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**Abstract:** This paper explores whether and why foreign-imposed regime change (FIRC) makes civil war more likely. It proposes that FIRC makes civil war more likely by changing state power, namely wrecking the state's ability to police and to distribute goods and services, and by introducing the most provocative form of state power, foreign occupation troops.

Empirical analysis uses rare event logit to examine the outbreak of civil war in all states from 1920-2004. Several control variables are included, such as democratization, ethnic divisions, and economic development. Results indicate that only FIRC which overthrows the leadership and follows interstate war make civil war more likely, offering support for the state power theory. The magnitude of the effect of FIRC on civil war onset is quite large, increasing the likelihood by eightfold. The findings show that FIRC does not make civil war more likely by creating disgruntled ex-leaders, or by changing political institutions.



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The overthrow of a troublesome leadership by force presents very real attractions to potential attackers. Such action promises to neuter decisively a lingering interstate military threat by ousting the regime itself, replacing it with a more docile successor. Twentieth century history seems to offer strong support for the promise of foreign imposed regime change as a means of reducing international threat. The replacement of militarist regimes in Japan, Germany, and Italy after World War II were the key actions transforming those states from war-prone aggressors into peaceful democracies. The lure of foreign imposed regime change (FIRC) attracted the American invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003. Indeed, the 2002 National Security Strategy, also known as the Bush Doctrine, allows for preventive attacks with the aim of FIRC as a means of safeguarding American national security (AUTHOR).

However, the effects of FIRC on interstate relations constitute only part of the story. What effects do FIRCs have on intrastate violence? Scholars have yet to explore the possible relationship between FIRC, the most earth-shattering domestic political event a country can experience, and the onset of civil war. Exploring this relationship is critical, as FIRC is closely connected to the kinds of political factors, which scholars have long connected to civil war onset. On the policy side, it is critical to know whether removing a rogue regime carries the costs of substantially increasing internal turmoil.

This paper proposes that FIRCs following interstate wars make civil wars more likely because they wreck state power. Scholars have long understood that state power plays a critical factor in affecting the likelihood of civil war onset. Some have argued that higher state power can make civil war less likely, because greater state power permits more effective deterrence of insurgents, and greater ability to deliver resources to the population. Conversely, some argue that higher state power can make civil war more likely, because a more intrusive, penetrating

state can provoke a population to violence. FIRC produces the worst of both worlds. FIRC following interstate wars produce great damage to a target's administrative and economic capacity, including in particular its ability to maintain internal stability and distribute goods and services to the population. However, FIRC are also followed by foreign occupation, the event most likely to produce violent counterreaction from the general population.

This proposal is tested on a data set of civil war onset among all states from 1920-2004, using rare event logit regression and including an array of control variables. The analysis permits the examination of the state power thesis. It also permits analysis of two other speculations as to why FIRC makes civil war onset more likely, that after FIRC deposed leaders may launch an insurgency to recapture power, and that FIRC may change the target's political institutions, which in turn may make civil war onset more likely.

Empirical analysis reveals strong support for the state power conjecture. FIRC following interstate wars increase the likelihood of civil war onset by eight times, an effect much larger than that of any other independent variable. The evidence does not offer strong support for the other two speculations on why FIRC makes civil war more likely. If FIRC made civil war more likely because deposed leaders resorted to violence, then all FIRC, not just those following interstate war, would make civil war more likely. But they do not. Further, we found that when external actors impose political institutional changes on a target state, civil war does not become more likely.

The paper makes three contributions to our understandings of FIRC and civil war. It demonstrates that a full understanding of the causes of civil war onset must account for state power in general and FIRC in particular. In addition, it sheds light on FIRC more generally: FIRC destroys state power, and wrecked state power makes a state less likely to initiate interstate

violence and more likely to experience internal violence. Last, it casts doubt on the attractiveness of FIRC as a policy tool. Policy-makers may be less willing to use FIRC knowing that it substantially increases the chances of civil war.

### **Foreign Imposed Regime Change and Civil War Onset**

The term “regime” has been used by scholars sometimes to refer to a leader (or set of leaders) (eg Bueno de Mesquita et al 1992; Werner 1996) and sometimes to refer to political institutions (eg Geddes 1999, Way 2005). Foreign imposed regime change, therefore, can mean an externally imposed change in either leaders or political institutions, though in practice it is often both. In both the theoretical discussion and the empirical analyses, we distinguish between foreign imposed leadership change and foreign imposed institutional change.

States sometimes use FIRC as a foreign policy tool. Some 38 foreign imposed leadership changes have occurred since 1920 (Goemans et al 2009), and by another count over the 1816-1980 period there were 26 foreign imposed leadership changes which occurred as part of an interstate war outcome (Werner 1996). Sometimes, a FIRC is the end result of an interstate war, such as the imposition of FIRC on Germany and Japan in 1945. In other instances, violence or international pressure short of interstate war, such as the lesser use of force or covert action, can result in FIRC, such as the American invasions of Grenada and Panama in 1983 and 1989, respectively.

In all contexts, two conditions are necessary for the imposition of FIRC. First, an outside actor, usually a state or coalition of states, must wish to impose regime change on a target state. Regime change is often imposed to remove an interstate threat. A state may fear that its

adversary is implacably hostile and untrustworthy. Regime change is seen as one brutal solution to this problem, replacing the dangerous older regime with a puppet regime or democratically elected leaders. In addition to removing interstate threats, FIRC can also be a means to advance foreign economic interests and spread ideology. Second, a potential imposer must have the capability to impose regime change. Some states simply do not have the military or covert intelligence capability to impose regime change on a target, regardless of how noxious they find the politics of the target's leadership (on causes of FIRC, see AUTHOR; Werner 1996; Morrow et al 2006; Owen 2002).

The evidence strongly indicates that FIRC greatly reduces interstate threats and the chances of interstate conflict (AUTHOR; Werner 1999; see also Enterline and Grieg 2005). However, what are the domestic political consequences for FIRC? Though FIRC may tame a war-mongering state, does it also allow for the establishment of domestic liberty and/or stability? As to the former goal of liberty, earlier work was more hopeful that intervention could spread democracy (Meernik 1996, Peceny 1999), but more recent studies are more doubtful (Enterline and Grieg 2005, 2008a; Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006; Easterly et al 2008).

