

A prominent question in comparative electoral studies concerns the so-called personal vote. Typically, scholars approach this question at a cross-national as opposed to a cross-party level. In this article, in contrast, the author focuses on the characteristics of parties, as opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of candidates' personal vote seeking. The author argues that a candidate's adoption of an individualistic or collective strategy depends largely on centralized or decentralized nomination control in his party, his party's alliance options, and his access to and control over funding and patronage. The author explores the Brazilian case, testing his claims at the national and district level using multiple regression analysis. Furthermore, he explains how one party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), has overcome the incentives of the electoral system.

INCENTIVES TO CULTIVATE A PARTY VOTE IN CANDIDATE-CENTRIC ELECTORAL SYSTEMS Evidence From Brazil

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A prominent question in comparative electoral studies concerns the so-called personal vote. Typically, scholars have approached this question at a cross-national as opposed to a cross-party level: They highlight features of national electoral systems that create incentives for individual politicians to pursue a personal (or a party) vote rather than highlighting features of parties that might predispose candidates in those parties to pursue personal (or party) votes. In this article, I will focus on the characteristics of parties, as

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opposed to the characteristics of electoral systems, as determinants of candidates' personal vote seeking.

Of course, any study of how party characteristics affect the balance of personal versus party vote seeking by a given party's candidates must hold electoral structure constant (just as studies of the impact of electoral structure implicitly hold party features constant). Here I focus on a class of electoral systems that promote, or even require, personal vote strategies—what I call candidate-centric electoral systems. I define this class more precisely later in this article, but for now, suffice it to say that it includes the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) system, Open-List Proportional Representation (PR) systems in general, and Brazil's version of Open-List PR in particular. Given a candidate-centric electoral environment, I ask how politicians can buck the trend by strategically developing party institutions that overcome the electoral system's push toward individualism.

Brazil is an interesting case both because its politics are notoriously individualistic and because Brazilian voters have the option—unusual in candidate-centric systems—of casting a label vote (by voting for a party number on the ballot).¹ When Brazilians cast a vote for a particular candidate, it seems natural to interpret this as in large part an expression of personal support (even though the vote does pool). When they vote for the party label as a whole, foregoing the opportunity to support any particular candidate, it seems natural to interpret this as, in large part, an expression of party support. The label vote percentage thus naturally measures the balance of party versus personal votes that each party receives.

This article shows that although individualism is a likely strategy under candidate-centric electoral rules in general and does indeed pervade Brazilian politics in particular, a collective electoral strategy under these electoral systems is both theoretically possible and empirically detectable (at least in Brazil). I demonstrate that the level of label votes that a party receives varies considerably in Brazil and is related to party structural features, including the nature of nomination control, candidates' access to pork and campaign funds, and alliance strategy. These findings are interesting in the Brazilian case because they do not gibe with previous suggestions that high label voting percentages are mostly a function of leftist ideology (Mainwaring, 1992, p. 688). Moreover, these considerations should generalize across all candidate-centric electoral systems; thus, this article opens the path to future comparative work at the cross-party level.

1. Italy (1945-1993) had a similar system.

The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and articulates hypotheses about electoral competition under candidate-centric electoral systems. Section 3 places this framework in the Brazilian context and reviews the conventional wisdom about Brazilian politics. Section 4 applies the hypotheses from Section 2, presenting quantitative evidence to support the hypotheses. Section 5 uses qualitative evidence to explain how one Brazilian party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT), has institutionalized its party label over the long term, overcoming the Brazilian system's notorious incentives for individualism. Although many parties receive relatively high percentages of label votes in the short-to-medium term, the PT is the only large Brazilian party that consistently receives a high level of label votes, and its ability to institutionalize its label in the long term merits special attention. Section 6 concludes.

ELECTORAL INCENTIVES UNDER CANDIDATE-CENTRIC ELECTORAL RULES

LITERATURE REVIEW AND JUSTIFICATION FOR NEW APPROACH

In this article, I do not assume that parties are unitary actors; individual candidates are my basic units of analysis. Existing efforts to model candidate behavior under different electoral systems are inadequate for the task at hand because they implicitly hold party features and candidate attributes constant in order to focus on variations in national electoral institutions.

Consider, for example, Carey and Shugart's (1995) contrast between SNTV and closed-list PR (one part of their larger project of rank-ordering electoral systems' propensity to generate incentives to seek a personal vote). Clearly, SNTV produces more incentives to individualism. However, the Japanese Buddhist *Kômeitô* Party—famous for the discipline and obedience of its voters—obviously overcame these incentives (Hrebemar, 1992), as did the Japanese Communist Party. If we compared the *Kômeitô* to a factionalized party under closed-list PR, our expectations about candidate behavior based on the electoral system comparison would be largely counteracted by not holding party characteristics constant. A related point is that not all candidates and parties pursue the same strategy within a given electoral system.²

Or, consider Myerson's (1993) argument that candidates in certain electoral systems have greater incentives to seek the support of special interests or

2. For example, in Italy, party strategy may have influenced the tendency for voters to use one or more of their preference votes (Katz, 1985).

favored minorities. To focus on the effects of the differing electoral systems, Myerson explicitly holds other features constant, such as candidates' ability to make credible pork-barreling promises to voters. Then, he explains to what extent and how candidates exploit their resources under different electoral systems.

Similar to Myerson (1993) and Carey and Shugart (1995), I am interested in the incentives to cultivate a personal or party vote. However, I differ from these analysts in that I do not hold party features constant. In contrast to Myerson, I am interested precisely in the case in which candidates may not have equal capabilities to make credible commitments to distribute resources so that some candidates may find campaigning on other grounds more attractive.

In sum, research on the impact of electoral rules has ignored cross-party variation within electoral systems, and we have some *prima facie* evidence that some candidates in some parties buck the trend. In the next section, I detail the set of electoral systems that my argument covers. Subsequently, I explain the logic of electoral competition under these rules and then hypothesize how candidates might overcome the incentives that the electoral system generates.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS COVERED

The framework I develop covers electoral systems that satisfy the following criteria: (a) Voting options: Each voter has the option of casting one or more votes directly for candidates. Voters may also have the option of casting a list vote; (b) District magnitude: Each electoral district returns more than one member to the assembly; and (c) Seat allocation: If there are no party lists, then candidates receive seats in order of their vote totals: The top M vote-getters receive seats in an M -seat district. If there are party lists, then the seats are awarded to the candidates on each list in accord with the votes that each candidate on the list receives: The top M vote-getting candidates receive seats on a list that wins M seats.

The real-world electoral systems that satisfy these criteria include STV systems in which $M > 1$ (e.g., Ireland, Malta, Australia's Senate); SNTV systems in which $M > 1$ (e.g., pre-1994 Japan, Taiwan); and Open-List PR systems (e.g., Poland, Finland, Chile, Brazil, pre-1994 Italy).³ I call these systems candidate-centric electoral systems because they all tend to push candidates

3. These criteria thus exclude all Closed-List Proportional Representation (PR) systems, all electoral systems in which district magnitude equals 1, and some other PR systems (see Carey & Shugart, 1995).

toward self-promotion rather than toward promoting the party's collective identity.

THE LOGIC OF THE PERSONAL VOTE IN CANDIDATE-CENTRIC ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

Given the institutional criteria distinguishing candidate-centric electoral systems, if there are multiple candidates per party per district, then these candidates cannot rely solely on the party label to get elected. Therefore, candidates must adopt some degree of individualism as an electoral strategy to differentiate themselves from their copartisans. Let us assume that the electoral system is exogenous, that politicians understand the effects of the electoral rules, and that when they begin to play the electoral game, they associate with like-minded politicians to form parties that further their own personal gain.

