

One Nation under Arms? Military Participation Policy and the Politics of Identity

RONALD R. KREBS

Students of comparative military organizations have advanced three hypotheses to explain when armed forces adopt more liberal manpower policies: when a major security threat looms, when the military professionalizes, or when the surrounding society grows more tolerant of difference. This article argues that all three are theoretically and empirically problematic: they potentially have much to contribute, but only in conjunction with a perspective that is more appreciative of the centrality of political processes. Enduring reform of the military's participation policies is more productively viewed through the lens of the struggle over national and communal identity. To illustrate the power of this alternative approach, this article reconsiders cases commonly cited in support of the existing hypotheses: the racial desegregation of the U.S. military, the integration of the Druze into the Israel Defense Forces, and the imperial and independent Indian armies' policies with respect to what the British termed "class."

The participation (or manpower) policies of armed forces determine who serves in the military and in what capacity. Accused of disloyalty or incompetence, communal minorities have often faced discrimination in military institutions. They have been segregated. They have been limited to support units in which it was claimed they could do the least damage to national security or to which it was asserted they were best suited by virtue of their intellectual and physical endowments. They have been sent into battle as cannon fodder, with minimal training and shoddy equipment. Hemmed in

Ronald R. Krebs is assistant professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities.

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by promotion ceilings, they have been under-represented in the officer corps. They have, in other words, often occupied positions on the exclusionary half of the manpower policy scale—when they have not been barred from service altogether.¹

At times, in contrast, militaries have pursued more inclusive policies. They have not simply permitted minorities to serve but have integrated them into mainstream units, opened the full range of career tracks, provided opportunities for all assignments, and ensured qualified members access to officer training and appointments—in short, they have created real equality. Between these poles on the equality-discrimination continuum lie a range of mixed positions, and armed forces have historically occupied all of them. As the subjects of episodic negotiation, the policies governing militaries' treatment of minority manpower have continually been in flux.² Existing accounts have sought to explain change by focusing on factors such as security competition, military professionalization, and social structure, but they have fallen short because they have failed to recognize that these policies are the product of a thoroughly political process.³

¹ For a catalog of discriminatory military practices, see Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).

² Although there is a substantial literature on change in military organizations with regard to doctrine, roles and missions, and force structure, that on the military's manpower policies is less extensive. For the former, see Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, eds., *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds., *The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

³ The configuration of domestic political interests features prominently, however, in accounts of specific cases, and the case studies in this article draw heavily on such historical narratives. Such factors are also notable in the closely related literature on military recruitment systems. See Deborah D. Avant, "From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War," *International Organization* 54, no. 1 (winter 2000): 41–72; Bastien Irondelle, "Civil-Military Relations and the End of Conscription in France," *Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (spring 2003): 157–87; Anna Leander, "Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription," *Armed Forces and Society* 30, no. 4 (summer 2004): 571–99; and John Lynn, ed., *Tools of War: Instruments, Ideas, and Institutions of Warfare, 1445–1871* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990). For (less than pure) realist views, see Eliot A. Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); George Q. Flynn, *Conscription and Democracy: The Draft in France, Great Britain, and the United States* (Westport: Greenwood, 2002); Karl W. Haltiner, "The Decline of the European Mass Armies," in *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*, ed. Giuseppe Caforio (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 361–84; and Justin McKenna, "Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France," *West European Politics* 20, no. 4 (1997): 125–45. For a more purely realist perspective, derived largely from study of the Anglo-American experience, see Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

This article makes the case for a more deeply political explanation of change in armed forces' manpower policies. More specifically, as a crucial sociocultural site, the military has at times become a major, or even the chief, battleground in contention over the identity and values of the political community. Enduring shifts in military participation policies often have less to do with narrow military needs than with these larger struggles. This argument is advanced by reexamining the histories of three countries whose experiences are typically cited in support of the aforementioned variables. The four case studies explore the origins of the racial desegregation of the U.S. military, of the integration of the Druze into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), of the imperial Indian army's policies with respect to what the British termed "class," and of the independent Indian army's gradual (and only partial) turn away from its imperial design.

Understanding where military manpower policies come from and why they change speaks directly to important questions in the study of politics and international relations. First, military service has, at least in the nation-state system, long been intertwined with citizenship and national belonging—arguably a polity's most central questions.⁴ Military manpower policies have aroused intense and passionate debate not primarily because they have implications for fighting effectiveness but because they are believed to matter for national identity. Patterns of military service are the subject of political contest, but they may also shape the processes through which nations are constructed and reconstructed.⁵

Second, military manpower policies are important determinants of combat effectiveness and ultimately battlefield victory. Civilian and military leaders have often feared—typically without good reason—that potentially rebellious minorities would turn their guns on their fellow citizens or provide the enemy with classified information on the most fundamental strategic and operational matters; were they to do so, they might supply the crucial difference. Discriminatory manpower policies dictated by communal politics imply their own costs, however, for they compel militaries to allocate resources in suboptimal ways. Assigning suspect ethnic troops, regardless of their individual talents, to support duties deprives combat forces and intelligence units of valuable members. Widely dispersing groups within armies, to avoid concentrations of troops of any single ethnicity, seems like a reasonable precaution, but such a strategy slowed Russia's mobilization before the Second World War and led Germany to believe the Schlieffen

⁴ See, among many others, Morris Janowitz, "Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," *Armed Forces and Society* 2, no. 2 (February 1976): 185–204; and Peter Paret, *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 39–52.

⁵ See Ronald R. Krebs, "A School for the Nation? How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (spring 2004): 85–124; and Ronald R. Krebs, *Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).

Plan was feasible. Fully excluding minorities from military service limits the amount of manpower that can be mobilized. This article thus indirectly contributes to a recent flowering of research on the conduct of war and the sources of military effectiveness and draws attention to a relatively neglected factor.⁶

This article proceeds in four parts. The first presents a critical review of the theoretical logic underlying the three main existing propositions. The second part elaborates the case for the preeminence of politics in explaining shifts in military manpower policies. The next section examines the four cases and presents an alternative reading of the historical evidence. The conclusion explores the implications of this argument for both scholarship and contemporary politics.

THREE HYPOTHESES IN SEARCH OF AN ARMY

Existing scholarship suggests three hypotheses regarding the conditions under which states may broaden or narrow the communal basis for military service and install policies of greater or lesser equality. These arguments are, if considered alone, theoretically problematic and empirically flawed. Such propositions nevertheless provide some explanatory leverage—but only when embedded within a larger causal account that emphasizes the centrality of the political process.

Threat

A structural realist would suggest that the geopolitical environment is the factor that most powerfully shapes the military's manpower policies.⁷ Under conditions of relative peace, military institutions operate with substantial slack and have the luxury of tolerating communal discrimination and the concomitant inefficient exploitation of human resources. Whether at the insistence of the surrounding political community or in response to the officer corps' own inclinations, the armed forces can afford to maintain an inequitable status quo. Under such conditions, moreover, there is

⁶ See, among others, Allan Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987); Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam III, *Democracies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Michael C. Desch, "Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (fall 2002): 5–47; and Risa A. Brooks, "Making Military Might: Why Do States Fail and Succeed? A Review Essay," *International Security* 28, no. 2 (fall 2003): 149–91.

⁷ In explaining the design of military recruitment systems, Cynthia Enloe combines geopolitical with regime-security imperatives, while Eliot Cohen highlights ideological considerations in addition to geopolitical factors. See Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, 50–84; Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers*, 25–41.

little functional reason to reform, certainly not enough to persuade potential reformers to bear the costs of change.⁸

Conversely, a threatening international environment creates powerful incentives to reform. First, it heightens the relative importance of the functional imperative and renders existing inefficiencies intolerable, for the nation's very survival may hang in the balance. Under such circumstances, the military will put in place more liberal policies that make full use of available manpower. Second, even if the military fails to pursue reformist steps of its own accord, civilians attuned to the international distribution of power will intervene to compel meaningful change.⁹ Third, the drive to mobilize national resources for war has historically contributed to the development of state institutions, but it has also often required the state to bargain with powerful groups whose resources it wishes to extract.¹⁰ As the price of their compliance, these groups may demand more liberal terms of service, and, under conditions of intense threat, the state will be hard-pressed to refuse.