As to the latter goal of stability, FIRCs may make civil war onset likely because of its effect on state power. The relevance of the "state" for the study of comparative politics has, of course, been a matter of great debate in recent decades. In the 1980s in particular, some pushed back against the abandonment of the concept of the state, moving to bring the state back in to scholarly analysis (Evans et al 1985). International relations scholars have also stressed the importance of state power. Some have argued that a nation-state's power is determined not just

by the size of its population, resources, and economy, but also by the ability of the state to extract resources from society (Organski and Kugler 1980; see also Kugler and Domke 1986).<sup>1</sup>

However, these literatures are generally concerned with questions such as political economy and effectiveness in fighting interstate wars, different from the central question here, the causes of internal violence. In this context, power is the state's ability to exercise control and autonomy over its society and territory (Mann 1988). It includes what Michael Mann (1988, 5) referred to as infrastructural power, the "capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and implement logistically political decisions throughout" the country. In application, scholars have explored many dimensions of infrastructural power, including the brute police and paramilitary capabilities necessary to crush insurgents, the ability to collect taxes, the creation of a national identity through education and other means, the construction of national physical infrastructure such as roads, and so on (Soifer 2008b; Goodwin 2001).

Scholars have speculated that greater state power can either increase or decrease civil violence (Lange and Balian 2008). On one hand, some have proposed that greater state power will reduce civil violence. Indeed, many see state power at its most essential as the ability to wield force to deter potential insurgents and to maintain order (Gurr and Duvall 1973; Herbst 2000). Thinkers as far back as Thomas Hobbes (1994) have recognized that the *raison d'être* of the state is to maintain order within society and prevent violence. More powerful states have greater abilities to use force to crush extralegal or violent protests through the use of police forces, internal security services, militia, or regular armed forces, and to compel the population to comply with anti-insurgency campaigns (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Kalyvas 2006; Goodwin

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<sup>1</sup> The use of state power to prevent internal conflict can be folded into the larger concept of state capacity, which is the ability of states to "implement official goals" (Skocpol 1985, 9)

2001). In Latin America, Chile's greater state power under Augusto Pinochet enabled it to maintain a firm grip on society and prevent the emergence of any violent insurgency. Conversely, the weaker state in Peru left it vulnerable to the appearance of the Shining Path Marxist insurgency (Soifer 2008a). Policing aside, power can also be the ability to distribute goods and services to the population, which can be used as a means of increasing popular support for the regime and undermining support for potential insurgents. Put differently, greater state power can improve popular welfare and undermine civil-war causing dissatisfaction. The role of state power cuts across the conventional greed and grievance categories, as state power permits the deterrence of greedy actors, and undermines grievance by spreading goods and services (on greed, grievance, and civil war, see Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Thyne 2006; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Conversely, some have predicted that greater infrastructural power can make civil war onset more likely. The state in its attempts to establish direct rule throughout the country can instead inspire resistance to state-directed actions such as taxation, regulation, and conscription. This is Charles Tilly's (1964) explanation of the Vendée counterrevolution in Western France in 1793, for example. In his study of nationalism, Michael Hechter (2000) argued that as a state embraces more centralized approaches to the control of subsidiary political units in its territory, subnational groups become more prone to violent, nationalist resistance. Robert Pape (2005) argued that perceived occupation by democracies increases suicide terrorism, though the empirical evidence on this claim is mixed (AUTHOR; Piazza 2008).

The existing quantitative findings on whether various measures of state power affect the likelihood of internal violence is thin and mixed. Many studies have found that higher levels of development are negatively correlated with civil war onset, arguing that higher development

undermines civil war-causing grievance (eg Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Fearon and Laitin (2003) proposed that development prevents civil war because it strengthens state power, which in turn prevents civil war. Fearon and Laitin also argued that states with less mountainous geography are better able to penetrate the extent of their national territories, and hence are more powerful and less likely to experience civil war onset. They found that mountains are positively correlated with civil war onset, but other studies found no relationship (Lange and Balian 2008; Thyne 2006). Lai and Slater (2006) found that military regimes are more likely to initiate military disputes, proposing that this is because military regimes have lesser infrastructural power and hence need to initiate external conflict in order to stave off internal political threats.

To recap, there are two theoretical accounts which offer different explanations for the connection between state power and civil war onset: that state power can overpower and coopt population support for the insurgents, and that state power can provoke insurgent violence. Lange and Balian (2008) proposed that neither effect generally dominates, as sometimes state power dampens internal conflict, and sometimes it provokes internal violence. We propose that FIRC is in some sense the worst of both worlds, in that the way in which it expands state power provokes insurgent violence, and the way in which it undermines state power reduces the state's ability to overpower insurgents and coopt the population. Regarding provoking insurgent violence, FIRC is often accompanied by the presence of foreign occupation troops, especially in the wake of interstate war. The FIRC imposers' troops are present on the territory in the wake of conventional combat operations, and often remain there for an extended period of time to administer the territory and perhaps provide direct support to the imposed puppet regime. The presence of foreign troops and the firm hand of foreign control may be more likely to inspire

violent resistance than would the attempt of a native government to extend its control throughout the territory.

Regarding the degradation of state power, FIRC, especially one following an interstate war, may wreak havoc on a state's ability to administer its territory, to provide conventional police functions, to collect information on potential insurgents, and to administer goods and services to the population. Narrowly speaking FIRC only necessarily changes a state's leaders and/or institutions, and not its bureaucracy, administrative apparatus, or internal security/police forces. However, in practice, FIRCs, especially those following interstate wars, overturn state power as well as leaders and political institutions. Certainly, scholars have long recognized that fighting and especially losing an exhausting war can make a state vulnerable to internal upheaval. This is perhaps the central argument of Theda Skocpol's (1979, esp. 285) foundational work, that defeat in war is one of the critical events which can undermine state power and spark revolution. Jeff Goodwin (2001, 13) described the inextricable links between state and regime: "The distinction between state and regime can become quite blurred in the real world. This happens the more that states and regimes interpenetrate each other, as when the armed forces (a key component of the state) directly wield executive power, or when a one-party regime penetrates key state organizations, or when important state officials are the personal clients of a powerful monarch or dictator, sultanistic or otherwise. In these instances, the fate of both the state and regime tend to become fused; if for whatever reason the regime collapses, it may bring the state down with it."

More specifically, a FIRC may destroy a state's military and paramilitary capabilities. A FIRC may come on the heels of the destruction of the FIRC target's military in war, and states sometime use their (regular) militaries to deter or combat insurgents (Andreski 1980). Combat

aside, after a FIRC, the imposer may dismantle the target's internal security forces as a means of preventing it from posing a threat to the puppet regime or to the occupation forces. Though actions such as these may reduce more regular threats posed by remnants of the former state to the imposer, they also weaken the ability of the target state to combat substate insurgents. This was the American experience in Iraq, as its decision to disband the Iraqi regular army in 2003 after Baghdad was captured undermined the ability of the Iraqi state to maintain order and deter and combat insurgents (Ricks 2006; Diamond 2005).