Subsequently, these office-seeking politicians might (or might not) believe that intraparty competition will harm more than help their career prospects; thus, they might structure their party so as to overcome the incentives that the electoral system imposes. What is the range of potential strategies that politicians could adopt under these electoral systems? Consider three simple potential strategies that move from individualistic to collective. First, politicians could structure internal party rules to allow completely unregulated individualism. Candidates would deliver their own pork and claim their own credit. They would take their own policy stands, again on their own account. If targeting pork or policy appeals meant stealing votes from their copartisans, then so be it.

Second, they could opt to regulate candidates' individualism. Here, each member of the list would still fend for himself or herself, but candidates would devise mechanisms to minimize the amount of direct intraparty competition through nomination control or by setting up bailiwicks and niches and sanctioning copartisans who violated party guidelines.

Third, politicians could attempt to cultivate a collective reputation. This can be done over and above option two and would entail developing a party platform. The party would require candidates to publicize the platform and prohibit them from dissenting from it. Pork-based individualism is not inconsistent with this type of strategy, but policy-based individualism is.

Politicians clearly possess a range of options under this set of electoral systems, and we have no a priori reason to assume that candidates in all parties will adopt similar strategies: Even if all candidates face similar electoral incentives, they still require the wherewithal to pursue a given strategy.

What might encourage candidates to fight against the incentives that the electoral rules impose? I assume that in any electoral system, some portion of

the electorate, and some politicians, have clear preferences over issues of public policy and do not want only divisible pork-barrel goods, and I assume that in any mass electoral system, voters possess few incentives to acquire information about candidates and parties (Downs, 1957). Given these assumptions, the extent to which voters can generalize about candidate behavior based on their image of the candidate's party as a whole is potentially important. Party labels could serve as cues, a way for voters cheaply to reduce their uncertainty about parties and politicians (Popkin, 1990). Voters might also vote for the label, instead of a candidate, if they trust and can distinguish their "brand name" and are indifferent across the party's individual candidates.

For individual politicians, under certain conditions, a party label could thus serve as a low-cost, high-return investment. Even in places such as Japan, Italy, and Brazil, notorious for their clientelistic politics, a candidate's efforts to articulate his or her party's collective image might reap a reward of voters who are either unreachable by private-goods distribution schemes (because they are outside of patronage networks) or who actively seek policy-oriented parties. Politicians in every party in candidate-centric electoral systems must choose between investing in their own reputation or in their party's reputation. They can seek votes by either distributing pork or adopting policy positions or, more realistically, by adopting a strategy that mixes individual and collective appeals.⁴ In the next section, I present hypotheses that explain when candidates in these electoral systems might adopt either individualistic or collectivistic strategies.

HYPOTHESES

In the abstract, candidate-centric electoral systems create strong incentives for personalism.⁵ However, I hypothesize that in the short-to-medium term, the extent to which candidates adopt a collectivistic or individualistic strategy depends on (a) the degree to which access to the ballot is centralized or decentralized, (b) the extent of candidates' access to campaign finance resources and whether access is centralized or decentralized, (c) the extent of candidates' access to office benefits (Strom, 1990)⁶ and whether access is

4. I do not mean to imply that the two strategies are necessarily mutually exclusive. Also, as noted earlier, it is possible to use policy to pursue a personal vote. However, from this point forward I use the word policy to mean a collective, party-platform policy appeal.

5. I take electoral systems to be exogenous in this article: Politicians, when they create parties, respond to the system's incentives and continue to respond as if the system were exogenous.

6. Strom (1990) defines offices benefits as government portfolios and "private goods bestowed on recipients of politically discretionary governmental and subgovernmental appointments" (p. 567).

centralized or decentralized, and (d) alliance opportunities and other features of each country's electoral system.

Hypothesis 1: Nomination Control and Label Voting

First, if nominations are centrally controlled, then all candidates owe their political careers, and hence their political allegiance, to the party. In such parties, we would expect candidates to more willingly stick to policy appeals that the party leadership dictates, regardless of the electoral structure. On the other hand, if nomination control is decentralized, then individual candidates will not feel as beholden to party policy makers. Even in Japan's personalistic SNTV system, for example, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the *Kōmeitō* both control nominations tightly and receive strict adherence to the party's policy line from its members (Hrebenar, 1992, p. 83).

Hypothesis 2: Campaign Finance and Label Voting

Second, personalism is an expensive strategy requiring resources that not all candidates possess or can obtain. Consequently, resource-poor candidates might not opt for a personalistic strategy simply because they cannot afford it. Candidates who can raise campaign contributions from a support network (in exchange for pork, special regulatory exemptions, etc.) are well situated to play the personal vote game (e.g., the Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], most Brazilian parties). In contrast, those who cannot raise money may instead opt to form parties in which the label stands for something. Adopting a label-promoting strategy may reap votes where money cannot buy them.

Whether a party centrally controls campaign finance might also influence candidates' strategies. A party that can turn the finance spigot on or off can credibly threaten candidates who deviate from the party line, whereas candidates responsible for their own fundraising might have the independence to ignore such threats.

Hypothesis 3: Access to Pork and Label Voting

Third, candidates who associate with the government so that they can access and deliver patronage resources such as pork-barrel projects can afford to and are expected to rely on their individual ability to "bring home the bacon" rather than on their party's programmatic platform. Even if candidates mix a pork-and-policy strategy, we expect them to rely relatively more on individualistic appeals than those without access to pork. Thus, those who cannot rely on government patronage, such as those with poor access to

campaign finance, may opt to rely on cheaper campaign strategies such as promotion of a label.

The extent to which the party centralizes or decentralizes control over pork will also influence candidate strategies. For example, in Brazil (1945-1964 and 1982-present), individual deputies seek pork largely without party leadership mediation (Ames, 1995a, 1995b), whereas central party leadership under Chile's Open-List PR system prior to 1973 apparently mediated access to patronage (Valenzuela, 1977). Analysts agree that Chilean parties prior to 1973 had stronger organizations than their Brazilian counterparts and that voters responded to party-label appeals more in Chile than in Brazil (cf. Mainwaring, 1995).

Hypothesis 4: Alliance Strategy or Other Rules

Fourth, we must also consider the specific quirks in each electoral system that might influence whether candidates adopt a label-enhancing or individualistic strategy. For example, allowing multiparty alliances in Open-List systems could push candidates to pay less attention to their party's label and more attention to their own reputation in order to increase their chances of victory within the alliance, as in Italy (Katz, 1985) and Brazil (see below for details).

In the long run, the four factors that I hypothesize as influencing candidate strategy are endogenous: Candidates may decide, for one reason or another, to develop party rules that tend to conform with or counteract incentives derived from the electoral rules or resource access. In Section 5, I explore the question of when and why individual politicians would create such institutions with lasting impact, given their resources and political goals, for one party in Brazil. I claim, however, that in the short term, these factors are "sticky." They are exogenous for any given individual candidate and will affect his or her propensity to promote the party label.

In sum, the way candidates access the slate and the extent and way in which candidates access resources vary within candidate-centric systems. These factors are fairly general. Specific quirks in each electoral system, such as alliance possibilities, could also vary quite widely across candidate-centric systems. For each case analyzed, we will have to combine the general hypotheses with details about how candidates and parties respond to the specific rules of the game. In any case, these variables should account for the differences observed in the degree to which candidates promote a party label or their own personal reputation under candidate-centric electoral systems. In the next section, I specify how parties respond to the rules in Brazil.

BRAZILIAN POLITICAL INDIVIDUALISM—THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

In this section, I will first describe the conventional wisdom about Brazilian parties and then elaborate hypotheses that follow directly from those articulated in the previous section. In the next section, I present empirical evidence that supports my hypotheses.