Perceived necessity has undoubtedly played an important role in motivating civilian and military leaders to take unwanted steps with regard to manpower policy. On several occasions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the U.S. armed forces, for example, recruited African-Americans and sometimes even integrated them into naval crews and infantry companies. But the American experience is also instructive, for these reforms did not prove lasting until the desegregation of the 1940s and 1950s: once the manpower pressures had subsided, the door to the military swiftly swung shut. Yet such threat-induced changes have also at times proved enduring, as when security competition combined with the belief in the superiority of the mass army to force nineteenth-century European statesmen to impose widespread conscription and to open their formerly closed political systems to the lower classes. Such variation might be explained by returning to the three aforementioned logics, which have divergent implications for the permanence of the policy shift. The first suggests that any liberalization will be short-lived and that policy will revert once the threat abates; the second yields no conclusions as to whether the change will endure; whereas the third implies a

⁸ On the classic distinction between the military's functional and societal imperatives, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 2–3 and passim.

⁹ Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*, 55–57.

¹⁰ On war mobilization and state-building, see, among a large and growing literature, Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*, ed. Felix Gilbert (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 178–215; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 67–95; and Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1994). On war mobilization, military format, and state-society bargaining, see Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, 96–117; and Everett Carl Dolman, *The Warrior State: How Military Organization Structures Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), esp. 24–34.

more permanent reconfiguration of the domestic political balance and hence a more durable change in manpower policy.

Although perceptions of military necessity cannot be entirely excluded from accounts of military liberalization—examples abound of such considerations influencing manpower choices—an increasingly threatening international environment does not logically yield more liberal policies. In fact, external threats have often made states especially sensitive to their internal lines of division, whether these take an ideological or a communal form. The atmosphere in the United States in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, particularly for immigrants and to a lesser extent for Muslims and Americans of Arab descent, makes this point particularly clearly.¹¹ States facing intense threats are as likely to maintain existing or impose new discriminatory policies that will keep the military trustworthy as they are to throw the military's doors wide open. Leaders may reason that they are better off mobilizing fewer resources that are dependable than greater resources that are questionable; this would reveal them to be risk-averse, not irrational.

The threat hypothesis is challenged by two sorts of cases. It cannot explain why some militaries might persist in discriminatory policies despite imposing threats, except by arguing, in post hoc fashion, that the threat was insufficient to propel change. A case in point is Israel. Had Israel not been surrounded by threatening Arab states, it is hard to imagine that its Arab citizens would have been denied the opportunity to serve in the IDF. At the same time, the hypothesis cannot account for military liberalization in the context of a relatively stable threat environment. The IDF is puzzling from this perspective as well. Although Israel's threat baseline was fairly high from the 1950s through the late 1970s, it was, broadly speaking, also fairly stable. Yet the IDF's manpower policy grew more liberal over time, as the military began to draft males from potentially disloyal minority groups, notably the Druze and the Circassians, and gradually loosened the restrictions on those groups' participation.

Professionalism

Alon Peled has suggested that the degree of military professionalism is the strongest predictor of a multiethnic military's manpower policies. The

¹¹ After September 11, President George W. Bush and other leading administration figures proclaimed that the "war on terror" was not directed at Islam or Arabs in general and pointedly embraced American Muslims and Arabs. Nevertheless, the government did begin to conduct more intensive surveillance of Arab and Muslim immigrants, and the number of hate crimes directed at Arabs and Muslims (not surprisingly) rose dramatically. Although Bush's rhetoric was admirable and his administration's policies restrained, particularly compared to the repressive treatment of German-Americans during the First World War and Japanese-Americans during the Second World War, it is incontrovertible that Americans became more sensitive to this internal dividing line after September 11. For a useful discussion, see Gary Gerstle, "Pluralism and the War on Terror," *Dissent* 50, no. 2 (spring 2003): 31–38.

professional officer devotes his energies to defending the state against external threats and does not meddle in domestic politics or combat the regime's internal enemies. Fixated on his military task, he concerns himself with his soldiers' backgrounds only insofar as they are relevant to building an efficient fighting force. Peled argues that professional militaries are blind to differences of religion, ethnicity, class, and so on.¹²

This hypothesis also suffers from a major theoretical flaw. Even the idealized officer attuned exclusively to the military's functional imperative may design the armed forces' policies around such categories as ethnicity and gender—not because he is pursuing a domestic political agenda but because such categories may, he believes or at least publicly declares, have ramifications for combat effectiveness. By most accounts, the American officer corps in the late 1940s was fairly professional, but the services, especially the army, steadfastly resisted racial desegregation. At times, the policy's defenders rehashed old (highly problematic) evidence that African-Americans were inherently less capable. More often, they blamed pervasive societal racism and declared that desegregation would undermine unit cohesion—no matter what their personal views on race matters.¹³ Undoubtedly many American officers did not truly believe these arguments they so readily professed, but, their sincerity aside, these claims were consistent with professional military norms. More than half of American commissioned and noncommissioned officers today oppose the open inclusion of gays in the U.S. armed forces, ostensibly because of similar concerns. Yet most observers would nonetheless hail their professionalism, particularly by historical standards.¹⁴

In short, professionalization may have no impact on a military's manpower policies.¹⁵ Nothing in the Huntingtonian model prevents officers from coming to the table with and avidly defending manpower policies rooted in ascriptive social categories—as long as they can plausibly be linked to military effectiveness.

¹² Alon Peled, *A Question of Loyalty: Military Manpower Policy in Multiethnic States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). On professionalism, see Huntington, *Soldier and the State*, 7–18.

¹³ Bernard C. Nalty, *Strength for the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military* (New York: Free Press, 1986), 204–54; and Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 135–217.

¹⁴ For the most recent survey of U.S. military attitudes toward gays, see National Annenberg Election Survey, press release, 16 October 2004, available at http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/naes/2004_03_2military-data_10-16_pr.pdf, accessed 24 March 2005.

¹⁵ It may also be the case, as Alfred Stepan suggests with regard to the Brazilian armed forces, that military cultures continually redefine the meaning of professionalism. He sees the Brazilian officer corps as adhering to professional norms that emphasize the acquisition of expertise in internal security (extraordinarily broadly defined), that stress the linkages and overlaps (rather than a sharp divide) between the military and civilian spheres, and that consequently encourage and even valorize the politicization of the officer corps. See Alfred Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion," in Alfred Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 47–53.

Social Structure and Values

Many have argued that armed forces mirror broader social patterns and trends. As one study concluded after reviewing several cases, "militaries tend to reflect the cleavages, stratifications, class relationships, and biases that are present in the larger society in which they exist." The French army of the Third Republic, one historian similarly maintained, acted "as a magnifying lens revealing aspects of national problems and of personal tensions, more clearly than they. . . [could] be seen in civil society."¹⁶ This implies a relevant hypothesis: if the military, for good or for ill, reflects the surrounding society (and all its inequities), manpower policy will change only when society itself changes.

While this body of literature has persuasively documented the cases in which militaries have paralleled their societies, it has underestimated the state's ability to act autonomously of social forces and constitute its military in ways that diverge from society's composition.¹⁷ As the historian Richard Kohn has noted with regard to the United States, "We should not *expect* the army as an institution to reflect society unless a centralized, stratified, cohesive, authoritarian, and autocratic institution can reflect a decentralized, heterogeneous, individualistic, democratic society."¹⁸ It may be true that "societies are uncomfortable with military organizations whose structures do not reflect the dominant characteristics of their societies,"¹⁹ but that discomfort can be resolved. The armed forces may be brought into line with social norms, or society may turn out to be the more moveable force in the long run. For instance, states have less often been spawned by fully formed nations' aspirations for independence than they have themselves shaped those national communities.²⁰ Similarly, armed forces have at times accorded minority communal groups more equal treatment than the latter have received from society

¹⁶ Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani, "The Military as a Vehicle for Social Integration," in *Ethnicity, Integration, and the Military*, ed. Henry Dietz, Jerrold Elkin, and Maurice Roumani (Boulder: Westview, 1991), 15–16; and Theodore Zeldin, *France, 1848–1945*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 905.

¹⁷ On state autonomy, see J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20, no. 4 (July 1968): 559–92; and Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in *Bringing the State Back In*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 3–37.

¹⁸ Richard H. Kohn, "The American Soldier: Myths in Need of History," in *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Army and the American People*, ed. Garry D. Ryan and Timothy K. Nenninger (Washington: National Archives and Records Administration, 1987), 54. See also Richard H. Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and Prospectus for Research," *American Historical Review* 86, no. 3 (June 1981): 553–67.