FIRC can also undermine a state's bureaucratic and administrative power. A FIRC following the end of interstate war is usually accompanied by the substantial destruction of the target state's physical infrastructure, either through unintended damage of conventional combat operations, because installations such as bridges and power-plants were directly targeted by the attacker, or because a retreating defender embraced a scorched earth policy. More specifically, total military loss usually accompanying a post-war FIRC often means heavy damage to and occupation of the national capital. Heavy destruction in the capital city can be especially damaging to infrastructural power, given the central importance of the national capital towards the administration of all national governmental functions, including policing functions and the distribution of goods and services to the population (Herbst 2000; Tilly and Blockmans 1994). Relatedly, a FIRC imposer may purge members of the target state's bureaucracy who are politically suspect, especially to facilitate war crimes trials. This may undermine infrastructural power, as those bureaucrats may also have expert knowledge in implementing critical functions of the state. For example, when the US in May 2003 ordered that former Baath Party members be banned from holding public sector positions in the Iraqi government, this had the effect of removing from administrative power various ministry employees with experience in carrying out

critical governing functions such as providing electricity and water to the population. The inability to provide basic services to the government incubated widespread grievance (Ricks 2003, 159-60; Diamond 2005).

Some might posit that the victorious occupiers can fill the state power void left by a postwar FIRC, and take over the policing and goods and services provision functions necessary to prevent internal conflict. However, occupiers themselves are often ill-equipped to fulfill these functions (Edelstein 2008). This was of course the unfortunate American experience in Iraq after 2003, as American forces and personnel were unable to fill the gaps created by de-Baathification and the disbanding of the Iraqi army (Ricks 2006). Brutal conquerors can sometimes maintain order with a threat that citizens either work or starve (Lieberman 1996). However, not all conquerors are morally prepared to embrace such awful measures, and sometimes even with the requisite will a conqueror cannot make a credible threat to starve out the population (if the population is agrarian and self-sufficient, for example). A regime as brutal as Nazi Germany was unable to prevent civil war-scale violence in occupied Yugoslavia during World War II, for example (Bailey 1978).

In sum, the state power theory proposes that FIRCs following interstate wars are especially likely to provoke civil war, because they both undermine policing and goods-provision functions and provoke societal counter-reaction.

*Hypothesis 1: States experiencing foreign imposed regime change following interstate wars are more likely to experience civil war onset than states experiencing foreign imposed regime change in other contexts, and states not experiencing foreign imposed regime change.*

State power aside, there are two other means by which FIRC might make civil war more likely. Following a FIRC, the deposed leaders might initiate an insurgency to recapture political

power. One model of governance speculates that leaders come to and stay in power with the support of a winning coalition, and autocratic leaders pay for this support by providing private goods to their supporters (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). If the leader is thrown from power from without, the former supporters of the leader lose the private goods they had been receiving, and may take up arms to reestablish the old leader and recapture these payments.

One reply might be that such actors are unlikely to take such actions in the aftermath of a FIRC, as FIRC often follows a severe military defeat. Such a defeat would provide credible information about the balance of power, that the target state cannot defeat the attacker, and so in turn the remnants of the regime would be deterred from launching a war they know they would go on to lose (Werner 1999). There are good reasons to suspect, however, that the information provided by interstate war might not shed much light on the possible outcome of a civil war. The interstate war may have been conventional, meaning that most fighting was between regular military units on fixed battlefields employing conventional military tactics, whereas the civil war promises to be unconventional, with lightly armed bands of guerrillas floating through the population employing less conventional tactics like sniping, suicide attacks, mining, and hit and run strikes. Relatedly, the political-military strategy in the civil war phase might be different, aiming simply to inflict high casualties on the occupying forces rather than seize or defend territory. Information revealed in the interstate war phase about the ability to capture territory may not shed much light on the ability of insurgents to impose costs, or on the victor to accept costs before making concessions. The 2001 Afghanistan and 2003 Iraq Wars exemplify this pattern. US military power was easily sufficient to win the conventional, interstate phase of conflict, but was much less successful in prosecuting the post-interstate war, insurgency phase. In the Iraq case in particular American political leaders vastly underestimated the difficulty of

detering and defeating insurgency (Ricks 2006). The Vietnam War also demonstrates this pattern, albeit in a broader way. The US assumed in the middle 1960s that the conflict would be a World War II-style conventional conflict. Their confidence proved to be misplaced as North Vietnam and the Vietcong were able to instead wage a less conventional, guerrilla campaign (Krepinevich 1986). Military strategy asymmetries aside, the civil war may be launched by remnants of the old regime insufficiently informed as to the outcome of the interstate war. Lower level military commanders and units may not have been privy to all of the combat outcomes during the interstate war, and hence may not have a sufficiently pessimistic understanding of the balance of power. These groups may have viewed a surrender preceding the FIRC to be premature and unjustified, and wish to carry on the fight with the (ill-informed) hope of ultimately prevailing.

The main theme of this theoretical strand is that any time a leader is deposed from without, civil war becomes more likely. That is, civil war should become more likely whether or not the leader is deposed in the wake of an interstate war.

*Hypothesis 2: States experiencing foreign imposed regime change are more likely to experience civil war onset than states not experiencing foreign imposed regime change.*

A second alternative theoretical connection between FIRC and civil war onset concerns political institutions. FIRC may overturn old institutions and impose new political institutions, which may make civil war more likely (Enterline and Greig 2008b), for three related reasons. New political institutions likely mean different processes of allocating goods within the state, and thereby different goods allocations. If new institutions emerge organically, then they may reflect changes in preferences of and balance of power between different substate groups. Under these circumstances, new institutions are more likely to be accepted by society because they

reflect new alignments of preference and power. However, imposed institutions are less likely to reflect bargains reached among substate actors. As a result, such imposed arrangements may give some substate factions incentive to engage in violent resistance.

Second, new institutions may make political competition violent. Institutions create regular, non-violent guidelines for political competition. New institutions following FIRC may lack political legitimacy, and substate actors may doubt that these new institutions will endure. As a result, they may instead resort to violence as a means of political behavior. The proposition that in general weak political institutions make civil war more likely is long established (Huntington 1968). Relatedly, new states by definition have new political institutions, and at their infancy such institutions may be ill-equipped either at containing violent nationalism, or at providing the state sufficient resources to deter insurgency. Studies have found that new states are more prone to civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Third, FIRCs may also be followed by attempts to impose democracy (Tilly 2004, 24). Empirical studies have found that in general democratization makes civil war onset more likely because it necessarily means the weakening or erasure of authoritarian political institutions like one party states, replacing them with new and immature democratic institutions, such as regular elections and party competition. Several studies have found empirical support for the proposition that in general democratization makes civil war more likely (Hegre et al 2001; Snyder 2000; Snyder and Mansfield 2007; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). Somewhat relatedly, other scholars have proposed that regimes with both democratic and autocratic characteristics (sometimes called mixed regimes or anocracies) are less institutionally stable, and are more prone to civil war. Such regimes are generally less enduring than dictatorships or democracies, and may be sufficiently repressive to invite violent opposition, but do not have the coercive tools

to deter any challenges. Some studies have found that such regimes are more prone to civil wars (Hegre et al 2001; Henderson 2002; Mousseau 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003), though one study with a more sophisticated measure of anocracy could not find evidence supporting this relationship (Vreeland 2008).

