient shows that evaluations of Reagan based on character weakness are much more pronounced among Democrats than Republicans. Second, the other trait interactions are insignificant, demonstrating that party identification does not influence the use of these traits. Note further that the F ratio

in twenty of the twenty-one comparisons. Some of the differences are modest, but the consistency of these results supports the claim that the character weakness variable exerts stronger effects on candidate evaluations than the other traits. These analyses are available from the author upon request.

TABLE 1 Candidate Trait Means, 1984–1996

	Competence	Leadership	Integrity	Empathy
<i>Ronald Reagan – 1984:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.57	.42	.57	.30
Strong Republicans	.86	.86	.88	.79
Sample Mean	.69	.61	.71	.51
<i>Walter Mondale – 1984:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.79	.66	.78	.76
Strong Republicans	.60	.33	.64	.53
Sample Mean	.68	.48	.69	.61
<i>George Bush – 1988:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.55	.35	.49	.37
Strong Republicans	.81	.66	.80	.73
Sample Mean	.66	.48	.62	.52
<i>Michael Dukakis – 1988:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.74	.66	.71	.71
Strong Republicans	.63	.39	.58	.49
Sample Mean	.67	.51	.63	.59
<i>George Bush – 1992:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.59	.35	.50	.31
Strong Republicans	.81	.69	.81	.75
Sample Mean	.67	.49	.61	.47
<i>Bill Clinton – 1992:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.78	.72	.64	.76
Strong Republicans	.59	.35	.29	.45
Sample Mean	.68	.55	.48	.61
<i>Bill Clinton – 1996:</i>				
Strong Democrats	.86	.75	.66	.80
Strong Republicans	.64	.27	.13	.32
Sample Mean	.72	.52	.40	.56

Notes: The range for the trait variables varies from 0.00 to 1.00. Higher scores reflect more positive assessments.

Source: 1984–1996 NES.

for the R^2 increment test is highly significant and thus reaffirms the importance of the empathy \times party identification effect. Finally, increasingly positive sociotropic assessments and more conservative and hawkish policy preferences are associated with more favorable evaluations of Reagan. In short, the results indicate that Democrats rely more heavily than Republicans on the aggregate level perception of Reagan's character weakness when evaluating him.

The Mondale case is next. Given leadership as his character weakness, the leadership \times party identification term should be positive and significant and the remaining trait interactions insignificant. The results show a negative and marginally significant leadership \times party identification term, which suggests Republicans rely less than

Democrats on leadership when evaluating Mondale. Thus, there is no support for the hypothesis that Republican identification promotes the use of character weakness in Mondale evaluations. Next, the other trait interactions and the F ratio for the R^2 increment are insignificant, which suggests party identification does not moderate the use of traits. Lastly, positive macroeconomic assessments and increasingly conservative and hawkish policy preferences are negatively associated with Mondale evaluations. Overall, there is no support for the hypothesis that Republican partisanship promotes reliance on the aggregate character weakness in the Mondale case.

I now consider the 1988 candidates, starting with Bush. Recall that Bush has no operationally identifiable character weakness; therefore, all of the trait \times party

TABLE 2 Aggregate Models of Negativity Bias, 1984 and 1988 OLS Regression Estimates

	Reagan ₈₄	Mondale ₈₄	Bush ₈₈	Dukakis ₈₈
Constant	-0.133 ** (.022)	0.424 ** (.047)	0.019 (.034)	0.419 ** (.053)
Sociotropic Assessment	0.114 ** (.020)	-0.065 ** (.024)	0.111 ** (.031)	-0.016 (.031)
Government Services	0.052 ** (.022)	-0.070 ** (.028)	0.103 ** (.029)	-0.125 ** (.030)
Aid to Blacks	0.055 ** (.018)	-0.039 * (.023)	0.035 * (.018)	-0.006 (.018)
Foreign Policy	0.094 ** (.021)	-0.077 ** (.025)	0.051 * (.028)	-0.073 ** (.027)
Competence	0.106 ** (.032)	0.065 (.061)	0.106 * (.058)	-0.022 (.076)
Leadership	0.168 ** (.037)	0.225 ** (.047)	0.234 ** (.057)	0.206 ** (.060)
Integrity	0.163 ** (.041)	0.116 * (.070)	0.200 ** (.060)	0.070 (.078)
Empathy	0.466 ** (.041)	0.136 * (.064)	0.139 * (.066)	0.295 ** (.074)
Party Identification	0.351 ** (.050)	-0.180 ** (.061)	0.260 ** (.063)	-0.120 * (.072)
Competence × Party Identification	-0.034 (.062)	0.041 (.096)	-0.135 (.108)	0.068 (.120)
Leadership × Party Identification	0.037 (.071)	-0.114 + (.076)	-0.047 (.098)	0.049 (.096)
Integrity × Party Identification	-0.050 (.082)	0.030 (.109)	-0.080 (.104)	-0.022 (.112)
Empathy × Party Identification	-0.304 ** (.072)	0.007 (.100)	0.101 (.110)	-0.178 + (.108)
R ²	.748	.485	.563	.455
F Statistic	295.541 **	75.766 **	88.069 **	55.811 **
R ² Increment:				
F _{4, N-14}	12.012	0.624	1.148	0.953
p value	.000	.645	.333	.432
Number of cases	1311	1058	901	884