Little empirical research exists on postauthoritarian Brazilian political parties because few political scientists believe they warrant attention as collective actors.⁷ Brazilian parties have historically been weak, decentralized alliances of patronage machines, tools of local or regional leaders who rely on access to public resources to build and maintain a support base. Parties as collective actors are little involved in legislative policy making. Instead, congressional deputies trade votes on policy issues for patronage served up by the executive (Ames, 1995a, 1995b; Avelino Filho, 1994; Mainwaring, 1991, 1992; Novaes, 1993).

Brazil's electoral rules are said to perpetuate this political individualism. Brazilian voters can vote directly for an individual candidate (by writing in the candidate's name or number) or for a party's entire label (by writing in the party's name or number). From the candidates' perspective, the incentives for individualism are clear: The party's total list vote equals the sum of the party's candidates' votes plus its party-label votes. If a candidate's party wins M seats, then those seats go to the M candidates on the list with the most candidate votes. Each candidate, therefore, always prefers a vote for himself or herself (which boosts both the party's expected seat total and the candidate's chances of getting one of those seats) over a party-label vote (which has only the first effect) and prefers a label vote only over a vote for another party's candidates or label.

Other institutional factors augment the incentives for individualism in Brazil. For example, district magnitude for national elections ranges from 8 to 70, and parties can nominate as many candidates as there are seats. If parties enter an electoral alliance, the alliance can run up to 1.5 candidates per seat. This permits an alliance to place 105 names on the ballot for federal deputy (70 seats) in the state of São Paulo, where in 1990 there were 610 candidates for federal deputy (Lamounier, 1991, p. 57). Thus, although not every party fills its slate, the number of both potential and actual candidates within a district is staggering. To stand out in this school of political sharks under Open-List PR, a politician must focus at least some energy, if not most energy, on his or her own personal attributes instead of on the party's.

7. Exceptions include Keck (1992) and Meneguello (1989).

All told, Open-List proportional representation generates tremendously individualistic incentives because parties do not control the candidates' rank on the list and candidates must compete against their copartisans. The resulting intraparty competition hinders party cohesion and promotes individualistic electoral appeals (Ames, 1995b; Mainwaring, 1992). To get the personal votes that they need, Brazilian candidates rely largely on their patronage credit-claiming ability (Ames, 1995a). Most research on Brazilian electoral politics has focused on the goals of individual politicians instead of parties, ignoring the possibility that a trade-off between individual and collective electoral strategy might exist.

EVALUATING THE HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1: Nomination Control

First, because all parties in Brazil, including the PT, decentralize nomination control to the district (state) level, I cannot test for this variable's impact across Brazilian parties. However, as I describe in Section 5, parties can enact provisions to counteract this rule's impact.

Hypothesis 2: Access to Campaign Finance

Second, I can confirm that campaign finance is highly decentralized in all parties. Most party organizations are weak, and candidates in all parties, including the PT, are responsible for financing their own campaigns, which are quite expensive (Ames, 1995a; Mainwaring, in press).

Nevertheless, substantial variations in the extent of campaign finance candidates can appear to exist across parties in Brazil. This raises the possibility, as Hypothesis 2 suggests, that poorer candidates cannot afford personalistic strategies, whereas wealthier candidates rely less on their party label and more on individual appeals. Although campaign expenditure data are unavailable, in 1994, the Brazilian electoral court (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE) required candidates to declare how much they had received in campaign donations. With this data, we obtain an indication of the relative influence of money across parties (see Appendix B on the data). Table 1 indicates the average declared donation per party for federal deputy (in reals, nominal 1994 values, when the real was worth approximately U.S.\$1), the standard deviation of the average donation, and the number of candidates who presented declarations.

Table 1
Average Campaign Donations Received in 1994 Federal Deputy Elections

Party	No. of Candidates	Average Donation	SD
PCdoB	17	28452.79	27341.81
PCB/PPS	15	16144.99	14389.81
PT	214	10180.41	5809.46
PSB	45	27967.83	48419.35
PDT	148	22192.62	20783.84
PSDB	173	85397.41	96733.90
PMDB	272	59194.55	39836.14
PP	88	61930.14	49790.37
PTB	108	67815.49	66458.34
PFL	161	66617.72	43097.70
PSC	25	18239.76	23492.49
PRN	7	48845.83	62802.31
PL	71	31714.60	43466.88
PDC	2	14000.00	X
PDS/PPR	110	43806.64	41900.31
PRONA	9	1047.21	778.82

Note: PCdoB = Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil), PCB/PPS = Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Partido Popular Socialista (Brazilian Communist Party/Popular Socialist Party), PT = Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), PSB = Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party), PDT = Partido Democrático Trabalhador (Democratic Labor Party), PSDB = Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social-Democratic Party), PMDB = Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), PP = Partido Popular (Popular Party), PTB = Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party), PFL = Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front), PSC = Partido Social Cristão (Social Christian Party), PRN = Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (National Reconstruction Party), PL = Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), PDC = Partido Democrático Cristão (Christian Democratic Party), PDS/PPR = Partido Democrático Social/Partido Progressista Reformador (Social Democratic Party/Progressive Reform Party), and PRONA = Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (Party for the Reedification of National Order)

Of the five leftist parties—PT, Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil, PCdoB), Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Partido Popular Socialista (Brazilian Communist Party/Popular Socialist Party, PCB/PPS), Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB), and Partido Democrático Trabalhador (Democratic Labor Party, PDT)—the PT not only has the lowest average donation per candidate but also has the lowest standard deviation as a percentage of the average donation. Similarly, the PT has a far lower average donation per candidate than any of the other major center or rightist parties—Partido Progressista Reformador (Progressive Reform Party, PPR), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB), Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian

Democratic Movement, PMDB), Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social-Democratic Party, PSDB), Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front, PFL), and Partido Popular (Popular Party, PP)—and its standard deviation as a percentage of the average is also lower. The data include declarations from both winning and losing candidates, so it is not surprising to see wide standard deviations. However, the PT's lower average and lower standard deviation indicates that in general even its winning candidates rely less on money. Only the Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (Party for the Reedification of National Order, PRONA), a small right-wing party that relies on the personalistic leadership of its president, and which receives high label votes for legislative elections, demonstrates lower per-candidate spending. This provides some evidence that in general PT candidates rely less on money to finance their campaigns. I statistically test for the effect of access to campaign finance on label voting in the next section.

Hypothesis 3: Access to Pork and Label Voting

Third, for all parties, central party organizations do not control access to government pork. Because Brazil's president typically has to compose a multiparty congressional coalition (Amorim Neto, 1995), many parties may hold ministerial or other government positions that provide access to particularistic goods.⁸ Deputies, senators, mayors, and state-government officials seek pork on their own, without party mediation. As Hypothesis 3 suggests, I expect parties with good access to pork to see lower label voting. I test for the effect of access to federal pork in the next section.

Hypothesis 4: Alliance Strategy and Label Voting

The last variable in Brazil affecting the choice of an individualistic or collective electoral strategy is the ability or willingness of a candidate in a party to decide to enter electoral alliances for legislative elections. In Brazil, label votes for a party in an alliance are added to the votes for the whole alliance, not to the party's candidates alone. Therefore, whether a party is from the left or the right of the spectrum, if it enters an alliance, its candidates have incentives to direct votes away from the label and toward themselves.⁹

8. Much pork in Brazil can be found at the state and local level. Although testing for the influence of such access would be useful, such an effort is beyond the scope of this article.

9. A candidate values a personal vote most highly, a label vote for his or her party in a single-party list second, a label vote for his or her party in a multiparty list third, and a vote for another party's candidates or label last.

Small parties feel this problem especially acutely because they often attempt to free-ride off of a larger party in an alliance by strategically restricting the number of candidates that they place on the ballot within the alliance and concentrating their vote on those candidates. Because those candidates who win are those with the highest personal vote totals, candidates from small parties in alliances must downplay the label vote. If they emphasize their party label and downplay the names within the alliance, they may not get enough personal votes to obtain a seat. A party in an alliance is thus expected to seek and reap fewer label votes than a party not in an alliance. I test for this effect in Section 4.