This focus on institutions generates the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3: States experiencing foreign imposed regime changes which change the cause changes in the states' domestic political institutions are more likely to experience civil war onset than are states not experiencing such changes.*

## **Research Design**

To test these hypotheses, we adopt a cross-sectional time-series research design in which the country-year is the unit of observation. We build on Fearon and Laitin's (2003) data set, extending its 1945-1999 temporal range forward as well as backward, so that our analysis covers all Correlates of War members of the interstate system from 1920 to 2004.

The dependent variable is binary and denotes onset of civil war in a particular country year. For the post-1945 period, our list of civil wars is based on the operational definition of Fearon and Laitin (2003). According to this definition, an armed conflict must meet the following three criteria in order to be included in the list: "(1) [it] involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of the government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government

policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels)” (76).<sup>2</sup>

### Central Explanatory Variables

The main explanatory variable indicates whether a foreign imposed regime change has occurred in the past 5 years. Foreign imposed regime change occurs whenever (i) the supreme political leader of a country has been deposed by a foreign power; and/or (ii) another person assumes that position with external assistance. The leadership change data is taken from Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza’s (2009) Archigos data set, which provides information on the manner in which state leaders have assumed or stepped down from power. Specifically, we are interested in exit codings of “deposed by another state.” From 1920 to 2004, there were 38 episodes of a leader being deposed by another state.<sup>3</sup> They are listed in Table 1.

[Table 1 about here]

We include three categorical variables to test our hypotheses. The first is coded 1 if a state experienced FIRC after losing an interstate war, 0 otherwise. The second is coded 1 if a

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<sup>2</sup> Our 1920-1945 list of civil wars is congruent with the COW list of civil wars with the following exceptions. We drop Bulgaria 1923, El Salvador 1932, and Austria 1934. We add Russia 1921. We also follow Fearon and Laitin and code the Greek Civil War as starting in 1945 rather than 1944. Our post-1999 civil wars include Guinea 2000, Liberia 2000, Ivory Coast 2002, Sudan 2003, Afghanistan 2003, Iraq 2004, Pakistan 2004, and Thailand 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Note that we code the effect of FIRC over a 5 year window, so we also looked at FIRCs in the 1915-1919 period. We included two other relevant FIRCs from this period, Greece 1917 and Albania 1916. We did not include the 1917 or 1918 Belgium FIRCs as indicated by Archigos, as they concerned change in who governed the occupied territories of Belgium, though the Belgian government was still recognized as the national leadership.

state experienced FIRC but not after losing an interstate war, 0 otherwise. The third is coded 1 if a state lost a war but not did experience a FIRC, 0 otherwise. Note that the excluded category is no FIRC, no lost war. We used the AUTHOR data on interstate war participation, which contains very slight refinements of the Correlates of War data.<sup>4</sup>

To code foreign imposed institutional change, we use the Polity IIIId ORIG variables, originally created for Polity II, and modified by Enterline and Greig (2008b).<sup>5</sup> Those variables measure the external imposition of a new polity, either at a state's birth or after its birth. ORIG considers there to be polity change if there was change in any of a state's codings along the six Polity dimensions of political institutions. The cases of imposed political institutions over this period includes episodes when a polity was imposed in the wake of interstate war (such as post-World War II Germany), episodes when a polity was imposed by the use of covert means (such as Chile 1974), and episodes when the shape of a new state's polity was determined at least in part by other countries (such as Ireland in 1922). Both the leader change and institutional change variables are lagged by one year to reduce the possibility of endogeneity—civil war leading to FIRC rather than vice versa. Each variable is coded 1 for the five years following a leader change/institutional change, and 0 otherwise, recognizing that the civil war-causing effects of a FIRC may linger for a few years past the event. We explore codings using time periods other than five years in the results section.

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<sup>4</sup> There are a very small handful of cases in which a state lost an interstate a war, did not immediately suffer a FIRC, but then suffered a FIRC soon after (within the next five years). France in the early 1940s is one example. If the FIRC war and FIRC non war variables are recoded such that the FIRC war variable is coded 1 if a state suffers a FIRC for any reason during the five years following a loss in an interstate war, the results do not change.

<sup>5</sup> Note that we cannot use Owen's (2002) data set, because he includes both successful and unsuccessful attempts at the foreign imposition of institutions.

## Control Variables

We include other variables, both because they are standard controls included in other studies of civil war onset, and because many of these variables fit under the theoretical aegis of the state power, institutions, or disgruntled ex-leader explanations. Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that per capita income, population size, previous war, oil, mountainous terrain, new state, instability, non-contiguity, anocracy, democracy, and ethnic fractionalization are at least close to being statistically significantly related to the likelihood of civil war onset. We include all of them in our statistical model, except for oil, for which there are missing data in the pre-1945 period.

GDP per Capita and Population Size. Higher development may make civil war less likely both because it increases state power (Fearon and Laitin 2003), and because it reduces popular grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Data on per capita income is taken from a variety of sources such as the World Bank's World Development Indicators, Conference Board's Total Economy Database, Angus Maddison's Historical Statistics for the World Economy, Penn World Tables (version 6.2), and the COW energy consumption data.<sup>6</sup> Country population size is obtained from the World Development Indicators database and the Penn World Tables.

Regime Type and New State. Following Fearon and Laitin (2003), to distinguish between regime types we refer to the Polity IVd data set, which indicates on an index of -10 to 10 the level of

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<sup>6</sup> Inflation conversion factors are employed where necessary.

democracy of a given country in a particular year.<sup>7</sup> We code states as either being autocracies, anocracies (mixed regimes), or democracies. To avoid falsifiability problems, we follow Vreeland (2008) by correcting the Polity measure of regime type, taking out elements of Polity which themselves measure internal violence.

Polity does not have data for the crucial cases of Afghanistan and Iraq following the FIRC's there in 2001 and 2003. We resolve this by using Freedom House evaluations. Thus, to approximate their regime types, we designate "Not Free" as equal to autocracy, while "Partially Free" and "Free" correspond to anocracy and democracy, respectively.

The new state variable is coded 1 if the country appears for the first time in a given year according to COW system membership data, 0 otherwise.

Democratization. We have three measures of democratization: moving from autocracy to anocracy, moving from autocracy to democracy, and moving from anocracy to democracy. We use the Vreeland (2008) corrections to the Polity data for this variable.