+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 1984 & 1988 NES.

identification terms should be insignificant. The data support these expectations. Party identification does not condition the relationship between any of the traits and Bush evaluations and the F ratio is far from significant. Among the control variables, positive economic assessments and conservative and hawkish issue positions are associated with positive Bush evaluations. More generally, these results indicate that in the absence of an aggregate character weakness, partisanship does not condition reliance on traits when candidate evaluations are rendered.

Leadership is the character weakness for Dukakis; therefore, the leadership × party identification term should be positive and significant and the other trait interactions insignificant. As the insignificant leadership × party identification term indicates, there is no support for the key hypothesis. The competence × party identification and integrity × party identification coefficients are also insignificant, while the negative empathy × party identification term is nearly significant. The latter result suggests Republicans rely less on empathy than

TABLE 3 Aggregate Models of Negativity Bias, 1992 and 1996 OLS Regression Estimates

	Bush ₉₂	Clinton ₉₂	Clinton ₉₆
Constant	-0.035 + (.024)	0.474 ** (.043)	0.437 ** (.037)
Sociotropic Assessment	0.116 ** (.023)	-0.088 ** (.029)	0.076 ** (.021)
Government Services	-0.011 (.021)	-0.021 (.027)	-0.158 ** (.025)
Aid to Blacks	-0.006 (.016)	-0.049 ** (.020)	0.013 (.019)
Foreign Policy	0.089 ** (.023)	-0.056 * (.027)	-0.019 (.025)
Competence	0.051 (.041)	0.008 (.061)	-0.030 (.046)
Leadership	0.309 ** (.040)	0.126 * (.061)	0.298 ** (.048)
Integrity	0.135 ** (.038)	0.173 ** (.052)	0.095 * (.043)
Empathy	0.339 ** (.041)	0.279 ** (.063)	0.201 ** (.048)
Party Identification	0.243 ** (.047)	-0.130 * (.058)	-0.289 ** (.047)
Competence × Party Identification	-0.020 (.080)	-0.088 (.093)	0.058 (.068)
Leadership × Party Identification	-0.004 (.070)	0.129 + (.095)	-0.084 (.075)
Integrity × Party Identification	-0.032 (.075)	0.146 * (.087)	0.399 ** (.075)
Empathy × Party Identification	-0.098 + (.072)	-0.215 * (.099)	0.003 (.075)
R ²	.655	.533	.762
F Statistic	230.226 **	108.981 **	264.651 **
R ² Increment:			
F _{4, N - 14}	1.918	2.021	13.478
p value	.105	.089	.000
Number of cases	1589	1256	1089

+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 1992 & 1996 NES.

Democrats, although the insignificant F ratio casts some doubt on this. Among the other predictors, conservative views on government services and hawkish foreign policy preferences weaken Dukakis evaluations. Overall, these results support the inference that Republicans are no more likely than Democrats to use aggregate-level impressions of character weakness when evaluating Dukakis.

The estimates for the 1992 and 1996 candidates appear in Table 3. The Bush character weakness is empa-

thy; hence the empathy × party identification term should be negative and significant and the remaining trait interactions insignificant. The evidence, while not statistically overwhelming, is consistent with expectations. The empathy × party identification coefficient is correctly signed and approaches significance ($p = .086$), suggesting that the relationship between impressions of character weakness and Bush evaluations is more pronounced among Democrats than Republicans. As predicted, the other three trait interactions are insig-

nificant. Next, the marginally significant F ratio ($p = .105$) reveals that adding the four interactions to the baseline model leads to a modest improvement in model fit.⁸ Note finally that increasingly positive views of the economy and more hawkish foreign policy positions translate into warmer evaluations of Bush. In sum, the Bush results suggest that stronger Democratic ties lead to greater reliance on aggregate perceptions of character weakness when a Republican candidate is evaluated.