¹⁹ Rosen, *Societies and Military Power*, 8. See also Andrew J. Goodpaster, "West Point, the Army, and Society: American Institutions in Constellation," in Ryan and Nenninger, *Soldiers and Civilians*, 3–12.

²⁰ See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, rev. ed. (New York: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986).

at large. The post–Second World War U.S. military—acclaimed as “an organization unmatched in its level of racial integration . . . [and] in its broad record of black achievement” and as “the only place in American life where whites are routinely bossed around by blacks”²¹—is only the best-known example.

This critique would appear not to apply to the more nuanced arguments of Stephen Peter Rosen. Rosen has suggested that the military at times reflects society only imperfectly: the smaller the military and the more isolated it is from society at large, the more it can diverge from societal imperatives.²² This recognition of the importance of both social structure and state design is an important advance, but it suffers from several flaws. First, the thrust of Rosen’s work is that profound tensions between societal and military values and views are not sustainable over the long run and that, when such strains come to the fore, social structure predominates.²³ Thus he does not take issue with others in the “social structure” school but simply introduces a lag (of indeterminate length) to account for instances in which there is no convergence. Second, relying on the military’s isolation as a central causal factor begs a question: Why are some states more capable than others of resisting societal pressure and creating more professional forces? Rosen offers no theoretical answer, but his historical accounts repeatedly turn to social structure. In explaining why the Maratha and Bombay armies implemented the European model more fully than other pre-imperial Indian armies, for instance, he focuses on those regions’ relatively liberal attitudes toward caste.²⁴ Despite Rosen’s claim that politics occupies an autonomous space, his empirical cases all but reduce politics to social structure. Third, Rosen implies that an isolated military is more professional and less political. Politics enters his account only when the military is brought into contact with society. But it is political contest that must determine whether the military’s isolation is maintained or disrupted in the first place.

Toward an Alternative

The comparative study of military organizations has often seemed curiously apolitical, and that is reflected in the three approaches explored above. All three allow politics into the story of manpower policy, but only as the proverbial fly in the ointment, as that which introduces discriminatory societal values and causes deviations from the ideal. All three turn to some factor beyond the realm of political contest to explain how such discrimination is overcome. All three seek analytically to seal off their accounts from political contestation by

²¹ Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler, *All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Racial Integration the Army Way* (New York: Basic Books, 1996), 2.

²² Rosen, *Societies and Military Power*, 29–30 and passim.

²³ *Ibid.*, 267.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 174, 178–79.

rooting their explanations in (allegedly stable) social structures, (supposedly objective) geopolitical competition, or military professionalization. Yet all three of necessity rely on political factors to a substantial degree in their empirical accounts, and questions about their theoretical frameworks inevitably lead one back to the political domain. All three treat their favored variables as independent, but the latter are in fact endogenous to political competition. Societal values are forged and reformed in the cauldron of politics. Threats are not objective, but constructed: they are defined and their intensity and immediacy are determined in the political arena. Military institutions are not immune from politics, for often political contest deeply affects those institutions' character and thus the level of professionalization of the officer corps. In short, existing accounts are not so much wrong as they are incomplete. A more political perspective cannot fully replace analysts' traditional emphases, but it does contextualize, and even subsume, such accounts.

BRINGING POLITICS BACK IN

A political explanation of shifts in manpower policy begins with the insight that the military is more than just a war-fighting machine: it is a social and cultural site.²⁵ The military has, in the popular imagination, long been associated with citizenship and nationhood.²⁶ In the latter half of the nineteenth century, it was widely hailed across Europe as a "school for the nation," and its apparent success in that endeavor was emulated as far away as tsarist Russia, Meiji Japan, and even Brazil. That reputation has proved enduring: states across the political spectrum turned to the armed forces in the quest for national integration throughout the twentieth century. Militaries are central national symbols, repositories of mythical constructions of the past and embodiments of the nation's aspirations. War and consequently the armed forces are central to the stories peoples tell about themselves, to tales of national origins and of struggles for independence. It is no accident that the symbols and rituals surrounding festivals of national independence and unification have traditionally been interwoven with martial imagery.²⁷ From the

²⁵ I am particularly indebted to Aaron Belkin for help in clarifying this argument.

²⁶ Thus a prominent student of the U.S. military has concluded that changes in the organization of the American military reflect shifting understandings of the service-citizenship nexus—"from being an obligation of citizenship in a community to being an obligation of national citizenship and, most recently, to being a job"—and such conceptual transformations, while rooted in part in technological change and broader trends toward bureaucratic rationalization, are not entirely reducible to them. See David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), 45 and passim.

²⁷ Anthony D. Smith, "War and Ethnicity: The Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-Images and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 4, no. 4 (October 1981): 375–97; and George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975), esp. chaps. 3–4.

republican city-states of ancient Greece to the present day, the military has often been seen as a key institution for the labeling and transmission of social values.²⁸

The military's often-prominent position in the sociocultural complex means that the struggle for communal identity may occur on that terrain. If who serves matters to who we are, then the political stakes of manpower policy may be enormous. Actors, within both the state and civil society, compete to shape military participation policy in the belief that the victors will have gained an important means of imposing their vision of the nation on the population as a whole and a foundational institution from which to do so. Winning the battle over military manpower policy not only may have symbolic value but may also be an instrumental resource, as actors contend over the privilege of drawing the boundaries of the political community.²⁹

Consider, as an illustration, the debate over the open inclusion of gays in the U.S. armed forces. In the early and mid-1990s, when this debate most obviously roiled the political scene, it pivoted on claims about the effects of sexual orientation on unit cohesion and of cohesion on military effectiveness.³⁰ That much was relatively predictable. More puzzling was the passion on both sides.³¹ The Clinton administration's acquiescence in "don't ask, don't tell" was understandably disappointing to gays, but what the former viewed as a reasonable compromise, the latter generally disparaged as an unforgivable sellout. Gay leaders' most vicious rhetoric was reserved not for the conservative Republicans and the top military brass who had subverted reform efforts, but for the Clinton White House that had gambled away its political capital on their cause. The reaction seemed out of proportion to the

²⁸ See Maury Feld, "Military Discipline as a Social Force," in Maury Feld, *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), 13–30; and Barton C. Hacker, "Military Institutions and Social Order: Transformations of Western Thought since the Enlightenment," *War and Society* 11, no. 2 (October 1993): 1–23.

²⁹ Scholars of Israel have been relatively unusual in grasping the implications of manpower policy for national identity and especially in perceiving that political forces are paramount. See Eyal Ben-Ari and Edna Lomsky-Feder, eds., *The Military and Militarism in Israeli Society* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999); Baruch Kimmerling, "Determination of the Boundaries and Frameworks of Conscription: Two Dimensions of Civil-Military Relations in Israel," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 14 (spring 1979): 22–41; and Yagil Levy, *Trial and Error: Israel's Route from War to De-Escalation* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997).

³⁰ For a review of these debates, see Elizabeth Kier, "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness," *International Security* 23, no. 2 (fall 1998): 5–39. For an analysis of more recent arguments, turning on privacy, see Aaron Belkin and Melissa Sheridan Embser-Herbert, "Privacy as a Flawed Rationale for the Exclusion of Gays and Lesbians from the U.S. Military," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (fall 2002): 178–97.

³¹ The irony is that prior to the eruption of this debate, gay rights leaders saw other issues—most notably, AIDS treatment and research—as more pressing. Timothy Haggerty noted that, for most gay activists, "the whole issue of gays and lesbians in the military seemed to come out of right field, or at least out of the conservative wing of the gay movement." Nevertheless, they swiftly embraced the powerful symbolism of military service. See Timothy Haggerty, "History Repeating Itself: A Historical Overview of Gay Men and Lesbians in the Military Before 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell,'" in *Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Debating the Gay Ban in the Military*, ed. Aaron Belkin and Geoffrey Bateman (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 10.

crime.³² It is equally difficult to comprehend the depth of the opposition. There could hardly have been a better time than the 1990s to experiment with a more liberal military policy on sexual orientation. The Cold War was over, great-power war no longer loomed, and although the United States regularly exercised its military muscle, it did so in a limited fashion—in situations in which, even if the purported harm to efficiency were realized, the costs would have been manageable. Cold arguments about efficiency can hardly explain the intensity of the conservatives' resistance.