Mountainous Terrain, Non-contiguity, and Ethnic Fractionalization. For Fearon and Laitin (2003), mountains are a measure of the roughness of terrain. This variable has been coded by geographer A. J. Gerard and indicates percentage of total territory which has mountainous terrain. Further, a country is coded as non-contiguous—1 for this dichotomous variable-- when it possesses territory "holding at least 10,000 people and separated from the land area containing the capital city either by land or 100km of water" (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81n). Non-contiguity may make it easier for insurgents to build power out of the reach of the state. Finally, ethno-

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<sup>7</sup> Available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> <downloaded October 20, 2008>.

linguistic fractionalization (ELF) scores indicate the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a society belong to different ethnic groups. The variable is obtained from the Soviet *Atlas Narodov Mira* (1964).<sup>8</sup>

## Statistical Method

Because the dependent variable is dichotomous, we use logit regression. We use rare event logit because the dependent variable is skewed, with more than 98% zeroes (King and Zeng 2001). Following Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Vreeland (2008), we use a lagged war variable on the right hand side.

## Results

There were five civil wars which followed within five years of a FIRC: Greece 1945, Uganda 1981, Afghanistan 2003, Iraq 2004, and Indonesia 1949. Of these, all but the last occurred following an interstate war.<sup>9</sup> A first cut reveals that FIRCs following interstate wars seem to be highly correlated with civil war onset. Across the 8920 country years in the data set, there is civil war onset in 146 of those cases, about 1.7%. In comparison, across the 56 country years in which the FIRC interstate war variable is coded 1 (a country year is coded 1 for the FIRC interstate war variable for the five years following an interstate war FIRC), there are 4 civil

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<sup>8</sup> Cederman and Girardin (2007) provide an alternate measure of ethnicity. However, data on this measure are limited to Eurasia and North Africa only, and to 1945-1999. For a critique of this measure, see Fearon et al (2007).

<sup>9</sup> Indonesia is arguably an exception that proves the rule, as that civil war did not follow an interstate war, but did follow an extrasystemic war, according to COW.

war onsets, about 7.1%. Civil war onset, then, is about four times more frequent during these five year windows following an interstate war FIRC than they are across the entire data set.

Table 2 presents our multivariate regression results.

[Table 2 about here]

Model 1 uses Archigos data on foreign imposed leadership change. Model 1 includes the three categorical variables of interest, FIRC/Lose War, FIRC/No Lose War, and No FIRC/Lose War. Among these three variables, only FIRC/Lose War is statistically significant, and it is positive as predicted. The institutional dummy variables for anocracy and democracy are statistically insignificant. Among the three democratization variables, all are insignificant except for the anocracy to democracy variable. This last finding is in contrast to the speculation by some that incomplete democratization, the move from autocracy to anocracy, is more likely to be destabilizing than the move from anocracy to democracy or autocracy to democracy (Snyder 2000; Snyder and Mansfield 2007).

These results offer support for the conjecture that FIRCs make civil wars more likely because they wreck state power, rather than because they create disgruntled ex-leaders or change political institutions. If civil wars were becoming more likely because of disgruntled ex-leaders, then FIRC/No Lose War should also make civil wars more likely, but they do not. Further analysis reveals that the difference between the FIRC/Lose War and FIRC/No Lose War coefficients is statistically significant. We also conducted analysis of whether leadership change in general (that is, leadership change which is foreign imposed as well as other forms of leadership change) made civil war onset more likely, but such a variable was insignificant. The finding that leadership change in general, even through extra-legal means such as non-war FIRC,

does not increase the chances for internal violence is consistent with the Iqbal and Zorn (2008) result that leadership assassinations do not increase the chances of civil war onset.

Wrecking state power is a key part of the FIRC-civil war relationship. Civil war becomes more likely following an interstate war FIRC, but not after non war FIRCs. This is because interstate war FIRCs destroy state power, and the ability of the state to deter, coopt, and combat insurgents. The results for the control variables confirm the importance of state power. Higher levels of development make civil war less likely, and development is likely positively correlated with state power. Further, mountainous terrain makes civil war more likely, and mountains undermine state power and specifically the ability of the state to reach into and control all regions of the country (infrastructural power). New states are likely to be less powerful over their societies because of underdeveloped administrative bureaucracies and physical infrastructures, and they are also more likely to experience civil war.

Some might speculate that it is the fighting of war rather than the losing of war which makes civil war onset more likely (for a related argument, see Young 2008). To explore this possibility, we reran the analysis with an additional control variable for war participation, coded as 1 if the state participated in an interstate war within the last five years, and 0 otherwise. This variable was not significant and did not change the other findings (results not shown). This indicates that it is the experience of losing a war and suffering a FIRC, not just fighting a war, which is critical. Note that no states won or drew a war and then also suffered a FIRC.

We next tried a different independent variable, the Enterline/Greig imposed institutional change variable derived from Polity. Note that data limitations mean these analyses go only from 1920 to 1994. We were unable to generate results with comparable categorical variables as we used in Model 1, as there were no cases in which a state suffered imposed institutional

change following an interstate war, and then experienced civil war within five years. Further, in only two of all of the 78 (for Polity codings, 63 for COW codings) episodes of imposed political institutional change were followed by civil wars within 5 years, Chad 1965 and Mozambique 1976. We were able to produce results with a simpler specification, including Lose War and Institutions-FIRC as separate independent variables. These results are provided in Model 2 of Table 2. The Institutions-FIRC variable is statistically insignificant. These results were produced with the Polity codings for the imposed institutional change data from Enterline and Greig. If we instead use their COW codings for these data, the variable is statistically significant but not in the predicted direction (results not shown). We also created an interaction dummy variable coded 1 if it was an Archigos FIRC and there were Enterline/Greig institutional changes. This interaction dummy variable was unrelated to civil war onset (results not shown).

The lack of relationship between imposed institutional change and civil war as compared to the Archigos-civil war relationship is striking. Note that the difference is not because of the restricted temporal ranges, the Archigos data going up to 2004 and the Enterline/Greig data going only up to 1994 (and therefore missing the 2003 Iraq and 2001 Afghanistan FIRCs). We reran the analysis of Model 1 (Archigos), but restricted the temporal range to 1920-1994. In such restricted analysis, the results do not change (results not shown). If the results were highly dependent on Iraq/Afghanistan, we would see the FIRC/Lose War variable become insignificant, but it does not. The insignificance may be because there are sometimes foreign imposed changes in regime which are not captured by changes in Polity/ORIG scores, such as when Idi Amin was deposed from Uganda in 1979.

The results indicate that FIRC makes civil war more likely, which begs the follow on question, under what conditions do FIRCs make civil war more likely, and when do they not?