I now take up the Clinton model results. Given that his character weakness is integrity, the integrity \times party identification term should be positive and significant and the remaining product terms insignificant across the models. The results from the 1992 model provide some support for these hypotheses. The integrity \times party identification term is correctly signed and statistically significant, which suggests Republicans more readily base evaluations of Clinton on impressions of his character flaw than Democrats. Furthermore, partisanship does not moderate the use of competence. However, the leadership \times party and empathy \times party coefficients approach or surpass significance. These results suggest Democrats rely less on leadership and more on empathy than Republicans. The R^2 increment test for this model is marginally significant ($p = .089$). Finally, increasingly positive economic assessments, opposition to aid to blacks, and hawkish foreign policy preferences are inversely related to Clinton evaluations. Overall, the Clinton₉₂ results support the hypothesis that Republican identification leads to greater reliance on aggregate impressions of character weakness when Democratic candidates are evaluated and partly supports the hypothesis that partisanship does not condition the use of other traits.⁹

The results for the Clinton₉₆ model are consistent with expectations. The positive coefficient for the integrity \times party identification term demonstrates that Republicans rely more than Democrats on integrity when evaluating Clinton. The remaining interactions are insignificant, which means party identification does not moderate the use of other traits. The highly significant F ratio for the R^2 increment test reinforces the importance of the integrity \times party identification interaction. Among the other predictors, positive macroeconomic

assessments and liberal positions on government services are associated with warmer evaluations of Clinton. In sum, as was the case for the other presidential incumbents, the Clinton₉₆ results support the conclusion that partisan bias promotes reliance on aggregate impressions of character weakness when an opposition party candidate is evaluated.

The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 indicate partisan bias strengthens the impact of character weakness on evaluations of opposition party incumbents (Reagan₈₄, Bush₉₂, and Clinton₉₆) and highly salient challengers (Clinton₉₂). This relationship can be further examined by using the regression model estimates to generate predicted candidate evaluation scores given different combinations of values for the character weakness and party identification variables. If the theory advanced in this paper is valid, a substantively significant difference in the predicted feeling thermometer scores should obtain between a presidential candidate's partisan supporters and opponents only at the negative end of the character weakness scale. Table 4 contains the predicted feeling thermometer scores for the aforementioned candidates given the highest and lowest scores on the character weakness variable for strong Democrats and strong Republicans, holding everything else constant at the scale midpoint.¹⁰

I focus on the Reagan₈₄ and Clinton₉₆ predicted values to illustrate the relationship. For the case of Reagan₈₄ Table 4 shows that strong Democrats and Republicans are predicted to render equally positive candidate evaluations when they rate Reagan at the highest point on the empathy variable: the feeling thermometer score equals .719 for both groups. But when Reagan is rated most negatively on empathy, strong Democrats have much lower thermometer scores than strong Republicans (.245 versus .570). Next, for Clinton₉₆ strong Republicans and Democrats holding the most positive impression of integrity render positive evaluations of Clinton, with predicted thermometer scores of .813 and .727, respectively. In contrast, given the most negative integrity impression the Clinton thermometer score among strong Republicans is much lower than the score for strong Democrats (.339 versus .613). In sum, consistent with expectations, these results show that for each candidate significant partisan differences in the feeling thermometer scores exist only at the negative end of the character weakness variable.

⁸When a trimmed model that includes only the empathy \times party interaction is estimated, the t ratio for this term and the F ratio for the R^2 increment are highly significant ($p < .01$, see the appendix).

⁹Further analysis indicated the leadership \times party term should be deleted from the trimmed model reported in the appendix. The estimates for this model show the integrity \times party and empathy \times party terms are significant and the p-value of the F ratio for the R^2 increment test is .056.

¹⁰The estimates in the appendix are used to generate predicted scores because these are unaffected by the coefficients for the insignificant interaction terms that appear in the Table 2 and 3 model estimates.

TABLE 4 Predicted Candidate Evaluation Scores for Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans given the Most Positive and Negative Character Weakness Scores, Aggregate Model of Negativity Bias

	Reagan ₈₄		Bush ₉₂	
	Strong Democrats	Strong Republicans	Strong Democrats	Strong Republicans
Most positive empathy impression	.719	.719	.654	.747
Most negative empathy impression	.245	.570	.302	.524

	Clinton ₉₂		Clinton ₉₆	
	Strong Democrats	Strong Republicans	Strong Democrats	Strong Republicans
Most positive integrity impression	.745	.678	.727	.813
Most negative integrity impression	.586	.340	.613	.339

Notes: Cell entries represent the predicted feeling thermometer score for each candidate. The character weakness variable takes on the following values: most positive impression = 1.00 and most negative impression = 0.00. The party identification variable takes on the following values: strong Democrat = 0.00 and strong Republican = 1.00. All other variables = 0.50.