Early on, however, both sides revealed that their stances were shaped by a deeper premise—that the inclusion of gays in the armed forces would have profound consequences for society at large.³³ For social conservatives and liberals alike, the struggle between the Clinton White House and the Pentagon was a bellwether battle in the culture wars. The *National Review* saw “don’t ask, don’t tell” as “a key victory. . . . Had Mr. Clinton delivered on his pledge to the gay lobby, he would have opened the way to the next controversy: redefining the family to mean just about anything.” For the columnist William Raspberry, the “basic, overriding anxiety” was that “gays in the military is the first wedge in what will become a series of demands for gay marriages, full civil rights as a protected category under the law, gay curricula, . . . and all that.”³⁴

On the other side, the *Nation* argued that the campaign was “ultimately the only way to advance society in the direction of sexual tolerance and, more than that, liberation.” Another observer, noting that “the ability to serve in the armed forces has been a defining characteristic of full citizenship,” believed that Clinton’s failure had demonstrated the hollowness of his broader campaign promise to gays: “I have a vision of America—and you’re part of it.” At the time, the journalist Andrew Sullivan placed the military’s prohibition of open homosexuals at the top of the gay political agenda. “Its real political power—and the real source of resistance to it—comes from its symbolism,” he wrote. “The acceptance of gay people at the heart of the state, at the core of the notion of patriotism, is anathema to those who wish to consign homosexuals to the margins of society.”³⁵ Nearly a decade later, Sullivan’s views had not greatly changed. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, Sullivan, along with much of the media, wrongly believed that the military

³² See Urvasi Vaid, *Virtual Equality: The Mainstreaming of Gay and Lesbian Liberation* (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 148–77; and Jacob Weisberg, “Torch Song Strategy,” *New Republic*, 9 August 1993, 11–14.

³³ For a similar interpretation, see Aaron Belkin and Geoffrey Bateman, “Introduction,” in Belkin and Bateman, *Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell*, 3–4.

³⁴ “Don’t Speak Its Name,” *National Review*, 9 August 1993, 13–14; and William Raspberry, “Threatened by Cultural Change,” *Washington Post*, 3 February 1993, A17.

³⁵ “Cross Purposes,” *Nation*, 9–16 August 1993, 1; Richard D. Mohr, “Military Disservice,” *Reason*, August–September 1993, 42–44; and Andrew Sullivan, “The Politics of Homosexuality,” *New Republic*, 10 May 1993, 24–32.

had stopped discharging gays, and he put great stock in this supposed decision.³⁶ “This is the first major war in which the open visible presence of gay and lesbian Americans cannot be denied,” he noted, and the war’s gay heroes would point the way toward “a brighter, integrated day.”³⁷ Given the imagined stakes, it is not without reason that the U.S. military’s policies toward gays have become the battleground for a fierce struggle over social values.

Explaining change in military manpower policy requires one to turn *first* to political contestation over citizenship and national identity. Such an approach does yield different expectations from the alternatives examined earlier. The professionalization hypothesis and some versions of the threat hypothesis locate the impetus for change within the military itself. In contrast, this article suggests that change in the armed forces is likely the product of intervention by highly motivated civilians. Students of the armed forces generally share the view that militaries are uncommonly resistant to reform, especially when it threatens the armed forces’ mission, resources, and character.³⁸ As Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who served as the U.S. assistant secretary of the navy between 1913 and 1920, famously noted,

The Treasury is so large and far-flung and ingrained in its practices that I find it is almost impossible to get the action and results I want. . . . But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State Department. . . . But the Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy. . . . To change anything in the Na-a-vy is like punching a feather bed. You punch it with your right and you punch it with your left until you are finally exhausted, and then you find the damn bed just as it was before you started punching.³⁹

³⁶ In fact, the military’s stop-loss order did not apply to discharge for reasons of sexual orientation. See Michelle Locke, “Prospect of War Brings Military Policy on Gays ‘Into Sharper Focus,’” Associated Press, 13 October 2001, available at www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/PressCenter/coverage10_13_01.htm, accessed 24 March 2005.

³⁷ Andrew Sullivan, “Our War Too: Gay Heroes, and Gay Necessities,” PlanetOut.com, 21 September 2001, available at www.andrewsullivan.com/homosexuality.php?artnum=20010921, accessed 25 March 2005.

³⁸ Despite the debate on this point, there is more agreement than meets the eye. For the traditional view, see Posen, *Sources of Military Doctrine*; and Jack Snyder, *The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). Even arguments that stress the capacity for independent innovation generally presume that military organizations are biased against change. See Rosen, *Winning the Next War*; and Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy*. Recent surveys of U.S. officers have confirmed that they are generally opposed to the adoption of new roles and missions and to the revolutionary implications of new technologies. See Deborah D. Avant and James H. Lebovic, “U.S. Military Responses to Post-Cold War Missions,” in Farrell and Terriff, *Sources of Military Change*, 139–60; and Thomas G. Mahnken and James R. FitzSimonds, “Revolutionary Ambivalence: Understanding Officer Attitudes towards Transformation,” *International Security* 28, no. 2 (fall 2003): 112–48. Elsewhere, however, Avant has pointed out that militaries often initiate change in ways consistent with their organizational culture. See Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*.

³⁹ Quoted in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2d ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 174.

Militaries may be particularly effective in parrying pressure because, like all agents, they enjoy an expertise that their principals (in this case, civilians) do not possess, and, unlike other agents, they can claim a rhetorical trump card: national security.⁴⁰ Change can be, and at times is, framed as threatening the military's efficacy, undermining national defense, and thus unnecessarily placing citizens at risk. Officers may be particularly resistant to civilian efforts to reform manpower policy, for tampering with the human resources that constitute the armed forces is arguably the greatest violation of autonomous military decision-making. Major change in military manpower policy is consequently rare. When it does occur, we should expect to see the civilian hand guiding, prodding, and even educating at critical junctures on the path toward reform.⁴¹ Even if the officer corps does not resist reform efforts, one would not expect it to initiate change.

Not only are actors outside the armed forces typically the driving force for change, they will often be motivated by concerns unrelated to the military's war-fighting function. Enduring change is infrequently driven by the imperatives of the international environment alone, for even when that arena is seen as threatening, actors generally remain in the realm of choice—that is, the realm of politics. One such political consideration is, of course, the (political) survival of the leader and his cronies, but politics is, at its heart, about more than simply remaining attractive to some “selectorate.” It is equally about vision, about the values the nation holds dear, and about conceptions of the good society. It is, at its core, about the very definition of the political community, and such identity bargains are subject to continual negotiation and renegotiation. Given the historical, ideological, and discursive relationship between military service and citizenship, it is not surprising that the armed forces are one social site in which these disagreements about a polity's most elemental questions may be worked through—as reflected in debates over military manpower policy.

Liberalizing military service may reflect a shifting societal consensus in favor of widening the boundaries of the political community. It may signal a co-optive effort aimed at gaining the backing of the rewarded group in domestic political competition. Liberalization may also bolster the state's international claims to democratic credentials. Conversely, discriminatory policies may help create and sustain a stable political coalition among their beneficiaries: the selective provision of incentives may draw clear lines between

⁴⁰ On the principal-agent problem and civil-military relations, see Peter Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).

⁴¹ James Burk similarly concludes that “as with the integration of racial minorities, the greater incorporation of women into the [U.S.] military has been the outcome of hard-fought political and legal contests more than it has been the result of enlightened organizational leadership.” Burk, “The Military Obligations of Citizens since Vietnam,” *Parameters* 31, no. 2 (summer 2001): 48–60. See also Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, *Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Politics Inside the Church and Military* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

national in-groups and out-groups and ultimately contribute to the formation of a shared identity. These examples are merely illustrative of the range of pathways linking military reform and the politics of identity. Which path leaders select is unpredictable, contingent on the particulars of the case and on the creativity of that leadership as it seeks to navigate between contending images of the nation. For social scientists committed to nomothetic generalization, this stance may be frustrating. But identifying factors that concatenate in a singular fashion and in unique circumstances is consistent with a methodological sensibility that configures political analysis around generalizable mechanisms.⁴² The political processes through which the boundaries of the political community are generated will be seen to be critical to each of the cases limned below—but in a different way in each.