THE FRAMEWORK APPLIED

AGGREGATE ELECTORAL DATA

This section applies the argument empirically. First, I present aggregate electoral returns, noting that the variation in the percentage of these parties' total votes that come in the form of label votes seems to follow the logic of the argument spelled out above. I then present a more systematic multivariate analysis at the district level of a party's label vote percentages that confirms the general validity of the approach.

Table 2 lists the percentages of each party's total votes that were given to the party label in the 1986, 1990, and 1994 Brazilian congressional elections (this table only includes the 15 largest national parties). The parties' initials are in the first column, with leftist parties at the top, moving to the right of the political spectrum as one moves down the list. An X indicates that the party did not compete or did not exist for that year's election. For reference, I include parallel information that indicates the party's total vote percentage (Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, 1986; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 1990; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, 1994).

Table 2 reveals what existing studies have suggested: Most Brazilian parties fail to attract many label votes. However, Table 2 also illustrates that label vote percentages vary and shows how much the PT differs from other parties over the last decade. Note that although in 1986 several parties received high percentages of label votes, the PT doubled its label vote between 1986 and 1990, and by 1994, among the large parties, only the PT managed to extensively promote the label. In 1994, excluding parties that received less than 1% of the national vote, the PT obtained label votes at more than 3 times the rate of its nearest competitor. Overall, the aggregate results demonstrate that only

Table 2
National Percentage of Party-Label Vote and National Percentage of Vote

		% Label			% Total		
		1986	1990	1994	1986	1990	1994
Left	PCdoB	15.6	17.2	1.8	0.7	0.8	1.2
	PCB/PPS	20.3	22.5	2.9	1.0	1.0	0.6
	PT	22.7	43.3	33.1	6.6	10.5	12.8
	PSB	8.7	8.6	2.1	1.1	2.0	2.2
	PDT	13.5	23.6	5.3	6.4	10.5	7.2
	PSDB	X	9.4	10.9	X	8.7	13.9
	PMDB	15	16.1	3.6	45.7	19.0	20.3
	PP	X	X	0.6	X	X	6.9
	PTB	19.1	12.4	2.3	5.4	6.0	5.2
	PFL	4.7	6.9	1.4	14.2	12.5	12.9
	PSC	6.4	19.9	6.5	1.4	0.8	0.5
	PRN	X	11.9	28	X	6.8	0.4
	PL	3.3	9.8	2.2	3.4	4.3	3.5
	PDC	18.1	9.3	X	0.8	2.7	X
	PDS/PPR	24.6	28.5	2.1	6.7	9.6	9.4
Right	PRONA	X	54.7	81.7	X	0.03	0.7

Note: X = party did not compete or did not exist for that year's election. PCdoB = Partido Comunista do Brasil (Communist Party of Brazil), PCB/PPS = Partido Comunista Brasileiro/Partido Popular Socialista (Brazilian Communist Party/Popular Socialist Party), PT = Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party), PSB = Partido Socialista Brasileiro (Brazilian Socialist Party), PDT = Partido Democrático Trabalhador (Democratic Labor Party), PSDB = Partido da Social-Democracia Brasileira (Brazilian Social-Democratic Party), PMDB = Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement), PP = Partido Popular (Popular Party), PTB = Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party), PFL = Partido da Frente Liberal (Party of the Liberal Front), PSC = Partido Social Cristão (Social Christian Party), PRN = Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (National Reconstruction Party), PL = Partido Liberal (Liberal Party), PDC = Partido Democrático Cristão (Christian Democratic Party), PDS/PPR = Partido Democrático Social/Partido Progressista Reformador (Social Democratic Party/Progressive Reform Party), and PRONA = Partido da Reedificação da Ordem Nacional (Party for the Reedification of National Order)

the PT has consistently gained a high level of label votes over time.¹⁰ This fits the hypotheses articulated above because PT candidates are resource poor, lack access to patronage, and the PT has been so successful at cultivating a label that when it enters alliances, other parties now free ride off of the PT's popularity. On the other hand, because candidates in other parties have more

10. I want to emphasize the word consistently. The PDS/PPR received a relatively high percentage of label votes in 1986 and 1990, but its leader, Paulo Maluf, then destroyed any appeal its label might have had by confusing voters and changing the party's name yet again in 1993 to the PPB. The PPB is known more for its personalistic leader, Paulo Maluf, who happens to be conservative, than for having a leader who happens to be personalistic and espouses a particular conservative ideology. Moreover, the PPB's label appeal appears linked somehow to Maluf. Nation-

access to money and patronage, their parties' label-vote performance conforms to the conventional wisdom articulated above.

Table 2 also reveals the absence of a pattern across the political spectrum, contrary to Mainwaring's (1992, p. 688) suggestion that label voting correlates highly with leftist ideology. For example, two small leftist parties received minuscule percentages of label votes in 1994. The excommunist PPS label vote percentage was reasonably high in 1986 and 1990 but then dropped precipitously in 1994 to 2.9%, a level equal to the clientelistic parties. The reason for this drop reflects the party's political strategy in 1994, when its candidates rode on PT's coattails in electoral alliances. Only one or two PPS candidates ran in each district, and they deemphasized the party label so that the candidates would more likely win a seat within the alliance.

Candidates in the PCdoB, another small resource-poor communist party, adopted the same strategy in 1994, with similar results (1.8% label votes). Only one or two candidates from the PCdoB ran in each district, and in television commercials during the 1994 campaign, PCdoB candidates deemphasized the party label, often not even displaying the traditional hammer and sickle. Instead, PCdoB candidates emphasized their name and ballot number (Carneiro & Schmitt, 1995). Thus, these leftist candidates adapted to the institutional environment and decided to sacrifice collective electoral appeals and instead adopt individualistic campaign strategies.

At the other end of the political spectrum, the PRONA, a small, resource-poor conservative party, received an astonishing percentage of label votes in both 1990 (54.7%) and 1994 (81.7%). In neither election did PRONA enter any alliances.

DISTRICT-LEVEL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The aggregate evidence provided above is suggestive but might be misleading because the national results aggregate state-by-state (i.e., district-

ally, even in 1986 and 1990, the PDS/PPR attracted few label votes: São Paulo state accounted for 39% of the party's total votes for federal deputy in 1990 but accounted for 65% of the party's label votes. Generally, parties that receive a large percentage of their national vote in São Paulo (PDS) PTB, PSDB, and PMDB demonstrate a drop in label voting outside of that state, whereas parties with political bases outside of São Paulo show an increase in label voting when São Paulo is subtracted from their national totals (PDT, PL, PSB, and PRN). This is evidence that parties simply receive some label votes in their electoral strongholds regardless of whether they cultivate the label vote. This does not, however, imply that all parties actually cultivate label votes: There is a more-than-ideological difference between the PPB, which is strong in São Paulo, and the PT, which also is strong in São Paulo. The former gained high label votes, but not consistently, either across space or over time. The PT consistently receives more label votes because it cultivates them.

level) results and I only included the 15 largest national parties in the chart. To reveal more precisely whether campaign finance, pork, and alliance opportunities are important in Brazil, I have constructed two simple statistical models using district-level data from the 1990 and 1994 federal elections (see Appendix A for why 1986 was excluded).