Source: Model estimates reported in the appendix.

The Idiographic Model of Negativity Bias

An Operational Definition of Character Weakness

In the idiographic model of negativity bias impressions of character weakness vary across individuals. Thus, a candidate may be viewed as weak on competence, leadership, integrity, or empathy. This type of character weakness is operationally defined as follows. The trait variables, as described above, are measured on seven-point scales [.00, .17, .33, .50, .67, .83, 1.00], so each trait can be recoded into positive and negative dummy variables with the scale midpoint serving as the (neutral) omitted category. When a respondent rates a candidate above the scale midpoint on an original trait variable, the new positive trait variable equals 1 and the new negative trait variable equals 0. Conversely, when a respondent rates a candidate below the midpoint on the original scale, the positive trait variable equals 0 and the negative trait variable equals 1. This procedure yields eight new variables: positive competence, positive leadership, positive integrity, positive empathy, negative competence, negative leadership, negative integrity, and negative empathy.¹¹

Statistical Results

If partisan bias promotes the use of idiographic perceptions of character weakness in the evaluation of opposition party candidates, then the following should obtain.

¹¹The idiographic model holds evaluations are more heavily influenced by negative than positive traits. To check this I regressed each evaluation variable on the controls, positive and negative traits, and party identification, and found the effects of the nega-

First, there should be no evidence that party identification conditions the use of positive trait impressions relative to neutral trait impressions. Operationally, the positive trait \times party identification terms should be insignificant. Second, partisans should rely more heavily on negative impressions of each trait relative to neutral impressions when evaluating opposition party candidates. Operationally, the negative trait \times party identification terms should be correctly signed and significant. F ratios are again reported to determine if adding the product terms enhances model fit.

Table 5 contains the estimates for the 1984 and 1988 candidates. For each candidate the positive and negative trait interaction model estimates are reported under the model 1 and model 2 headings, respectively. Separate models are reported to isolate the effects of each variable block on model fit. Beginning with the first Reagan model, the results show party identification does not condition the use of positive traits. Consistent with expectations, three of the four interactions and the F ratio are insignificant. Next, the model 2 estimates suggest Democrats may rely more on negative integrity and empathy than Republicans ($p < .10$ for both) in evaluating Reagan. However, the insignificant F ratio shows the interaction terms do not enhance model fit over the baseline, and thus the key hypothesis is not supported.¹²

tive traits exceed those of the positive traits in nineteen of twenty-eight comparisons. While some of these differences are modest, the pattern of results suggests negativity bias operates at the idiographic level. These analyses are available from the author upon request.

¹²The control variable findings reported in Tables 5 and 6 are the same as those reported above; therefore, I will not discuss them again.

TABLE 5 Idiographic Models of Negativity Bias, 1984 and 1988 OLS Regression Estimates