What may be more predictable is when such debates tend to manifest themselves in political contestation over manpower policy. The cultural prominence of the armed forces varies across countries and across time. At certain points and in certain places, the military is more central to the collectivity's symbolic life.⁴³ When the armed forces constitute such a central societal reference point, broader debates over the political community's identity and values crystallize in debates over this institution's policies. Explaining when the military occupies such a sociocultural site is beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed students of "militarism"—that much-neglected, derided, and politicized term—have not offered generalizable explanations for the phenomenon's emergence.⁴⁴ It appears not to be accidental that the most militaristic societies have generally been those that have perceived the international environment as menacing or at least those for whom war mobilization and preparation have not receded too far into the past. Culture is akin to terrain on which the rivers of history deposit much sediment, however, and human agents extract and mold that sediment for their own purposes. Consequently, the sociocultural location of the armed forces—ever in flux and, at any given time, at best relatively stable—is itself the product of prior contestation and thus may not correspond to "objective" conditions.

Such an approach is not usefully viewed as competing with the existing literature's favored propositions. More accurately, it supplements and may arguably even subsume them, and it certainly helps resolve some of their

⁴² For methodological statements, see Charles Tilly, "To Explain Political Processes," *American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (May 1995): 1594–610; Tilly, "Mechanisms in Political Processes," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001): 21–41; and Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 13–14 and *passim*.

⁴³ Baruch Kimmerling, "Patterns of Militarism in Israel," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 34 (1993): 196–223.

⁴⁴ For key texts, see Alfred Vagts, *A History of Militarism: Civilian and Military*, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1959); Asbjorn Eide and Marek Thee, eds., *Problems of Contemporary Militarism* (London: Croom Helm, 1980); Volker R. Berghahn, *Militarism: The History of an International Debate, 1861–1879* (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1981); and Michael Mann, "Roots and Contradictions of Modern Militarism," in Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

theoretical difficulties. For instance, the emergence of a security threat can be part of the manpower equation, but do states in that situation erase or reinscribe communal cleavages? How they respond depends on the discourse of citizenship and the construction of the threat—both of which are, at their core, political questions. Thus, true to Israel’s liberal self-image, its draft law did not discriminate on the basis of religion, ethnicity, or gender. Despite an acute manpower shortage, however, few Israeli leaders seriously considered drafting the country’s Arab citizens. In part because the external threat was constructed as “Arab” rather than as Egyptian or Syrian, and in part, too, because of Israel’s identity as a “Jewish state,” Arab citizens were granted a blanket exemption from military service. Notwithstanding the existential threat, the IDF’s manpower policy reinforced the line dividing Arab from Jew.

MILITARIES AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY IN THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL, AND INDIA

Not only do the usual hypotheses suffer from logical flaws, they do not fare much better empirically. Handicapping my favored horse on the scholarly racetrack, I examine below whether these three hypotheses can, on their own, adequately account for “easy” cases—that is, cases commonly cited as supporting their central claims—and I conclude that they cannot.⁴⁵ Rather, as I configure these cases, they reinforce my call for the more systematic inclusion of political contestation and a reorientation of the research agenda.

Threat: The Racial Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces

In its treatment of African-Americans, the United States has often been cited as a prime example of a state that has pursued more liberal manpower policies only under duress.⁴⁶ There is certainly much truth to that claim. During the First World War, the U.S. armed forces initially sought to avoid relying on black manpower, later shunted blacks into support roles without regard to their qualifications, and finally permitted small numbers to take part in combat under the American flag only through poorly staffed, poorly trained, and poorly equipped all-black divisions. During the Second World War, African-Americans were called upon to sacrifice along with the rest of the country, but

⁴⁵ The drawback to this case-selection strategy is that all three countries—the United States, Israel, and India—have democratic regimes, limiting the ability to generalize. The argument may well apply to the militaries of countries with nondemocratic regimes as well, but the findings cannot support that conclusion.

⁴⁶ For a brief treatment, see Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, 68–76. For similar observations regarding India and its treatment of *dalits* (“untouchables”), see Stephen P. Cohen, “The Untouchable Soldier: Caste, Politics, and the Indian Army,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (May 1969): 453–68.

the vast majority were again relegated to the tail of the military beast; larger numbers, however, were permitted to join in combat, and, during the final push on the Western front, some even served in integrated companies. These minor advances proved ephemeral, however. When the threat abated at the conclusion of each war, the military's manpower policy reverted toward, though it did not fully reach, the more discriminatory prewar norm.⁴⁷

Beginning in the early 1950s, the U.S. armed forces gradually abandoned segregation and moved toward a racial equality not found in civilian society. Many contend that this dramatic change was the product of military necessity, for the U.S. military, especially the Army, was stretched thin during the Korean War.⁴⁸ From this perspective, the President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services—which was appointed by President Harry Truman to integrate the armed forces and was better known as the Fahy Committee, after its chairman, Judge Charles Fahy—was a well-meaning enterprise of but limited import, for segregation persisted long after the army had formally conceded to the committee's demands.

This explanation, however, cannot account for two puzzles. First, the army, if left to its own devices, presumably could have coped with the manpower pressures of the Korean War without abandoning segregation. Indeed, despite greater manpower pressures during the Second World War, racial segregation in the military had remained largely intact. What warranted this abandonment of the military's racist ways during the conflict in Korea? Second, there was much precedent for reversing racial manpower policies at the conclusion of hostilities, even when the wartime policy had been demonstrably more efficient. The army's experiment with integrated companies toward the end of the Second World War had been a success, but it had had little long-term impact. Thus the desegregation of the Korean theater did not necessitate its extension to Europe or the United States. Yet that is what happened. While the Korean War should feature in the story, no explanation would be complete without incorporating the politics of desegregation.

Such a political account would recognize that Truman and his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, deserve much credit for pushing desegregation forward. After the Second World War, the military's traditional attitude toward race swiftly took hold, and the army in particular labored to reduce the quantity and quality of black participation.⁴⁹ After Truman issued his famous executive order of July 1948, calling for racial equality in the armed

⁴⁷ For historical overviews, see Jack D. Foner, *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Ulysses Grant Lee, *The United States Army in World War II—The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1966); and Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*.

⁴⁸ Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, 254; Moskos and Butler, *All That We Can Be*.

⁴⁹ Richard M. Dalfiume, *Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969), 132–47; Morris J. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965* (Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1981), 123–205; and Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, 204–34.

forces (which he later publicly stated included desegregation),⁵⁰ and after he appointed the Fahy Committee to oversee the order's implementation, the army stonewalled, repeatedly resisting the committee. Truman's staff kept him apprised of the army's recalcitrance, and, at critical junctures and always in support of racial equality, Truman and his aides intervened in the committee's deadlocked negotiations, bolstering its resolve. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, who ardently defended segregation and refused all compromise, was eventually forced to resign. When Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson approved a plan over the committee's objections, Truman publicly labeled the army plan a "progress report," reaffirmed his commitment to ending segregation, and implicitly rebuked the secretary.⁵¹ Thus emboldened, Fahy admonished Karl Bendetsen, the special consultant to the secretary of the army, for suggesting that the committee had overstepped its bounds, and he asserted its prerogatives: "The Committee operated under an executive order of the President, and . . . in the Committee's view the Army's policy did not meet the requirements of the policy expressed in the president's Executive Order 9981."⁵² In 1950, with only the question of the racial quota unresolved, Truman rebuffed Johnson's recommendation that the committee be dissolved.

The participants themselves have attested to the importance and consistency of Truman's support. The Fahy Committee's executive secretary, E. W. Kenworthy, recalled, "I don't know what took place between Judge Fahy and the President. All I know is that the President stood by him every step of the way through the negotiations, and it was a very tortuous and long-drawn out [sic] procedure." White House aide Philleo Nash remembered that Truman repeatedly refused to disband the Fahy Committee "even during the Korean War when he was under heavy pressure to let up." As one historian has concluded, "the President's backing for all of the Fahy group's recommendations to the Army enabled the committee to overcome the almost total opposition to integration in this service."⁵³

⁵⁰ The ambiguity of the order initially seemed to leave room for segregation, causing some concern among blacks. See John H. Sengstacke, "An Outline Discussion of the President's Executive Order 9981," in "Discussion of E.O. 9981 by John H. Sengstacke (Committee Member)," Charles S. Fahy Papers, Harry S Truman Library (HSTL), Independence, Mo. Truman immediately put such concerns to rest; see News Conference, 29 July 1948, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 422.