Model 1

Model 1 regresses the percentage of each party's vote in each district that goes to the label (what the Brazilians call a *voto de legenda*), indicated by %LEGENDA. The main variables of interest follow the hypotheses outlined above. First, following Hypothesis 3, I include two variables that attempt to capture access to pork: CABINET, a dummy variable that codes all parties in government and holding ministries in the president's cabinet at the time of the election as 1 and all others as 0; and CABPORK, a dummy variable that equals 1 if a party holds a ministry that distributes pork and 0 otherwise (Fundação Getúlio Vargas, Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil, n.d.).¹¹ If my hypothesis holds, then parties with pork portfolios should obtain a lower label vote percentage than parties without such portfolios. Second, following Hypothesis 4, I include ALLIANCE, a dummy variable equal to 1 for parties in alliances and 0 for parties running alone (Câmara dos Deputados, 1987, 1989; Instituto de Estudos Sócio-Econômicos [INESC], 1994; Senado Federal, 1995; TSE, 1990, 1994). Parties in alliances should obtain a lower percentage of label votes than those not in alliances. I also include several control variables (described below). I used weighted least squares multiple regression analysis for each year's election¹² in equations specified as follows:

11. I considered the following ministries non-pork oriented: gabinete civil (akin to chief of staff), culture, science and technology, environment, justice, foreign relations, planning, and economy. My thanks to Octávio Amorim Neto on this point.

12. I used weighted least squares to correct for heteroskedasticity; variables are weighted by party size and the percentage of the vote that the party received in the state. After running a Chow test for differences between regressions (see Gujarati, 1988, pp. 443-445), I determined that I could not pool the two elections' data and run only one equation without violating the assumption of homoskedasticity. The large differences in residual sum of squares between the two years' equations may be linked to the ballot structure change in 1994, when party labels were eliminated from the ballot. Running one equation with fixed-effects variables for each year does imply that the ballot structure change affected voters' propensity to vote for a label (and the fact that label names were eliminated indicates politicians' desire for this to happen). The 1994 results are not, however, an aberration: Except for ALLIANCE in 1990, all other variables are significant in both equations, independently.

$$\%LEGENDA = a + \beta_1 ALLIANCE + \beta_2 CABINET + \beta_3 CABPORK \\ + \beta_4 INCOME + \beta_5 MAGNITUDE + \beta_6 LEFTIST + \beta_7 PT + e$$

where INCOME is per capita income in the state (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística [IBGE], 1993, pp. 7-101). This variable controls for any regional differences across Brazilian states in terms of economic development. Socioeconomic factors might influence voters' propensity to vote for an individual or a party. MAGNITUDE is the district magnitude—the number of seats in the district. LEFTIST codes leftist parties (including the PT) as 1 and all other parties as 0.¹³ This variable measures whether leftism affects whether candidates adopt collectivist or individualistic strategies. PT is a dummy variable that codes the PT as 1 and all other parties as 0.

If my hypotheses are valid, we should find significant and negative coefficients on the ALLIANCE and CABPORK variables, whereas the CABINET variable's impact is indeterminate. The PT dummy variable, it should be noted, does not distinguish the PT from all other parties but serves as an interactive variable with the LEFTIST dummy variable: The PT variable thus distinguishes the PT only from all other leftist parties, and we expect it to have a strongly positive coefficient, whereas we expect no positive impact of LEFTIST ideology. We expect MAGNITUDE to have a negative coefficient, if any: As the district gets larger, the fight for personal votes should get relatively more desperate (Carey & Shugart, 1995). I also included an indicator of socioeconomic development: per capita INCOME. Following a standard political science argument, some have claimed that Brazil's more developed regions should more likely see party-oriented voting (Schwartzman, 1975).

The results in Table 3 confirm most of my hypotheses.¹⁴ The ALLIANCE variable is strongly significant in the 1994 election, and the CABPORK variable is strongly significant in both elections. INCOME shows a statistically significant impact in 1994 but not in 1990. Further investigation into the relationship between socioeconomic variables and political strategy across Brazil's widely disparate regions could prove fruitful.¹⁵ In addition, contrary to Carey and Shugart (1995), MAGNITUDE exhibits a small but statistically

13. I coded the following parties as leftist: PSB, PPS, PCdoB, PT, and PDT (see Mainwaring, 1995). I did not code the PSDB as leftist based on its less-than-consistent attention to left-ideological programmatic positions.

14. I use one-tailed tests because I have strong theoretical reasons to suggest the slope of the betas on my variables of interest (see Lewis-Beck, 1980, pp. 33-34; Gujarati, 1988, p. 108).

15. To see if the results from the state of São Paulo distort the findings, I ran a regression for each equation that excluded the cases from that state. Doing so does not change my results for 1990; in the 1994 equation, none of my main variables were affected; however, M lost significance.

Table 3
Determinants of Label Voting in Brazilian Legislative Elections, 1990-1994

Variable	Estimated Coefficient (SE)	
	1990	1994
ALLIANCE	-2.27 (2.10)	-2.97 (.85)***
CABINET	-.41 (1.96)	1.27 (.66)*
CABPORK	-4.44 (2.17)*	-1.59 (.60)**
INCOME	.28 (.21)	.39 (.07)***
MAGNITUDE	.20 (.05)***	.05 (.02)***
LEFTIST	2.67 (2.30)	.48 (.83)
PT	18.61 (3.16)***	22.98 (1.00)***
Constant	7.86 (2.88)**	.87 (1.12)
R^2	.30	.76
SER	33.32	11.14
N	314	358

ALLIANCE = a dummy variable equal to 1 for parties in alliances and 0 for parties running alone; CABINET = a dummy variable that codes all parties in government and holding ministries in the president's cabinet at the time of the election as 1 and all others as 0; CABPORK = a dummy variable that equals 1 if a party holds a ministry that distributes pork and 0 otherwise; INCOME = a variable measuring per capita income in the state; MAGNITUDE = a variable measuring the district magnitude—the number of seats in the district; LEFTIST = a variable that codes leftist parties (including the PT) as 1 and all other parties as 0; and PT = a dummy variable that codes the PT as 1 and all other parties as 0. SER = standard error of the regression.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

significant upward pressure on the label vote totals.¹⁶ Finally, as expected, although LEFTIST ideology in general has no effect, the PT distinguishes itself from its ideological fellow travelers by gaining many label votes.¹⁷

Model 2

Model 2 includes data on candidates' access to campaign finance. I run a separate regression with this variable for two reasons: first, because I only have data for the 1994 elections; and second, because I only have donation data for 213 cases in 1994 as opposed to the 358 cases in Model 1 (not all

16. The results should be interpreted in the following way: In 1990, for every one-seat increase in district magnitude, a party would more likely get about 0.2% more label votes.

17. The PT does not drive the equations: Taking the PT out of the equations and running them again does not change the direction of any variable and only minimally affects the magnitude of the betas, except for the ALLIANCE variable in 1994 ($\beta = -1.45$, not significant). Of importance, without the PT data, the LEFTIST variable hardly changes (compare 1990 LEFTIST without the PT: $\beta = 3.27$, not significant; 1994 without the PT: $\beta = .72$, not significant), indicating that leftism independently matters little for label promotion.

Table 4
*Determinants of Label Voting in Brazilian Legislative Elections,
 Including Campaign Donations, 1994*

Variable	Estimated Coefficient (SE)
ALLIANCE	-3.79 (1.09)***
CABINET	1.58 (.86)*
CABPORK	-1.84 (.82)*
DONATIONS	-.000054 (.00000886)*
INCOME	.35 (.09)***
MAGNITUDE	.06 (.02) ***
LEFTIST	.59 (.90)
PT	21.21 (1.16)***
Constant	2.43 (1.40)*
R ²	.77
SER	6.65
N	213

Dependent variable = %LEGENDA; ALLIANCE = a dummy variable equal to 1 for parties in alliances and 0 for parties running alone; CABINET = a dummy variable that codes all parties in government and holding ministries in the president's cabinet at the time of the election as 1 and all others as 0; CABPORK = a dummy variable that equals 1 if a party holds a ministry that distributes pork and 0 otherwise; INCOME = a variable measuring per capita income in the state; MAGNITUDE = a variable measuring the district magnitude—the number of seats in the district; LEFTIST = a variable that codes leftist parties (including the PT) as 1 and all other parties as 0; and PT = a dummy variable that codes the PT as 1 and all other parties as 0. SER = standard error of the regression.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

candidates presented declarations; in particular, candidates in smaller parties failed to do so) (see Appendix B). The model includes all of the variables used in Model 1 as well as a variable denominated DONATIONS, which is the mean declared donation to a party's federal deputy candidates in a given district (TSE, 1997). Following Hypothesis 2, as candidates have access to more money, they should campaign more individualistically and label voting should decline. Table 4 relates the results of Model 2.