	Reagan ₈₄		Mondale ₈₄		Bush ₈₈		Dukakis ₈₈	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	0.316 ** (.030)	0.334 ** (.027)	0.654 ** (.041)	0.697 ** (.032)	0.385 ** (.038)	0.370 ** (.036)	0.680 ** (.042)	0.741 ** (.036)
Sociotropic Assessment	0.124 ** (.020)	0.126 ** (.020)	-0.079 ** (.024)	-0.081 ** (.024)	0.130 ** (.032)	0.132 ** (.032)	-0.015 (.031)	-0.022 (.031)
Government Services	0.057 ** (.023)	0.057 ** (.023)	-0.083 ** (.028)	-0.088 ** (.028)	0.090 ** (.030)	0.091 ** (.030)	-0.150 ** (.030)	-0.149 ** (.030)
Aid to Blacks	0.049 ** (.018)	0.050 ** (.018)	-0.051 * (.023)	-0.050 * (.023)	0.039 * (.019)	0.039 * (.019)	-0.008 (.018)	-0.008 (.018)
Foreign Policy	0.117 ** (.021)	0.116 ** (.021)	-0.071 ** (.025)	-0.070 ** (.025)	0.071 ** (.028)	0.069 ** (.028)	-0.065 ** (.027)	-0.070 ** (.027)
Positive Competence	0.003 (.020)	0.012 (.015)	0.025 (.029)	0.010 (.017)	0.016 (.027)	0.030 + (.019)	-0.055 + (.037)	-0.017 (.018)
Positive Leadership	0.047 * (.021)	0.060 ** (.013)	0.055 ** (.021)	0.044 ** (.016)	0.054 * (.033)	0.040 ** (.016)	0.041 * (.025)	0.026 + (.017)
Positive Integrity	0.058 ** (.022)	0.050 ** (.016)	0.072 * (.035)	0.058 ** (.019)	-0.001 (.028)	0.016 (.019)	0.043 + (.034)	0.031 * (.018)
Positive Empathy	0.128 ** (.023)	0.085 ** (.014)	0.053 * (.026)	0.050 ** (.014)	0.067 * (.034)	0.059 ** (.019)	0.153 ** (.032)	0.072 ** (.018)
Negative Competence	-0.077 ** (.017)	-0.079 ** (.022)	-0.052 ** (.022)	-0.016 (.043)	0.010 (.024)	-0.008 (.031)	-0.054 * (.027)	0.056 (.055)
Negative Leadership	-0.064 ** (.015)	-0.054 ** (.020)	-0.037 ** (.015)	-0.074 ** (.023)	-0.060 ** (.018)	-0.078 ** (.025)	-0.074 ** (.016)	-0.098 ** (.030)
Negative Integrity	-0.106 ** (.020)	-0.129 ** (.024)	-0.073 ** (.026)	-0.083 + (.055)	-0.083 ** (.021)	-0.076 ** (.028)	-0.036 + (.023)	-0.111 ** (.047)
Negative Empathy	-0.098 ** (.014)	-0.121 ** (.019)	-0.024 (.019)	-0.005 (.036)	-0.067 ** (.018)	-0.036 + (.026)	-0.018 (.020)	-0.052 (.042)
Party Identification	0.188 ** (.047)	0.133 ** (.019)	-0.122 ** (.045)	-0.204 ** (.024)	0.094 * (.048)	0.151 ** (.029)	-0.107 ** (.045)	-0.206 ** (.026)
Positive Competence × PID	0.017 (.038)		-0.028 (.042)		0.044 (.054)		0.060 (.050)	
Positive Leadership × PID	0.030 (.038)		-0.024 (.039)		-0.025 (.045)		-0.041 (.043)	
Positive Integrity × PID	-0.029 (.050)		-0.024 (.049)		0.037 (.051)		-0.025 (.049)	
Positive Empathy × PID	-0.087 ** (.036)		-0.008 (.039)		-0.009 (.051)		-0.135 ** (.045)	
Negative Competence × PID		0.017 (.052)		-0.054 (.058)		0.063 (.077)		-0.171 * (.075)
Negative Leadership × PID		-0.034 (.052)		0.072 * (.034)		0.036 (.042)		0.042 (.041)
Negative Integrity × PID		0.120 + (.074)		0.026 (.074)		-0.015 (.064)		0.123 * (.063)
Negative Empathy × PID		0.053 + (.039)		-0.030 (.051)		-0.085 * (.051)		0.060 (.055)
R ²	.734	.734	.477	.478	.555	.556	.458	.454
F Statistic	209.53 **	209.42 **	55.83 **	56.11 **	64.77 **	65.09 **	43.03 **	42.43 **
R ² Increment:								
F _{4, N-18}	1.784	1.662	0.641	1.266	0.427	1.034	4.645	3.138
p value	.130	.156	.633	.282	.789	.389	.001	.014
Number of cases	1311	1311	1058	1058	901	901	884	884

+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 1984 & 1988 NES.

For the case of Mondale there is no support for the hypothesis that party identification promotes reliance on idiographic perceptions of character weakness in a manner consistent with underlying partisan motivation. As predicted, the positive trait \times party identification terms and the R^2 increment test are insignificant. However, contrary to expectations, there is no evidence that Republicans rely more than Democrats on idiographic impressions of character weakness when evaluating Mondale. The lone significant interaction term, negative leadership \times party identification, is incorrectly signed, and the block of negative trait variables does not lead to a significant increase in explained variance.

The 1988 results also fail to support expectations. Starting with Bush, model 1 shows partisanship has no effect on the use of positive traits: the interaction coefficients and the F ratio are insignificant. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Democratic identification enhances the use of negative impressions of Bush's traits. Three of the four multiplicative terms are insignificant, the one significant term is incorrectly signed, and the F ratio for the R^2 increment test is insignificant. Hence there is no indication at the idiographic level that Democrats rely more than Republicans on negative traits when evaluating Bush.

I now turn to the Dukakis results. Model 1 reveals that empathy \times party identification is positive, highly significant, and likely responsible for the significant improvement in model fit (all other interactions are insignificant). This suggests Democrats make greater use of positive empathy than Republicans when evaluating Dukakis and thus runs counter to the expectation of no relationship. In model 2 the negative competence \times party and negative integrity \times party variables are significant and enhance model fit. These estimates imply that when evaluating Dukakis Republicans rely more on negative competence and that Democrats, surprisingly, rely more on negative integrity. Hence, the hypothesis that party identification promotes reliance on individual-level perceptions of character weakness when opposition party candidates are evaluated garners little support from the Dukakis results.