⁵¹ "Reports to the White House, October 11, 1949—Further Interim Report," Fahy to Truman, Fahy Committee Records, Record Group (RG) 220, HSTL; David Niles to Truman, 5 October 1949, in "Correspondence," Philleo Nash Files, Staff Member and Office Files (SMOF), HSTL; News Conference, 6 October 1949, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), 501.

⁵² E. W. Kenworthy, Memo for the Record, "Telephone Conversation with Mr. Fahy, 27 November," 28 November 1949, in "Fahy Committee Meetings, December 10, 1949," Fahy Committee Records, RG 220, HSTL.

⁵³ Kenworthy, oral history, HSTL, 22; Philleo Nash, "Science, Politics, and Human Values: A Memoir," *Human Organization* 45, no. 3 (fall 1986): 194; and Dalfume, *Desegregation*, 200. In general on the Fahy

The Fahy Committee was no trivial venture. Rather, its efforts—notably its insistence that the army’s racial quota be eliminated—were, in combination with the Korean War’s exigencies, critical to the demise of segregation in the U.S. Army. Without a quota, black enrollments shot up. To maintain segregation, more blacks were placed in black units than were called for by the tables of organization. While white units fell short of personnel, black units were over strength, and commanders, desperate for combat troops, unofficially began to call up blacks as replacements. As positive assessment reports streamed in, these informal experiments won converts, notably General Matthew Ridgway, who, soon after he replaced Douglas MacArthur as the head of the Far Eastern Command, requested permission to integrate all units. Meanwhile the army could never predict how many recruits of what race would enter its training installations, and basic training was soon integrated as well.⁵⁴ Had the army’s racial quota still been in effect—as it would have if the Fahy Committee had not been so unrelenting and if Truman had not so ardently defended the committee—the Korean War would probably have had little impact on segregation, in Korea and certainly in the United States and elsewhere.

The intense negotiations between the army and the Fahy Committee were critical in a second sense. By mounting a concerted assault on the military’s own rhetorical turf—the alleged efficiency of segregation—the committee further fixed the terms of debate and ensured that the future of the military’s racial policies would hinge on the experiments underway in Korea. When, in a study code-named Project Clear, social scientists commissioned by the military enthusiastically endorsed racially integrated units on those very grounds of combat effectiveness, the results could not be easily dismissed. It was only because of the Fahy Committee’s labors that “Project Clear ended most of the remaining opposition to integration among the Army General Staff.”⁵⁵ Generals, not Truman, ultimately did the heavy lifting in integrating the Korean theater and the entire army, nudging along laggards and creating an atmosphere in which vocal opposition to integration was unsustainable. But this military consensus itself would never have emerged without civilian pressure by way of the Fahy Committee.

To argue that more than military necessity was involved in desegregation and that the Fahy Committee was in fact central is to affirm the importance of Truman, but that alone does not make the case for a more deeply political explanation, let alone one focused in particular on the politics of identity. Some claim, for example, that Truman saw racism as an impediment to victory in the Cold War and that the need to bolster America’s lagging image

committee, see Dalfiume, *Desegregation*, chapter 9; Mershon and Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines*, chap. 8; and Nalty, *Strength for the Fight*, 242–54.

⁵⁴ Dalfiume, *Desegregation*, 210–19; Mershon and Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines*, chap. 9.

⁵⁵ Dalfiume, *Desegregation*, 215. On Project Clear, see Leo Bogart, ed., *Project Clear: Social Research and the Desegregation of the United States Army* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992).

abroad was the key factor motivating American statesmen to push, if only half-heartedly, for race reform.⁵⁶ Yet even in Mary Dudziak's extensively researched account, there is little direct evidence that the principal actors in the Truman administration—as opposed to ambassadors and State Department desk officers—were truly concerned about how America's failings on race affected the country's foreign policy.⁵⁷ In fact, the battle for hearts and minds in the Third World, which would be central to American strategy later in the Cold War, was at best a muted theme in the Truman years. In the late 1940s, the administration's leading thinkers on foreign affairs, notably George Kennan, identified critical nodes of power worthy of American attention and investment but thought it pointless to expend resources challenging the Soviets the world over. Proponents of the domino theory, which would underpin American interventions in later years, rarely had a prominent voice. Although the Truman administration conceived of the Soviet threat in the broadest terms and saw its vital interests as engaged in areas far removed from the homeland, it gave only slight economic and technological assistance to developing countries.⁵⁸ U.S. foreign policy in the Truman years was more the product of improvisation and intuition than deductive strategy, but it is hard to imagine the administration running the risk of having its foreign-policy priorities fall victim to southern vengeance in Congress—simply for the sake of America's image in countries of little strategic import.

Many historians have instead maintained that politics in fact explains Truman's (at minimum rhetorical) commitment to racial equality, but they point to electoral politics, not the politics of identity.⁵⁹ In a well-known 1947 memorandum, often portrayed as the basis for Truman's 1948 campaign, presidential adviser Clark Clifford forecast that the winning coalition would comprise minorities and labor, and he all but endorsed the view that blacks held the balance of power in the North. No longer easily satisfied, the black

⁵⁶ Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Azza Salama Layton, *International Politics and Civil Rights Politics in the United States, 1941–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and John David Skrentny, "The Effect of the Cold War on African-American Civil Rights: America and the World Audience, 1945–1968," *Theory and Society* 27 (1998): 237–85.

⁵⁷ The evidence is more persuasive, however, with regard to the Eisenhower administration's decision to intervene in the 1957 standoff in Little Rock, Arkansas, and with regard to later administrations. See Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

⁵⁸ See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 30–31, 41–42, 58–65; Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); and Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947–1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 349–50 and passim.

⁵⁹ William C. Berman, *The Politics of Civil Rights in the Truman Administration* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1970); Barton J. Bernstein, "The Ambiguous Legacy: The Truman Administration and Civil Rights," in Barton J. Bernstein, *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970); and Donald R. McCoy and Richard T. Ruetten, *Quest and Response: Minority Rights and the Truman Administration* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973).

voter had become “a cynical, hardboiled trader,” and Clifford took seriously threats by blacks to swing back into the Republican column. Catering to black demands might estrange southern Democrats, but that was “the lesser of two evils.”⁶⁰ According to this view, Truman’s willingness to indulge the black voter and ignore the South—epitomized by his February 1948 civil rights address and especially his July executive order regarding segregation in the armed services—paid rich dividends. He received over two-thirds of the African-American vote, more than Franklin Roosevelt had ever garnered. J. Howard McGrath, the Democrats’ national chairman, exulted afterwards that the focus on black concerns “lost us three Southern states, but it won us Ohio, Illinois, would have carried New York for us if it had not been for Henry Wallace, and it was a great factor in carrying California.”⁶¹

The problem is that this argument exaggerates African-Americans’ political strength and confuses the Clifford memo with how Truman actually ran his campaign. At the end of the day, Truman was not prepared to abandon the South, and he worked hard to avoid a break in 1948.⁶² Much to blacks’ dismay, Truman did not introduce an omnibus civil rights bill, nor did he issue the promised executive orders that winter or spring. During his “whistle-stop tour,” Truman never touched on civil rights, and at the Democratic National Convention, he and his aides preferred a weak civil rights plank; the president eventually embraced his own record, but only with great reluctance. Moreover, the fact that Truman did not actively campaign among African-Americans suggests that he believed blacks were firmly in the Democratic camp. Truman seems to have thought that his record in prior years “add[ed] up to a solid back-log of strength.”⁶³ Furthermore, as Samuel Lubell famously argued shortly after the election, both third-party challenges worked to Truman’s advantage: the Dixiecrats made Truman seem more progressive, and Henry Wallace, running to Truman’s left, protected him from red-baiting.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, notwithstanding his popularity among the black elites, the Republican candidate, Thomas Dewey, failed to capture the hearts of the black masses, and most grasped that a vote for Wallace was a vote for Dewey.⁶⁵ Truman’s gamble was on the money: African-Americans had little option, and they voted overwhelmingly for him. Truman could consequently “have treated the civil-rights problem with soft soap alone.”⁶⁶

⁶⁰ Clifford to Truman, 19 November 1947, in “Confidential Memo to the President [Clifford-Rowe memorandum of November 19, 1947 (1)],” Political File, Clifford Papers, HSTL. See also Erving Kingsley, Memorandum for Clark Clifford, “Comments on 5th Draft of Civil Rights Message,” n.d., in “President’s Committee on Civil Rights,” Elsey Files, SMOF, Truman Papers, HSTL.