The results confirm my hypothesis that access to campaign finance influences label voting: DONATIONS has a statistically significant negative impact, even with the reduced N .¹⁸

In sum, although future research could provide better operational indicators of access to pork and investigate the impact of socioeconomic variables on voters' propensity to respond to deliberate promotion of the party label (e.g., at the state and municipal level), both the descriptive and quantitative

18. The coefficient on DONATIONS reveals that one Real donated to candidates in a given party reduces that party's label vote by .0000154%.

analyses tend to confirm my hypotheses: Although most Brazilian candidates seek money and pork and their parties consequently fail to develop a label, some parties do encourage label voting as a short-term expedient. In this regard, no clear pattern exists across the political spectrum; in fact, small parties across the spectrum vary in their adopted strategy. Leftist ideology is not a sufficient cause of promotion of a party label. Instead, resource constraints and alliance options play important causal roles. Of the large Brazilian parties, only the PT has generated a sizable percentage of label votes consistently. The difference between the PT and the others demands further exploration.

THE WORKERS' PARTY AND OPEN-LIST PR

The empirical data confirm what Brazilianists already know: The PT gets a big label vote. In this section, I question whether ideology is a sufficient explanation for this result and investigate in more detail the institutional underpinnings behind PT candidates' behavior. How does the PT do it? Are the same factors that I considered in Sections 3 and 4—nomination control, access to pork, alliance options—relevant?

The PT is an important actor in Brazilian politics: It is now the fifth largest party in Congress, with 10% of the seats; its candidate (Lula) has finished second in the last three presidential races; its candidates have won the mayor's office of some of Brazil's largest cities, including São Paulo; and in 1994, the party won its first two statehouses. The PT has demonstrated that there is room for a programmatic party in Brazilian politics.

I have argued that political strategy matters for promotion of a label. In this section, I argue that by institutionalizing certain rules, PT politicians have successfully bound their own hands, and consequently, unlike politicians in other (leftist and rightist) parties that lack such internal rules, they have institutionalized their party's label over time. The way in which PT politicians have implemented these mechanisms is not random, nor, as leftists, are their motivations merely ideological; the PT's ideology is not a sufficient condition to explain the party's durable label. In fact, although socialist ideology did play an important role in the PT's self-definition, the party has deliberately never defined a concrete and unified political line onto which voters could easily latch (Garcia, 1991; Gurgel, 1989), as have other Brazilian leftist parties (with less electoral success, it should be noted). The creation of rules is strategic, as well as causal, because it affects the long-term behavior both of PT politicians and Brazilian voters. These institutional innovations are the key to understanding how the PT has found a niche in the individualistic

Brazilian electoral system that the conventional wisdom describes and how, given the PT's lack of resources and allies early on, it was able to institutionalize a party label.

Hypothesis 1: Nomination and Access Control

First, consider the PT's efforts to institutionalize a party structure that held elected representatives collectively accountable to each other and that held elected representatives accountable to the party's popular base. This innovation has allowed the PT to develop a nationwide reputation. Although, as in all other parties, nomination is decentralized, the PT requires that candidates for legislative office be nominated by party *núcleos* (local organizations) instead of through elite negotiations in the state executive committee (Sader & Silverstein, 1991, p. 80). Furthermore, unlike all other parties, the PT prohibits use of the birthright candidate (*candidato nato*) rule, retaining the power to deny deputies a slot on the label come reelection time. In addition, although the party legally cannot impose an order on its candidate list, in contrast to other parties, the PT nominated only one candidate per seat, even though prior to 1994 it could nominate 1.5 candidates per slot for legislative posts (Keck, 1992).¹⁹ All told, then, even though nomination is still decentralized, PT elected leaders are far more beholden to the party than are deputies from other parties.

The PT has institutionalized other rules that discourage individualistic behavior. For example, to maintain its commitment to intraparty democracy and philosophical eclecticism (Gurgel, 1989, p. 88), the party institutionalized factions, but they were institutionalized in a way that maintained party cohesion (Keck, 1992, p. 117): The party allows extensive internal debate, but after internal votes are taken, the party demands "obligatory respect for decisions" (Keck, 1992, p. 96) under the threat of expulsion (Keck, 1992, pp. 222, 230, 235; Novaes, 1993, p. 125), a credible threat that has been carried out on several occasions. Although tension has resulted from the imposition of collective decisions on elected officials (Keck, 1992, p. 216) and PT deputies are hardly a set of doctrinal clones, the party continues to demand and obtain cohesive behavior from its elected officials. In particular, the PT gets exceptionally high cohesion on congressional roll-call votes, nearly 100% (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995a, 1995b). No other party obtains such high discipline, which highlights the success of the combination of internal democracy and collective and individual responsibility to the party that the PT has

19. However, interviews with PT officials in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo suggest that prior to 1994, filling legislative slates with even one candidate per position was difficult for the PT.

engineered. Elected leaders are accountable to each other and depend electorally on each other.

The rules cited above, in combination with the drastic requirement that all PT elected officials must give 30% of their salary to the party, create a sort of implicit nomination control: They effectively dissuade all but the most committed from joining the party. Interviews confirm that although some candidates find the rules tying elected officials to the party appealing, these same rules, and not differences in leftist ideology, often dissuade candidates from entering the PT (Marco Aurélio Garcia, member of the PT National Executive, personal communication, São Paulo, June 29, 1995; Léo Lince, chief aide to the PT leader in the Rio de Janeiro statehouse, personal communication, July 24, 1994; Jaílson de Souza Silva, member of the PT state directory in Rio de Janeiro, personal communication, July 22, 1994). Moreover, as party officials acknowledge, threatened sanctions are heeded because individual politicians, who came to the party lacking resources, know that they would be a fish out of water were they to leave the PT (Marco Aurélio Garcia, personal communication, São Paulo, June 29, 1995). Because of these rules, the PT possesses a largely impermeable recruitment structure, defined as one in which "all higher-level officers and candidates are recruited from lower levels within the party" (Strom, 1990, p. 579). Evidence for the PT's impermeability comes from comparing the rates at which Brazilian deputies change parties: Whereas party switching is common in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (260 changes occurred during the 1991-1994 legislature, when there were 503 deputies), the PT exhibited the lowest level of migration either to or from other parties (Nicolau, 1996). The less a party acts as a revolving door, the more likely it is that the party has created internal rules that discourage both immigration or outmigration and the more likely it is that the party members have attempted to preserve the value of the party label.

In sum, the PT is the only Brazilian party that has institutionalized internal rules that counter Brazil's notoriously individualistic electoral rules. These internal party institutions push PT politicians to adopt more collective strategies, strengthening the party label.