Table 6 contains estimates for the 1992 and 1996 models. For the Bush candidacy, there is limited evidence that partisanship conditions negativity bias at the idiographic level. The four positive trait \times party terms and the F ratio are insignificant, indicating partisanship does not condition reliance on positive trait impressions relative to neutral impressions. The model 2 estimates reveal a correctly signed and significant negative empathy \times partisanship interaction that helps improve model fit.

This implies Democratic identification is more strongly associated with using negative empathy impressions to construct Bush evaluations than Republican identification. However, the tendency for Democrats to rely more heavily on idiographic perceptions of character weakness does not extend to negative impressions of competence, leadership, or integrity. In other words, the evidence that Democratic partisanship strengthens the relationship between idiographic perceptions of character weakness and Bush evaluations is limited to one of four traits.

Lastly, the Clinton₉₂ and Clinton₉₆ results fail to support the idiographic hypotheses. First, for 1992 the model 1 estimates reveal three of the four positive trait \times party interactions approach or achieve significance, which is contrary to expectations, while the insignificant F ratio ($p = .244$) indicates these terms do not enhance model fit, which is as predicted. Most critically, in model 2 all of the negative trait \times party terms, as well as the F ratio, are insignificant, demonstrating that Republican partisanship does not promote reliance on individual perceptions of character weakness when Clinton is evaluated. Second, the 1996 results suggest partisanship conditions the use of positive leadership (model 1) and negative competence and integrity (model 2). These terms approach or surpass significance and, as indicated by the significant F ratios, help enhance model fit. Substantively, the results imply Republican identification leads to greater reliance on positive impressions of Clinton leadership, which is inconsistent with expectations, and greater use of negative impressions of Clinton competence and integrity, which is as expected. Overall, the results suggest the partisan opponents of a candidate do not make greater use of idiographic perceptions of character weakness than his partisan supporters when evaluating him.

Summary of Principal Findings

Overall, the results support the conclusion that when citizens evaluate incumbent presidential candidates, party identification promotes reliance on aggregate impressions of character weakness in a manner consistent with underlying partisan motivation. In the Reagan₈₄, Bush₉₂, and Clinton₉₆ models, the predicted aggregate character weakness \times party identification effect is correctly signed, statistically significant, and substantively meaningful. The empathy \times party identification variable has a significant negative effect on Reagan₈₄ and Bush₉₂ evaluations, suggesting that when incumbent Republi-

TABLE 6 Idiographic Models of Negativity Bias, 1992 and 1996 OLS Regression Estimates