⁶¹ Quoted in David McCullough, *Truman* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 713.

⁶² Bernstein, “Ambiguous Legacy.”

⁶³ Milton D. Stewart to George M. Elsey, 19 January 1948, in “President’s Committee on Civil Rights,” Elsey Files, SMOF, Truman Papers, HSTL.

⁶⁴ Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper, 1952).

⁶⁵ Berman, *Politics of Civil Rights*, 129–30.

⁶⁶ McCoy and Ruetten, *Quest and Response*, 352.

For decades, historians have debated whether Truman's pursuit of civil rights was rooted in crass electoral politics or sincere ideological commitment.⁶⁷ Yet this misses the point. Regardless of Truman's "true" (ultimately unknowable) motives,⁶⁸ his announcement of the desegregation of the U.S. armed forces was an unquestionably political act implying a boldly race-free vision of the American political community, a vision that some welcomed and others reviled. It was controversial, despite a broad consensus over the international peril facing the United States, and it brought forth immense passion, among African-Americans who recalled the military's segregated conditions during the two world wars and among white southerners who feared that their cherished way of life could not survive racial integration of the armed forces. At stake in the military's racial policies was more than military efficiency: at issue was the very meaning of the American nation. Casting military race reform in terms of the realist account—which attributes desegregation either to the exigencies of the Korean War or to the Cold War struggle for hearts and minds—or in terms of electoral competition fails to grasp the still larger stage on which the desegregation drama was played.

Professionalism: Israel's Integration of the Druze

According to Alon Peled, the IDF's treatment of Israel's Druze minority—a relatively small, non-Muslim, Arabic-speaking religious group—illustrates the power of the professionalism hypothesis.⁶⁹ Over its first three decades, the IDF became increasingly professional, and this, Peled asserts, led to the Druze's increasing integration into the army, especially after 1967.⁷⁰ The available evidence does not support this account, however. The hypothesis evokes the image of an apolitical process of reform, initiated by the armed forces itself for narrowly military reasons. Yet political pressures originating outside the armed forces, not military needs, compelled change in the IDF's policies with regard to the Druze. The empirical discussion that follows analyzes

⁶⁷ Truman's aides have almost to a man affirmed his sincerity on civil rights. See Clark Clifford and Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President: A Memoir* (New York: Random House, 1991), 206; see also the oral histories of David E. Bell, Clark M. Clifford, Matthew J. Connelly, Donald S. Dawson, and Stephen J. Spingarn, all at HSTL.

⁶⁸ Resolving this dispute has proved impossible because, as Hans Morgenthau long ago noted, pinning down actors' motives with any certainty is "both futile and deceptive"; "motives," Morgenthau wrote, "are the most illusive of psychological data." Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, brief ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1993), 5.

⁶⁹ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*.

⁷⁰ Peled's key independent variable, professionalism, relies on the classic distinction between the civilian and military spheres. But that Huntingtonian distinction may not be applicable to Israel, where the boundaries are unusually blurred. See Uri Ben-Eliezer, "Rethinking the Civil-Military Relations Paradigm: The Inverse Relation between Militarism and Praetorianism through the Israeli Case," *Comparative Political Studies* 30, no. 3 (June 1997): 356–74; and Rebecca L. Schiff, "Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: Israel as an 'Uncivil State,'" *Security Studies* 1, no. 4 (summer 1992): 636–58.

separately the initial conscription of the Druze in 1957 and the subsequent gradual liberalization of IDF manpower policy. In neither case was an increasingly professional military's adherence to the functional imperative the driving force.

By all accounts, the early IDF was a thoroughly politicized institution.⁷¹ Conceived from the start as a “melting pot,” the IDF was intended to reflect not the incoherent reality of the young polity, but the Israel that the state's Zionist founders envisioned. And that vision—implied in the claim that Israel was “a land without people for a people without land” and in the identification of Israel as “the Jewish state”—did not make room for the substantial Arab national minority that remained within Israel's borders after independence.⁷² Although all citizens—without regard to gender, religion, or ethnicity—were in principle (and by law) subject to conscription, in practice Arabs were not welcome in the new state's armed forces. David Ben-Gurion, who served as both defense minister and prime minister, granted Arabs a blanket exemption from the draft. The official explanation, endorsed by many scholars, was that the government was merely responding to the wishes of the Arab population, for Arab Knesset members, with the exception of those from the Communist Party, had requested the exemption.⁷³ In this period, however, Arab members of the Knesset (MKs), again with the exception of the Communists, were elected on “affiliated lists,” not as members of independent political parties. They were deeply beholden to the Zionist parties, especially Ben Gurion's Mapai, and took their marching orders from them.

After the war of independence came to an end in 1949, the IDF maintained a segregated Minorities Unit, and in 1956 the army announced that Druze men would be subject to the draft. This decision was not the product of an increasingly professional force but was political in nature. The official version is that the Druze leaders themselves requested that the military service law be applied to their community.⁷⁴ The documentation that has surfaced, however, suggests that the initiative lay not with the Druze but with the Israeli government. Immediately after the imposition of mandatory reserve duty on the Druze in 1953, the commanding officer of the Minorities Unit proposed obligatory conscription for Druze males. In late 1954, Druze MK Jabber Muaddi met with IDF chief of staff Moshe Dayan and requested that

⁷¹ See, among others, Peter Y. Medding, *The Founding of Israeli Democracy, 1948–1967* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); and Yoram Peri, *Between Battles and Ballots: Israeli Military in Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

⁷² For good overviews, see Ian Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State: Israel's Control of a National Minority* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980); Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–1999* (New York: Knopf, 1999); and Tom Segev, *1949: The First Israelis* (New York: Henry Holt, 1986), 43–67.

⁷³ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 130–32.

⁷⁴ See *Israel Government Yearbook 1957* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1957), 47. Many scholars have accepted this version of events. See Gabriel Ben-Dor, *The Druzes in Israel: A Political Study* (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1979), 131–32; and Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 132.

the Druze be drafted. In late 1955 Druze leaders dispatched a wave of stilted formal requests for conscription. Written in an identical tone (and nearly identical language), virtually all invoked the equation of rights and obligations, and most indicated that the letters had been composed at Muaddi's request—a sure sign that the state had solicited the letters to ensure a proper paper trail.⁷⁵ In fact, army plans for drafting the Druze appeared as early as February 1955 and were discussed in the IDF throughout that year, long before any Druze request appears in the records. A special committee had even been appointed to assess and supervise the revision of manpower policy. By late November 1955, as the first Druze requests flowed in, IDF officials had already decided how many Druze were to be drafted in each wave in the coming year.⁷⁶

To the extent that the authorities' motives can be discerned, domestic and international political considerations—not strategic or ethical concerns—appear to have been paramount.⁷⁷ Conscription of the Druze would serve valuable propaganda purposes, both within and outside Israel. Jewish Israelis could satisfy critics from abroad by pointing to the Druze as proof of their liberalism and as evidence of the perfidy of other Arabs. While the Druze were small in number, admitting them to the IDF would neutralize those who claimed that the state persecuted its minorities without cause. Moreover, it would fragment the Arab community in Israel, forestalling nationalist mobilization.⁷⁸

No one put much stock in the Druze unit's tangible contribution to Israel's physical security. The Minorities Unit was poorly supplied and poorly trained, and only political considerations during the state's first decade had saved the unit from repeated efforts to disband it on grounds of inefficiency.⁷⁹ Moreover, explanations that the Druze were more trustworthy than other Arabs were belied by the way in which the Minorities Unit was used after

⁷⁵ See various letters, located in the IDF Archives (IDFA), Giv'atayim, Israel, 57/222/5; and Abba Hushi Archive (AHA), Haifa, Israel, 6/102B. See also Shimon Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze in Israel and Its Implementation: Consistency and Lapses (1948–1967)" (in Hebrew), Ph.D. diss., University of Haifa, 2002, 102–3.