When does FIRC generate the peace of post-1945 Germany and Japan, and is FIRC followed by the descent into violence as in Afghanistan and Iraq? The results presented so far provide some illumination, that leader change matters and institutional change doesn't, and that FIRC following war is destabilizing, and that FIRC under other conditions is not.<sup>10</sup>

Further analysis provides more clues. We explored the effect of the pre-FIRC regime on the FIRC-civil war onset relationship. We might suspect that authoritarian regimes cracked by FIRC are more likely to dissolve into violence, as authoritarian systems tend to contain intranational conflicts by force, rather than craft long term bargains between factions which all can accept. If the firm hand of an authoritarian leader is taken away, intrastate groups may lunge at the opportunity to attack one another, rather than wait for the appearance of political institutions which might allow peaceful bargains to be crafted. We explored for this possibility, replacing the FIRC/Lose War variable with two different variables. One variable is coded 1 if there is a FIRC after interstate war and the pre-FIRC regime was autocratic, 0 otherwise. The other variable is coded 1 if there is a FIRC after interstate war and the pre-FIRC regime was not autocratic, 0 otherwise. These results are provided in Model 3 of Table 2. The FIRC/Lose War/Autocracy regime variable is statistically significant, but the FIRC/Lose War/Non-Autocracy regime variable is not statistically significant.

What makes this result especially interesting is pairing it with the finding that movement from autocracy to anocracy or from autocracy to democracy does not make civil war more likely (Model 1). Why is that movements away from autocracy cause civil war when they occur after

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<sup>10</sup> One factor we do not explore here is whether the size of the post-FIRC occupation force affects the likelihood of civil war onset. Edelstein (2008, 17n) argues that occupations are not more likely to succeed with greater commitments of resources. Unfortunately, testing this speculation would require data on non-FIRC troop deployments as well, and comprehensive data on foreign troop deployments do not exist.

interstate war FIRCs, but not under other conditions? State power provides one possible answer. Transitions away from autocracy may be peaceful and pacted, in which through negotiations autocrats agree on new political institutions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Importantly, the tools of state power, the bureaucracy itself, are left in place or changed marginally as the transition occurs, permitting the continued deterrence of potential insurgents and the distribution of basic goods to society. However, FIRC overthrows autocrats more violently, without necessarily crafting bargains among substate actors, and likely destroying state power in the process.

We explored other possible factors which make a FIRC more likely to break down into civil war. One possibility is that FIRCs against ethnically diverse targets are more dangerous, as perhaps rival ethnic groups will move to fight each other when their ruling government is overthrown. However, interactions variable of FIRC multiplied by Ethnic Fractionalization and FIRC/Lose War times Ethnic Fractionalization were insignificant and did not change the other results. Another possibility is that the regime type of the imposer, that perhaps authoritarian imposers can more easily maintain order in FIRC targets than can democratic imposers.

We also examined whether our results were robust to different lag structures. The results in Table 2 were produced with a research design which allowed for the effects of FIRC on civil war onset for five years past the occurrence of the FIRC. We explored a variety of different lag structures, testing models which coded the FIRC and related war variables for effects of only one year up to ten years. The results of these robustness tests are provided in Table 3. Each row indicates a different lag structure specification. For example, in the first row, the relevant independent variables are coded as one only one year after the FIRC and/or war. Each column is for the most important independent variables. The first three columns, FIRC/Lose War,

FIRC/No Lose War, and No FIRC/Lose War, are the three key independent variables in Model 1. The right-most column, imposed political institutions, is the key independent variable in Model 1. Each cell indicates whether the relevant independent variable is significant (and in the predicted direction) or insignificant, for that lag structure. Note that the results for each cell for the left most three columns were produced together with a single run of the research design in Model 1, and the result for the cell in the right most column was produced with a run of the research design in Model 2.

[Table 3 about here]

Table 3 indicates the results are generally robust to specification of the lag structure. FIRC/Lose War is statistically significant for all ten different lag structures. FIRC/No Lose War and No FIRC/Lose War are insignificant for eight of the ten lag structures. Imposed Political Institutions, the Enterline/Greig variable, is insignificant for nine of the ten lag structures.

The results are robust even when some more of the debatable codings of the FIRC independent variable are changed. For example, Archigos codes France as suffering a FIRC in 1944 but not in 1940 or 1942. If the results are changed such that there is no FIRC in 1944, the results do not change. The results do not change if we code FIRCs as occurring in both 1940 and 1944.

One possible concern is selection bias concerning state death. A state might suffer a FIRC following an interstate war and then cease to exist as a nation-state and then get dropped from our data set because it is no longer a COW member of the nation-state system (on state death, see Fazal 2007). However, one could argue that these dead states should still be accounted for, because a theoretically and policy consequential civil war might still occur in

these “dead” states, and if civil war has not occurred in these cases, then their exclusion would bias our results in favor of finding that interstate war FIRCs make civil war onset more likely.

We tested for this possibility by adding back in “dead” states, that is, states which were members of the COW nation-state system, suffered a FIRC, and then got dropped from the COW nation-state data set.<sup>11</sup> The results of the analysis of this expanded data set are in Model 4 of Table 2; note that missing data forced us to exclude some of the controls. The results are highly consistent with the Model 1 results, with FIRC/Lose War significant, FIRC/No Lose War and No FIRC/Lose War insignificant.

Is there endogeneity bias in our general inference about Interstate War FIRCs? The argument would be that states are more likely to impose FIRCs in war on targets where civil war is more likely, hence a high probability of civil war might be causing FIRC, rather than FIRC causing a high probability of civil war. The observed correlation between War-FIRCs and civil war might then be spurious, as War-FIRCs are not causing civil war onset, but rather structural factors are causing both civil wars and FIRCs.

However, there are three problems with this speculation. First, the models in Table 2 include several control variables for common causes of civil war onset. The FIRC/Lose War variable is significant despite the inclusion of these variables, providing confidence that the FIRC-civil war onset relationship is not spurious. Second, the endogeneity critique makes little theoretical sense. It is not clear why a state would go to war with a state just because the latter was prone to civil war. Further, even if war did occur, if the attacking state defeated the target's

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<sup>11</sup> The added country-year cases include Netherlands 1941-1944, Belgium 1941-1944, France 1943, Poland 1940-1944, Austria 1939-1944, Czechoslovakia 1940-1944, Albania 1940-1943, Yugoslavia 1942-1943, Greece 1942-1943, Norway 1941-1944, Denmark 1941-1944, Ethiopia 1937-1940, Estonia 1941-1945, Latvia 1941-1945, and Lithuania 1941-1945. Among these new cases, there was civil war onset only in Yugoslavia 1942 (Bailey 1978).

military, it would not then have an extra incentive to enact a FIRC just because civil war is likely to break out. If anything, there might be a disincentive, as for a victorious power the outbreak of post-interstate war civil war creates severe problems, as the US discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Nazi Germany discovered in Yugoslavia. Indeed, one reason that Britain did not impose regime change on Turkey after World War I was British fear of a violent reaction, albeit elsewhere in the British empire (MacFie 1975). Fear of intrawar violence was one reason George H. W. Bush did not march on Baghdad in 1991 in pursuit of Saddam Hussein's overthrow after the liberation of Kuwait (Baker 1995, 436-438; Woodward 2006, 11-12; Ricks 2006). Third, empirical analysis provides at best mixed evidence on this endogeneity conjecture. We performed rare event logit analysis of the determinants of interstate war FIRC, using as independent variables several of the factors which make civil war onset more likely (results not shown). New States were not more likely to suffer interstate war FIRC. Less developed and larger countries were more likely to experience interstate war-FIRC and civil war (consistent with the endogeneity critique), but more mountainous countries were less likely to experience interstate war-FIRC but more likely to experience civil war (inconsistent with the endogeneity critique).