	Bush ₉₂		Clinton ₉₂		Clinton ₉₆	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Constant	0.365 ** (.026)	0.381 ** (.025)	0.736 ** (.038)	0.772 ** (.032)	0.788 ** (.039)	0.712 ** (.034)
Sociotropic Assessment	0.125 ** (.024)	0.124 ** (.024)	-0.109 ** (.030)	-0.110 ** (.030)	0.097 ** (.024)	0.099 ** (.024)
Government Services	-0.014 (.022)	-0.012 (.022)	-0.035 (.028)	-0.034 (.028)	-0.235 ** (.028)	-0.230 ** (.028)
Aid to Blacks	0.004 (.016)	0.002 (.016)	-0.051 ** (.020)	-0.052 ** (.020)	0.010 (.022)	0.008 (.022)
Foreign Policy	0.137 ** (.023)	0.137 ** (.023)	-0.052 * (.028)	-0.052 * (.028)	0.000 (.028)	-0.003 (.028)
Positive Competence	0.021 (.019)	0.026 * (.014)	0.045 + (.034)	0.003 (.017)	0.020 (.032)	0.038 * (.017)
Positive Leadership	0.072 ** (.022)	0.062 ** (.012)	0.035 + (.024)	0.070 ** (.015)	0.029 + (.021)	0.054 ** (.014)
Positive Integrity	0.038 * (.018)	0.033 ** (.012)	0.037 * (.020)	0.044 ** (.015)	0.034 * (.020)	0.046 ** (.016)
Positive Empathy	0.066 ** (.024)	0.066 ** (.013)	0.084 ** (.028)	0.050 ** (.016)	0.022 (.026)	0.048 ** (.016)
Negative Competence	-0.023 (.018)	-0.014 (.023)	-0.003 (.024)	-0.065 (.058)	-0.024 (.022)	0.034 (.049)
Negative Leadership	-0.095 ** (.012)	-0.084 ** (.017)	-0.023 + (.016)	-0.040 (.032)	-0.080 ** (.016)	-0.057 * (.030)
Negative Integrity	-0.060 ** (.014)	-0.056 ** (.019)	-0.078 ** (.015)	-0.056 * (.026)	-0.047 ** (.017)	-0.021 (.024)
Negative Empathy	-0.095 (.012)	-0.133 ** (.017)	-0.031 * (.018)	-0.027 (.040)	-0.085 ** (.016)	-0.068 * (.035)
Party Identification	0.163 ** (.035)	0.134 ** (.022)	-0.140 ** (.043)	-0.188 ** (.025)	-0.281 ** (.039)	-0.107 ** (.030)
Positive Competence × PID	0.013 (.039)		-0.065 + (.048)		0.030 (.043)	
Positive Leadership × PID	-0.014 (.032)		0.069 * (.041)		0.064 + (.040)	
Positive Integrity × PID	-0.011 (.033)		0.011 (.039)		0.057 (.048)	
Positive Empathy × PID	-0.011 (.035)		-0.058 + (.043)		0.048 (.042)	
Negative Competence × PID		-0.029 (.059)		0.090 (.076)		-0.086 + (.062)
Negative Leadership × PID		-0.030 (.032)		0.024 (.045)		-0.046 (.042)
Negative Integrity × PID		-0.018 (.044)		-0.041 (.039)		-0.082 * (.042)
Negative Empathy × PID		0.104 ** (.035)		-0.005 (.055)		-0.030 (.045)
R ²	.632	.634	.501	.500	.707	.707
F Statistic	158.67 **	160.01 **	73.15 **	72.83 **	151.68 **	152.16 **
R ² Increment:						
F _{4, N-18}	0.203	2.306	1.365	0.675	4.142	4.755
p value	.937	.056	.244	.609	.002	.001
Number of cases	1589	1589	1256	1256	1089	1089

+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 1992 & 1996 NES.

can presidents are viewed as possessing some character flaw, Democrats rely more heavily than Republicans on such impressions when constructing candidate evaluations. The positive and significant integrity \times party identification effect in the Clinton₉₆ model suggests that when Republicans perceive a Democratic incumbent as lacking in some aspect of character, they make greater use of these perceptions to evaluate him than do his Democratic allies. Finally, all remaining trait \times party identification terms are insignificant, demonstrating that partisanship does not promote other types of trait-based evaluation of incumbent candidates.

Next, there is limited support for the claim that partisanship promotes reliance on aggregate impressions of character weakness when nonincumbents are evaluated. The character weakness \times party identification effect is present in the Clinton₉₂ model, which implies Republicans utilize impressions of integrity more readily than Democrats in constructing Clinton₉₂ evaluations. The first Clinton campaign was marred from its inception by allegations of personal misconduct, which suggests that opposition party partisans focus on the character flaw of a nonincumbent when relevant information is highly salient early in the campaign. Furthermore, the null results for the Bush₈₈ model demonstrate that when a candidate lacks a readily identifiable character weakness, there is no propensity for party identification to promote trait-based evaluation. However, the failure of the character weakness \times partisanship effect to appear in the Mondale₈₄ and Dukakis₈₈ models suggests the partisan motivation to construct evaluations rooted in aggregate perceptions of character weakness does not extend to all candidates. Finally, as predicted, there is little support for the inference that party identification promotes trait-based evaluation of nonincumbents more generally. At the broadest level, then, it seems reasonable to conclude that partisan motivation promotes reliance on aggregate perceptions of character weakness when citizens evaluate presidential incumbents and, more suggestively, that partisan motivation may have this effect under sufficiently stimulating circumstances for nonincumbent candidates.

Finally, there is no support for the hypothesis that party identification promotes the use of idiographic impressions of character weakness when opposition party candidates are evaluated. This prediction receives support from the Bush₉₂ model, although the effect occurs for only one of the four traits (negative empathy). Estimates from the other models demonstrate that party identification does not systematically moderate the impact idiographic impressions of character weakness have on candidate evaluations.

Conclusions and Implications

This article integrates insights from theories of negativity bias and motivated reasoning to explain how and why party identification should influence the relationship between impressions of character weakness and evaluations of presidential candidates. I argue that partisans are motivated to generate negative evaluations of opposition party candidates and look for cues that enable them to do so in a seemingly rational and objective manner. Given that impressions of character weakness are highly salient to a presidential candidate's partisan opponents, these individuals should rely more heavily on such impressions, at both the aggregate and idiographic level, than the candidate's partisan supporters when evaluating him.