Hypotheses 2 and 3: Lack of Resources

Next, consider PT candidates' historical lack of resources. Brazil has had many leftist parties. Whereas other Brazilian parties, including leftist ones (such as the PTB and PDT), have traditionally formed from the top down, the PT's leaders organized the party from the bottom up, without access to governmental goods and without deep pockets backing their efforts. As shown in

Table 1, PT candidates have fewer monetary resources for campaigning. Moreover, since its formation the PT has won relatively few executive-level positions; although it has won a few spectacular victories at the municipal level (such as the city of São Paulo in 1988), only in 1994 did it win two gubernatorial races. This lack of access to executive office means that, unlike other parties, the PT has not built up an extensive clientelistic network that depends on access to government for survival. Instead, grassroots unions and social movements opposing Brazil's military regime in the late 1970s provided the base for the party's formation and electoral growth. The key difference between the PT and its leftist contemporaries is that the party's rank and file have been important political resources and have taken an active role in party planning, institutionalizing, and decision making (Keck, 1992; Sader & Silverstein, 1991). Thus, although the PT as an organization has greater resources than do other parties, as in other Brazilian parties, the PT does not pay its candidates' campaign expenses. Instead, PT candidates use the PT's organizational resources, which results in a different campaign style.

Hypothesis 4: Alliance Strategy

Finally, consider how the PT's electoral alliance strategy generates a collective party image. At its inception, the PT eschewed electoral alliances in order to establish a collective reputation. For example, in 1982, the PT refused to join the largest opposition party (the PMDB) in alliances in order to affirm its presence as "an autonomous force" (Sader & Silverstein, 1991, p. 80). Prior to 1985, even discussion of entering alliances was considered taboo (Keck, 1992) because PT candidates felt that alliances would "dilute the party's program" (Keck, 1992, p. 226). By the late 1980s, however, the party had modified its tactics and began to enter alliances. Still, the PT did not succumb to the temptation to ally with any party simply for short-term expedient. The PT has never abandoned its position as standard-bearer of the opposition and has tactically chosen to ally only with opposition parties. In 1994, smaller leftist parties sacrificed their own party labels to free ride on the PT's popular national image.²⁰ Moreover, the PT has maintained a national alliance strategy: The national directory imposes a right of veto on state directories' alliance decisions (Nicolau, 1994, p. 18). Thus, although the PT now commonly enters electoral alliances, contrary to what my hypothesis might predict,

20. The PT recognizes that alliances allow smaller parties to free ride but makes this sacrifice to garner support for its executive-office candidates (José Luís Fevereiro, member of the PT National Executive Committee, personal communication, Rio de Janeiro, July 26, 1994; see also "Tempo de TV", 1994; "Tempo na TV", 1994.

because the PT initially eschewed alliances, it initially established a strong national partisan reputation. Currently, unlike other parties (which never had strong labels to begin with), because the PT maintains a consistent national alliance strategy, it has consequently been able to counter the predicted impact of entering alliances and maintained the image of its party label intact.

EFFECTS OF PT STRATEGY: CAMPAIGN BEHAVIOR

What are the effects of nomination control, lack of resources, and a national alliance strategy? How do the PT's internal rules play out in electoral politics? Following the hypotheses elaborated above, PT candidates innovate cheaper ways of attracting votes: During campaigns, PT candidates deliberately attempt to attract label votes. Party leaders encourage candidates to incorporate broad themes, such as opposition to the national government and promotion of social rights, into the context of local issues. Adopting broad appeals levels the playing field for the PT because it has fewer financial resources. For example, one labor-intensive way in which the PT promotes the party vote happens on election day: The PT brings activists to polling places with signs and banners that read "Vote #13" (the party's official electoral code number) or "Vote PT" to encourage those who have not made the choice of an individual candidate to cast a party vote.

In addition, the PT uses its media exposure differently than other parties, encouraging voters to vote the label. Brazilian law prohibits individual candidates from independently advertising on television and radio. The government instead allots air time to parties, which broadcast their programs twice a day, every day, for 2 months before elections.²¹ Parties decide how to divide their allotted time. Because the personal vote is most important for all candidates, we can assume that all candidates would rather have more TV time than less. Distribution of TV time causes fierce intraparty squabbles because the average time that each candidate gets is generally very short. In Rio de Janeiro in 1994, PT candidates received 9 seconds each, once a week. For the larger parties, candidates could get 30 seconds each.

The PT in Rio de Janeiro deliberately attempted to increase its label vote by promoting a *puxador de legenda* (literally, a vote puller) during its free media time in 1994. This entailed granting more airtime to one candidate over the rest.²² The candidate did not then engage in self-promotion but instead encouraged voters to mark their ballots for the PT label, as he

21. One third of the time is divided equally and two thirds of the time is allotted proportionally according to each party's number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies (see Câmara dos Deputados, 1993).

recognized his colleagues expected of him (Milton Temer, PT candidate for federal deputy, personal communication, Rio de Janeiro, July 25, 1994).²³ The logic behind this party decision is clear: With a marketable party label, and free air time, the PT can cheaply provide an information shortcut to voters; the PT employs a collective puxador de legenda because its candidates lack the financial resources to run expensive modern campaigns.

SUMMARY: THE PT LABEL OVER THE LONG TERM

Why adopt a structure that enhances cohesion? During the early phases of Brazil's redemocratization (1978-1980), only the formation of a different party, with a strong organizational structure, would guarantee to the heterogeneous political and social movements and their potential electoral supporters that the PT would tie its own hands and remain distinct in the long term. These groups had been either excluded from channeling their demands through representative political institutions or were simply disenchanting with the political process. To convince these groups that the PT would remain different, PT politicians had to innovate rules to make themselves more dependent on their own organization. By enforcing cohesion and promoting a label, PT politicians created a cheap baseline political identity that could be marketed to a broad spectrum of social groups and lowered the costs to individuals or small groups of participating in politics. The relative success of the PT is a testament to this strategy.

PT leaders and representatives have incentives to promote cohesion that others do not: Their effectiveness does not depend on allegiance to a political boss, or being able to buy votes, but on the effectiveness and success of their organization. PT politicians favor long-term collective interests, although immediate electoral considerations are of course important. This is significantly different from other parties' legislators, who value long-term individual gain above all. Similar to other leftist politicians, PT politicians have different political goals and resources from other nonleftists, but, unlike other leftist politicians, the PT has invested in cohesive,

22. The PT's puxadores de legenda had 30 seconds, whereas other candidates had 9 seconds per appearance. In other parties, a puxador is not nominated, it simply defines a popular candidate.

23. The decision to let a candidate act as puxador and receive extra TV or radio time creates jealousy and intense rivalry within the PT. As Adilson Pires, PT city council member in Rio de Janeiro (personal communication, July 23, 1994) put it,

Of 46 deputy candidates we have, 33 will get about 2,000 votes. They have absolutely no chance. The real battle for the seats is with the next 10 guys, who get about 10,000 votes each. The puxadores will get 20,000 votes each. So the real problem for us is who gets to be puxador.

programmatic behavior by developing an array of powerful internal rules. This creates a stronger party label in comparison with other Brazilian parties across the political spectrum.