The lagged civil war variable is statistically insignificant. We tried a different means of addressing temporal autocorrelation, replacing the lagged variable with the temporal controls suggested by Carter and Signorino (2007). The new controls were not significant, and their inclusion did not change the other results.

Another possibility is that the results are sensitive to exactly how we coded FIRC. Archigos provides two means of coding FIRC, the means by which a leader is deposed, and the means by which a leader enters power. In practice, in most cases when a leader is deposed by

foreign pressure or force, his or her successor is installed by foreign pressure or force. However, there are three cases in the data set of regime changes in which the exiting leader does not leave because of foreign pressure, but the entering leader is brought into power because of external pressure.<sup>12</sup> None of these three cases occurred following an interstate war, and civil war does not follow any of these three cases. Hence, these cases support our general findings that civil war is more likely after interstate war FIRC, but not after non-interstate war FIRC.

The magnitude of the effects of interstate war FIRC on civil war onset is quite substantial, as described in Table 4.

[Table 4 about here]

Setting all other variables at their means or modes, the chances of civil war onset increase from 1.1% if there is no interstate war FIRC, to 9.0% if there is an interstate war FIRC, an eightfold increase. The magnitude of this effect is much greater than the effects of all the other statistically significant independent variables. The chances of civil war onset increase only from 1.1% to 1.7% if the measurement of development decreases from the mean value to one standard deviation below the mean. The chances of civil war onset increases from 1.1% to 3.3% if the state has undergone transition from anocracy to democracy. It increases from 1.1% to 5.0% if one compares non-new states to new states. It increases from 1.1% to 1.4% if the population variable moves from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. It increases from 1.1% to 1.4% if the mountains variable moves from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. It increases from 1.1% to 1.4% if the ethnic fractionalization variable moves from the mean to one standard deviation above the mean. It increases from 1.1% to 1.7% when the contiguity variable moves from 0 to 1.

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<sup>12</sup> Czechoslovakia 1938, Liberia 1990, and Gabon 1964.

## Conclusions

Analyzing the causes of civil war onset from 1920-2004, we found that FIRC following interstate war make civil war onset substantially more likely. The effect is quite substantial even in relation to other factors, increasing the risk of civil war onset by eight times. The result was robust to the inclusion of an array of control variables, and to alterations in research design. This result, demonstrating the limits that outside actors have in controlling a nation's domestic politics, is consistent with existing empirical findings that FIRC cannot easily transplant democracy abroad. The finding that only interstate war FIRC makes civil war onset more likely provides evidence that state power explains the FIRC-civil war relationship, that FIRC undermines the state's ability to police and provide goods and services to the population, and that occupation forces accompanying postwar FIRC constitute the most provocative form of state power, especially likely in incite violence.

Other findings also indicate that state power is a key factor making civil war onset more likely. Higher levels of development, which increase state power, decrease the likelihood of civil war onset. More mountainous terrain makes civil war more likely, as the presence of mountains moots the ability of the state to project its power throughout the country as a means of deterring potential insurgents. FIRCs overthrowing autocrats are especially likely to cause civil war, because there is a more dangerous drop in state power when an autocrat is overthrown than when another kind of regime is overthrown.

The findings also provide evidence against other possible theoretical connections

between state power and civil war onset. The finding that non-interstate war FIRCs do not make civil war more likely is inconsistent with the speculation that FIRCs cause civil war because deposed leaders seek to regain power. The results also offer some evidence against the speculation that FIRCs cause civil war because they change political institutions. A measure of imposed change in political institutions, either by itself or interacted with leadership change, was found to be uncorrelated with the likelihood of civil war onset. Perhaps relatedly, static measures of regime type were uncorrelated with civil war onset. However, political institutions were not completely unrelated to the chances of civil war onset. Consistent with other studies, democratization was found to be significantly correlated with the chances of civil war onset, though notably only one form of democratization was significantly correlated, the move from anocracy to democracy.

These results, combined with other scholarly work, paint a theoretically consistent and striking picture. FIRCs following interstate wars both significantly decrease the odds of interstate conflict, and significantly increase the odds of intrastate conflict. These two findings are linked by the devastating effect of FIRC on state power. If a state's power is undercut, this reduces both its power to launch interstate wars, and to maintain order internally. At a broader level, these results emphasize the importance of using state power to understand conflict behavior. Traditionally, state power and strength was used in the study of political economy, but our results encourage the application of these concepts to conflict, as well.

On the policy side, these results offer grave warnings against the use of interstate war as a policy tool to impose regime change. Going to war to impose regime change is quite tempting, offering the possibility of curing a source of militarism and instability, and eliminating a regime likely to repress or massacre its own population. However, doing so carries the risk of

significantly increasing the risk of civil war. Such an outcome can undermine policy goals, by creating a humanitarian disaster through mass civilian death, the breakdown of social order, and the creation of refugees. Though a former rogue regime wracked by civil war may be less likely to instigate interstate war, it may also become a host for terrorist groups. Such a threat may in turn require the imposer to deploy troops in the target state for several years, in the hopes of creating stability and reestablishing order. And, we know from previous research that FIRC is an ineffective tool to spread democracy.

This paper provides directions for further scholarship. Though the findings indicate the importance of state power for civil war onset, more work needs to be done on the determinants of state power, and relatedly the elements of state power critical for maintaining internal order. At the most general level, there is the question of whether state power matters because it facilitates policing, because it alleviates grievances, or some combination. More specifically, there is the question of what national attributes are most important for the state power-civil war relationship. Some focus on geography as critical determinants of state power. Fearon and Laitin (2003) argued for the importance of mountains in constraining state power. In his study of state power in post-colonial Africa, Herbst (2000) also focused on geography, arguing that state power is undermined if that national capital is located on the border of the nation instead of the center.

State power can also emerge from other sources. Policing effectiveness may be determined by the size and composition of internal security forces. The ability to deliver goods and services is determined by the level of economic development, the capacity of the state to extract from the economy, and the capacity of the state to deliver to the population. In turn, all three of these factors affecting the ability to deliver goods to the population may be affected by

factors such as physical infrastructure, namely the extent of roads, rail, and air and maritime transport.