The empirical results are partly consistent with theoretical expectations. More precisely, the results suggest that Democratic identifiers make greater use of aggregate impressions of character weakness than Republicans in evaluating Republican incumbents, and that Republican identifiers rely more heavily on aggregate impressions of character weakness than Democrats when evaluating Democratic presidents. Thus, Democrats rely more heavily than Republicans on impressions of character weakness when evaluating Reagan and Bush in 1984 and 1992, respectively, while Republicans rely more than Democrats on impressions of character weakness when evaluating Clinton in 1996. Next, the Clinton₉₂ results suggest that if a candidate's public image is crystallized early enough in the campaign season, partisanship can affect the relationship between aggregate-level impressions of character weakness and the evaluations of nonincumbent candidates. Finally, contrary to expectations, the evidence indicates party identification does not strengthen the relationship between idiographic impressions of character weakness and candidate evaluations.

When evaluating a presidential candidate, opposition party identifiers may rely more on aggregate perceptions of character weakness than the candidate's partisan supporters; however, the relationship between character weakness and candidate evaluations does not operate at the idiographic level. What are the implications of this? The null results from the idiographic models imply partisans do not automatically translate perceptions of character weakness into evaluations. Instead, they may respond to targeted cues generated by party leaders. Just as party elites signal party positions on various issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Gerber and Jackson 1993; Jacoby 1988), they signal how citizens should assess the opposition party's presidential nominee. This can be

more easily accomplished by focusing on a single negative trait that fits extant public perceptions of a given candidate's personality profile than by making more detailed arguments about why the candidate lacks competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy. In short, party elites can highlight the principal character flaw of the opposition party nominee and their co-partisans in the electorate learn to rely heavily on impressions of this trait when evaluating the nominee.

The findings reported here have some broader implications for the study of public opinion and electoral behavior. First, the findings suggest party identification affects political judgment more subtly than by directly coloring it. This strongly attests to the biasing nature of

party identification in a manner that has been understudied (but see Jacoby 1988 and Zaller 1992) while highlighting the continuing salience of partisan ties in contemporary mass publics (see also Bartels 2000). Second, the results suggest we can begin to develop a framework for understanding how and why the effects of impressions of presidential character on candidate evaluations vary across citizens, vary within and across presidential candidates in a given campaign season, and vary across presidential candidates over time. Impressions of presidential character influence how candidates are evaluated and, by extension, how voters decide, and future research should seek to clarify the conditions under which the effects of character wax and wane.

APPENDIX Trimmed Aggregate Models of Negativity Bias, OLS Regression Estimates

	Reagan ₈₄	Bush ₉₂	Clinton ₉₂	Clinton ₉₆
Constant	-0.125 ** (.018)	-0.027 + (.020)	0.487 ** (.038)	0.425 ** (.029)
Sociotropic Assessment	0.114 ** (.020)	0.115 ** (.023)	-0.090 ** (.029)	0.075 ** (.021)
Government Services	0.053 ** (.022)	-0.011 (.021)	-0.021 (.027)	-0.156 ** (.025)
Aid to Blacks	0.055 ** (.018)	-0.006 (.016)	-0.050 ** (.020)	0.015 (.019)
Foreign Policy	0.095 ** (.021)	0.089 ** (.023)	-0.057 * (.027)	-0.017 (.025)
Competence	0.094 ** (.021)	0.043 * (.026)	-0.041 + (.032)	0.005 (.024)
Leadership	0.183 ** (.024)	0.306 ** (.024)	0.195 ** (.032)	0.253 ** (.027)
Integrity	0.145 ** (.027)	0.122 ** (.024)	0.159 ** (.049)	0.114 ** (.034)
Empathy	0.474 ** (.033)	0.352 ** (.034)	0.261 ** (.056)	0.201 ** (.027)
Party Identification	0.325 ** (.032)	0.222 ** (.028)	-0.152 ** (.046)	-0.274 ** (.025)
Integrity × Party Identification			0.179 * (.081)	0.360 ** (.050)
Empathy × Party Identification	-0.325 ** (.047)	-0.129 ** (.048)	-0.188 * (.086)	
R ²	.747	.655	.532	.762
F Statistic	384.744 **	299.747 **	128.584 **	344.329 **
R ² Increment:				
F _{k2-k1, N-k-1}	47.252	7.274	2.894	52.353
p value	.000	.007	.056	.000
Number of cases	1311	1589	1256	1089

+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.

Standard errors in parentheses.

Source: 1984, 1992, & 1996 NES.

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