In sum, the PT's founders, by deciding to enter electoral politics, had to take institutions into account. Because the PT was not linked to government, was not formed from within the Congress, did not have an established team of well-known politicians, and generally lacked financial resources, it could not compete on the same turf as the other parties by using similar tactics. Instead, the PT had to differentiate its identity, and its candidates' identities, from other politicians and parties. Unlike other leftist parties in Brazilian history, such as the PTB, to ensure that individual politicians would resist the temptation of the pork barrel and to realize its long-term goals, the PT institutionalized its difference. These internal party institutions, more so than PT ideology (which the PT has never defined), make the costs of defection by an individual PT politician much higher than they are to politicians in other (leftist) parties. PT elected officials owe their mandates, and political futures, much more to the party than do politicians from other parties. Because of internal party rules, and not simply ideology, PT politicians behave differently both within the party and in the public arena. The result is cohesiveness and the use of a strong party label. Voters clue into this cue, causing the PT to consistently gain more party-label votes than other parties. This institutional innovation in the Brazilian system has proved to be the PT's strength over the last 15 years.²⁴

CONCLUSION

This article contributes to our understanding of how politicians with different resources and strategies adapt to a given set of electoral rules and has advanced our understanding of Brazilian electoral politics. First, I argued that although analysts correctly claim that a given electoral system creates static incentives to promote more or less individualism, this notion provides little purchase on assessing the causes of within-system variation on the same dependent variable. Thus, although a system's electoral rules may push toward individualism, I argue that not all politicians have the capability to compete effectively with a purely individualistic strategy. Although being in

24. Given the PT's electoral success, it now has deputies in many states and has cracked the executive-office barrier by winning two statehouses in 1994. The temptations of office holding and Brazil's vast regional differences may strain the PT's cohesiveness. However, if the PT maintains its internal rules and its alliance strategy, it ought to also retain its strong national party label. Only time will tell.

an alliance may push candidates to downplay their partisan attachments, candidates may be restrained by owing their nomination to the central party and they may lack access to money and/or patronage. Therefore, some politicians adapt to the rules and appeal to those voters who are either not linked to a patronage system or who reject it.

Second, I used electoral data from Brazil's recent congressional elections to test the hypothesized relationships and found that access to campaign finance and pork and alliance strategy influence a party's promotion of its label. Several important new findings emerged from this analysis. The most significant finding was that although many parties gain sizable percentages of label votes, the Workers' Party is the only large Brazilian party to exhibit a consistently high percentage of label votes across space and time, which confirms the street-knowledge perception that the PT is distinct from the mass of rent-a-parties that characterize Brazilian electoral politics in that it has a nationally recognizable party label.

I also found that no clear pattern on the dependent variable exists across the political spectrum in Brazil, illuminating the counterintuitive finding that for important aspects of electoral strategy in Brazil, institutional rules trump ideology. In Brazil, the consequences of ideology in general remain unclear in terms of electoral strategy: Politicians in leftist parties do not necessarily cultivate labels, do not necessarily eschew personalism and cultivate policy-oriented votes, and do not necessarily develop an obviously different connection to voters, at least in terms of directing their supporters in how to vote. Conversely, rightist parties do not necessarily always cultivate only personal votes. At times, particularly for small parties, resource limits and alliance possibilities push parties on the left to adopt personalistic strategies and push parties on the right to adopt collective strategies.

Finally, I explained how PT politicians counteract the incentives of the electoral system over the long term. The PT's leftist ideology, which the party has refused to define exactly, may be a necessary condition but is not a sufficient explanation for the cohesion that the party demonstrates and its promotion of a party label. Instead, PT politicians have distinguished themselves from others, particularly other leftists, by making the costs of individualistic behavior too high. Several sanctioning mechanisms, including controlling access to the label and credibly threatening expulsion, achieve this result. Consequently, the benefits of a party label have exceeded the costs, and the PT remains the only party to consistently gain a high percentage of label votes in legislative elections across Brazil.

Although I have provided details on only one country, the logic of my hypotheses is general and builds on Strom's (1990) and Myerson's (1993)

theoretical approaches to the study of the behavior of candidates and political parties and Carey and Shugart's (1995) effort to compare the incentives for individualism that various electoral systems generate. Future research could extend this argument and attempt to explain variation across parties in other candidate-centric systems.

APPENDIX A Electoral Data

I compiled electoral data from Brazil's Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) computer diskettes for 1990 and 1994. I calculated the percentage of every party's label vote and total vote in every district (state) for 1994. For 1990, I excluded the state of Goiás because of a recording of "zero" label votes in that state, an impossible result.

The TSE never prepared a complete set of election returns for 1986. I obtained computer printouts from state Regional Electoral Tribunals. Several states are missing, including Rondônia, Acre, Piauí, Paraíba, Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goiás. Moreover, the results from several other states do not allow one to separate out the label votes by party because they are grouped by alliance.

I also do not have complete data on alliances; this problem was particularly acute for 1986. The TSE does not provide data on parties or alliances of parties that do not win at least one seat in either federal or state elections. Thus, although for the three elections I found 1,136 cases, I only had alliance membership data for 672 cases. Because I lacked complete electoral returns and adequate alliance data for 1986, I excluded that year's election from the regression.

APPENDIX B Campaign Finance Data

No empirical studies of campaign spending in Brazil exist because Brazilian law does not require candidates to detail expenditures. However, for the 1994 elections, Brazil's Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) required candidates to submit a *prestação de contas* (registry of campaign contributions) (TSE, 1997).²⁵ Because the TSE lacks mechanisms to enforce its rules, we can assume that candidates underreported

25. The data contain information on all registered campaign contributions ($n = 141,162$) to candidates for the following offices during the 1994 calendar year: president, governor, senator, federal deputy, and state deputy. Candidates are required to send a report to their state's regional electoral tribunal, which then sends all records from the state to the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE) in Brasília. Twenty-four states sent records: Rio de Janeiro, Alagoas, and Mato Grosso do Sul did not. Not all candidates submitted a *prestação de contas*: For federal deputy, the 24 states

contributions. However, we can also assume that all candidates have the same incentives to underreport (or not), and so although reported donations may only represent some fraction of total campaign expenditures, the ratio of the average donations in a state of one type of office to the others is likely to reflect accurately the relative costs of each type of campaign.²⁶

In 1994, winning candidates declared the following donations, on average:

Position	Amount (rounded to nearest thousand)
Governor	R\$2,497,000
Senator	R\$377,000
Federal Deputy	R\$94,000
State Deputy	R\$34,000

From the data, we see that, on average, a winning gubernatorial candidate declares about 6 times more than a winning senatorial candidate, who in turn declares about 4 times more than a winning candidate for federal deputy. A winning candidate for federal deputy declares about 3 times as much as a winning candidate for state deputy (TSE, 1997).

Can we trust the data? Declared donations do range considerably by state and by candidate, particularly for gubernatorial and senatorial candidates. For example, the winning candidates for governor in the (relatively poor) states of Piauí and Paraíba declared donations of R\$310,000 and R\$320,000, respectively, whereas their counterparts in the (relatively rich) states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais declared donations of R\$10 million and R\$11 million, respectively. Two winning Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party, PT) senate candidates from small, poor states declared donations of only R\$3,500 and R\$6,500, respectively, whereas a winning PSDB senate candidate in São Paulo declared donations of almost R\$2 million. From "soaking and poking" in the field during the 1992, 1994, and 1996 election seasons, I believe that the wide range particularly evident in declared donations is due to real differences

that sent records to the TSE send 450 deputies to Congress. I only included donations made on or after July 1, 1994: Brazil changed currencies on this day and closely tied its currency's exchange rate to the dollar, nearly halting runaway inflation in its tracks. Prior to July 1, 1994, inflation had been running at between 30% to 50% per month, making currency standardization difficult. This decision eliminates less than 5% of all donations.

26. Candidates are required to submit receipts of donation amounts and the donor's government-issued personal or corporate registration number (cadastro de pessoa física [CPF] or cadastro de pessoa jurídica [CPJ]). All bank transactions require a CPF or CPJ. However, bank records can only be opened after a lengthy, complex, and costly legal battle, which makes tracking donations very difficult. Thus, a candidate could provide a receipt for a \$10 donation when in fact he or she received \$10,000. Although TSE officials recognize that this probably occurs frequently, they acknowledged that the phenomenon is also probably randomly distributed across candidates (Valéria Alves de Sousa, head of internal control, Tribunal Regional Eleitoral, personal communication, São Paulo, September 23, 1996; Salatiel Carvalho, head of internal control, TSE, personal communication, Brasília, June 17, 1997).

in campaign costs and not nonrandom underreporting. For example, PT candidates have less access to money and rely instead on grassroots get-out-the-vote supporters.

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