Answering these state power questions will in turn provide purchase on a related question, what conditions make it especially likely that a FIRC will cause civil war? FIRC does not always cause civil war, post-World War II Japan and Germany being perhaps the most prominent examples of FIRCs which were not followed by civil war. This paper has provided some purchase on this question. It found that among ethnic diversity had no effect on making FIRCs more or less dangerous. It found that overthrowing autocrats is more dangerous than overthrowing other kinds of leaders. These results accompany other scholarly findings that internal violence ought to be less likely when the target state faces high levels of external threat (Edelstein 2008), when local elites in both states cooperated with occupying forces (Mann 2003), and others.<sup>13</sup> Future research on the FIRC-civil war relationship should examine more closely state power elements, such as whether after a FIRC the imposer purged the target's bureaucracy, was the target's physical infrastructure (including the capital) heavily damaged, was the target's internal security apparatus and/or conventional military disbanded, and others. Relatedly, future research could take a closer look at the size and nature of post-FIRC occupation forces, testing the simple hypothesis that the necessary and sufficient condition for post-FIRC peace is enough occupation troops per capita (Dobbins et al 2003).

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<sup>13</sup> In a quantitative study, Enterline and Greig (2008b) found that among all cases in which political institutions were externally imposed, a number of factors can make internal political challenges more likely, such as regime type, ethnoreligious divisions, and characteristics of the geographic neighborhood. Note that they used a different dependent variable than civil war, and as discussed previously there are almost no examples of imposed political institutions being followed by civil war onset, making it difficult to test their hypotheses on a dependent variable of civil war onset difficult.

Table 1: Foreign Imposed Leadership Changes, 1915-2004

	Country	Year
1	Albania	1917
2	Greece	1918
3	Mongolia	1925
4	Ethiopia	1936
5	China	1937
6	Austria	1938
7	Albania	1939
8	Poland	1939
9	Belgium	1940
10	Estonia	1940
11	Latvia	1940
12	Lithuania	1940
13	Netherlands	1940
14	Norway	1940
15	Ethiopia	1941
16	Greece	1941
17	Yugoslavia	1941
18	France	1944
19	Hungary	1944
20	Czechoslovakia	1945
21	Germany	1945
22	Japan	1945
23	Romania	1947
24	Indonesia	1949
25	Hungary	1956
26	Czechoslovakia	1968
27	South Vietnam	1975
28	Cambodia	1979
29	Central African Rep.	1979
30	Uganda	1979
31	Mongolia	1984
32	Kuwait	1990
33	Panama	1990
34	Kuwait	1991
35	Haiti	1994
36	Sierra Leone	1998
37	Afghanistan	2001
38	Iraq	2003

Note: Drawn from Archigos data set. Even though the data set runs from 1920-2004, the above list includes FIRC's back to 1915, because the FIRC variable change is coded 1 for the five years following the FIRC, meaning that we need to include pre-1920 cases.



Table 2: Rare Events Logit Analysis of Civil War Onset

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Years	1920-2004	1920-1994	1920-2004	1920-2004
Development	-.375*** (.0879)	-.345*** (.0946)	-.382*** (.0882)	---
Population	.0919*** (.0202)	.325*** (.0723)	.0910*** (.0203)	---
Lagged Civil War	-.0825 (.241)	-.123 (.267)	-.0699 (.242)	.171 (.222)
No FIRC/Lose War	.608 (.523)	---	.508 (.537)	.640 (.517)
FIRC/Lose War	2.17*** (.587)	---	---	1.85*** (.538)
FIRC/No Lose War	.659 (.646)	---	---	.853 (.658)
Institutions FIRC	---	-1.12 (.746)	---	---
Lose War	---	.649 (.456)	---	---
FIRC, Lose War, Replace Autoc.	---	---	2.02*** (.668)	---
FIRC, Lose War, Replace Non-Autoc	---	---	1.22 (1.34)	---
Mountains	.179** (.0658)	.178** (.0748)	.176** (.0658)	.279*** (.0590)
New State	1.53*** (.477)	1.96*** (.513)	1.53*** (.479)	1.71*** (.274)
Non-Contiguous	.431* (.247)	.003 (.274)	.443* (.246)	.386* (.205)
Anocracy	.192 (.274)	.373 (.312)	.208 (.276)	---
Democracy	-.311 (.281)	-.170 (.306)	-.305 (.281)	---
Autocracy to Anocracy	.0428 (.430)	.131 (.556)	.0812 (.424)	---
Anocracy to Democracy	1.12** (.388)	1.02*** (.433)	1.11** (.394)	---
Autocracy to Democracy	.486 (.745)	.647 (1.04)	.495 (.744)	---
Ethnic Fractionalization	.859** (.364)	.662* (.372)	.853*** (.364)	1.24*** (.327)
Constant	-3.10*** (.738)	-5.27*** (1.02)	-3.03*** (.740)	-5.53*** (.233)
n	8325	6815	8325	8920

Note: \*significant at .05 level; \*\*significant at .01 level; \*\*\* significant at .001 level. All significance tests one-tailed.

Table 3: Statistical Significance of Key Independent Variables With Different Lags

Lags (in years)	FIRC war	FIRC no war	Lose War No FIRC	Imposed Institutions
1	Sig	Sig	Sig	Insig
2	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
3	Sig	Insig	Sig	Insig
4	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
5	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
6	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
7	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
8	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
9	Sig	Insig	Insig	Insig
10	Sig	Insig	Insig	Sig

Note: FIRC War, FIRC No War, and Lose War No FIRC results were all produced with the research design of Model 1 in Table 2. Imposed Institutions results were produced with Model 2 of Table 2. “Sig” indicates significant at .05 level, one-tailed test, in the predicted direction. “Insig” indicates not significant at .05 level, one-tailed test.

Table 4: Substantive Effects on Likelihood of Civil War Onset

Variable	Likelihood of Civil War Onset, all variables at means and modes	Change in Indicated Variable	Likelihood of Civil War Onset with Change in Variable, other variables at means and modes
FIRC war	1.1%	0 to 1	9.0%
Development	1.1%	Mean to one S.D. below mean	1.7%
Anocracy to Democr.	1.1%	0 to 1	3.3%
New State	1.1%	0 to 1	5.0%
Population	1.1%	Mean to one S.D. above mean	1.4%
Mountains	1.1%	Mean to one S.D. above mean	1.4%
Ethnic Fractionaliz.	1.1%	Mean to one S.D. above mean	1.4%
Contiguity	1.1%	0 to 1	1.7%

All predicted values for civil war onset produced with coefficient estimates from Model 1 of Table 2. All non-dichotomous variables were set at their means. All dichotomous variables were set at their modes, which in all cases were zero.

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