⁷⁶ See, among many other documents, Ya'akov to IDF General Staff, "Druze in Mixed Units," 23 February 1955, IDFA 57/222/1; Amit to Commander, Minorities Unit, "Summary of the Visit," 27 June 1955, IDFA 56/637/67; Ya'akov to various officials, "Meeting to Discuss Mandatory Conscription for the Druze Community," 31 July 1955, IDFA 57/222/3; Pereg to various officials, "Druze—Mandatory Conscription," 6 October 1955, IDFA 56/637/67; Ya'akov to General Staff Branch, "Supplements to the Report of the Committee on the Application of Mandatory Conscription to the Druze Community," 3 November 1955, IDFA 56/637/67; and Ya'akov to (illegible), 23 November 1955, IDFA 57/222/5.

⁷⁷ Ascertaining the authorities' motives is hampered by continued classification of relevant documents; even full declassification may not fully clarify matters because such sensitive issues may have been handled verbally.

⁷⁸ See "Recommendations for Dealing with the Arab Minority in Israel," undated [1962?], AHA 1/5/9. See also Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze," 90–94 and passim; Kais M. Firro, *The Druzes in the Jewish State* (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 124–27, 150–51, 158–60; and Lustick, *Arabs in the Jewish State*, 93–94, 133–35, 209–11.

⁷⁹ See Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze," 90–100.

the war of independence: it was assigned the task of patrolling the southern border, so that the Druze soldiers would not confront Syrian or Lebanese co-religionists and betray their new country. The unit's commander bluntly defended the segregated status quo in 1955, maintaining that "it is also desirable, for security reasons, that there should be separate units to improve supervision of them."⁸⁰ In short, the professionalization hypothesis provides little explanatory leverage over the initial conscription of the Druze.⁸¹

As early as 1957, young Druze began to demand that Druze soldiers and officers be fully integrated into the IDF and not be confined to the Minorities Unit, but the unit's commander succeeded throughout the 1960s in preventing all but cosmetic changes and minor openings. Meaningful integration of the Druze across the IDF commenced only after the 1967 war.⁸² During that war, the Minorities Unit had participated in the breakthrough to the West Bank, and between 1968 and 1970, it had been called upon to patrol Israel's western border against infiltration by Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists; for the first time, numerous Druze had been killed in the line of fire. Subsequently the Minorities Unit became a full infantry brigade and was tasked with the usual battle duties. By the mid-1970s Druze soldiers and officers were gradually being fully integrated within the IDF's combat arms.⁸³ A decade later, only 40 percent of Druze were joining the Minorities Unit, and many were calling for its termination; the IDF chief of staff formally announced in 1984 that Druze officers would no longer face a glass ceiling and that Druze soldiers would face no restrictions in assignment.⁸⁴ By the 1990s even the most sensitive units, notably in military intelligence and the air force, were open to the Druze. The IDF was undoubtedly a fairly professional organization by the late 1960s, but the key question is whether the IDF, on its own initiative, opened its doors because it recognized that the Druze could further the organization's military objectives.

⁸⁰ Ya'akov to IDF General Staff, "Druze in Mixed Units." Avivi argues that the Druze continued to be viewed as a security threat well into the 1960s. See Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze," 112, 132, 265, 382, and *passim*.

⁸¹ The IDF also recruited young men from "loyal" tribes of Bedouin Arabs, using them largely as scouts. Some have suggested that this decision can be explained on the basis of military need (Professor Stuart Cohen, personal communication, 26 August 2004). But such Israeli thinking was related to the British imperial obsession with "martial races" (see note 91 below) and bore the imprint of "Orientalism." Certainly today, when few Bedouin are nomadic—the Israeli government has consistently pursued a policy aimed at rendering the Bedouin sedentary—the assignment of Bedouin to such positions would seem to have little to do with military necessity.

⁸² Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze," 132–36.

⁸³ The emphasis here is on "gradually," for Druze contended into the 1980s that their path to other units was often obstructed. See "Peres Says IDF Opening More Units to Druze," *Jerusalem Post*, 21 May 1975; Dov Zakin, "For Druze Integration into Israeli Society," *Al HaMishmar*, 28 March 1976; and Yaacov Friedler, "Deserters from Army Due to Discrimination," *Jerusalem Post*, 17 June 1979—all in Givat Haviva Archive (GH) (9)80: 323.1.

⁸⁴ Avivi, "Policy towards the Druze," 132–36; Daniel Gavron, "Druze Loyalties," *Jerusalem Post Magazine*, 28 December 1984, GH (9) 8D: 355; and Musbah Halabi, "Progress—According to Qualifications" (in Hebrew), *Davar*, 20 November 1984, GH (9) 8D: 355.

There is little evidence of a causal relationship between the IDF's professionalism and its manpower policies—and far more evidence to the contrary. The gradual liberalization of the IDF after 1967 occurred in the context of mounting Druze political mobilization, and the military's discriminatory policies were among the activists' first targets. Although the Druze were small in number, undereducated, and relatively poor, they proved remarkably effective on the Israeli political scene and succeeded in wringing meaningful concessions out of a resistant political leadership. As early as October 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol promised the Druze that they would henceforth be fully integrated into Israel's public institutions, including the military, and that they would, for better or worse, be treated just like Jewish citizens.⁸⁵ This commitment was implemented only sporadically and only after further Druze protest in the early 1970s; the process of integration into the civilian administration was as slow as the corresponding process within the armed forces. The IDF's reluctance to integrate the Druze is all but inexplicable from the perspective of the professionalism hypothesis. The insistent political activity of, in particular, Druze youth in the 1970s culminated in the 1974 appointment of two government committees charged with investigating their grievances, and both published proposals in 1975 in line with Druze demands, notably including the dispersion of Druze soldiers and officers throughout the IDF.⁸⁶ The following year the so-called Committee of the Directors-General was formed, tasked with overcoming bureaucratic resistance. All this political pressure played no small role in driving IDF reforms, as even Peled's narrative intimates.⁸⁷

Neither the initial decision to draft the Druze nor the later liberalization was driven primarily by the threatening international environment or by the Druze's potential military contribution. Political considerations had more to do with the increasingly fair treatment that Druze received within and outside the IDF. Druze political activism in the late 1960s through the 1970s bore implications for the distribution of scarce resources, but, even more important, it also had ramifications for Israel's identity. When Druze activists declared that "equal obligations deserve equal rights," they were challenging, understood themselves to be challenging, and were perceived as challenging the priority Israel had traditionally placed upon its Jewish population. The Druze's success in exploiting tensions between Israel's ethnonational and

⁸⁵ "Prime Minister Informs Druze Delegation: The Affairs of the Druze Community—For Direct Care by Government Ministries," *Davar*, 11 October 1967.

⁸⁶ See Gabriel Ben-Dor, Fayz Azzam, Salman Faraj, "Report of the Committee to Investigate the Problems of the Druze in Israel," November 1974, Files of the Committee of the Directors-General, Papers of Salman Falah, Ministry of Education, Jerusalem; and State of Israel, Knesset, "To Strengthen the Druze Community of Israel" (Jerusalem: Office of Information, June 1975).

⁸⁷ Peled, *Question of Loyalty*, 160–61. For more complete discussions, see Firro, *Druzes in the Jewish State*, 184–241; and Krebs, *Fighting for Rights*, chaps. 4–5.

civic republican citizenship discourses,⁸⁸ in compelling Jewish politicians to acknowledge the justice of their claims and to offer substantive gains toward first-class citizenship, marked an important (and ongoing) episode in the struggle over Israel's identity.⁸⁹ Druze efforts to achieve equality of service in the IDF were a central element in the battle for first-class citizenship—both because such service would be a useful political resource, further substantiating the claim to equality of obligations, and because Israeli political culture had long held up the soldier as the paragon of commitment to the political community and the IDF as the mirror of the nation. As Druze soldiers and officers have been assigned throughout the IDF and promoted to all ranks, they have been living symbols of Israel's (still all-too-often unfulfilled) democratic promise, and their sacrifice has helped to break down remaining barriers.

Social Structure: The Indian Army and the “Martial Races”

The highly fractured nature of Indian society has undoubtedly influenced the organization of its armed forces. Although the salience of particular cleavages has waxed and waned, the (social) fact that India has been composed of a welter of competing communal groups may be treated as a relative constant. Yet before and after independence, the Indian army undertook substantial reforms that altered its ethnoreligious distribution. This section will focus on two moments, separated by just under a century: (1) the British decision in the late nineteenth century to recruit heavily among “martial races,” which led to the over-representation of Punjabis in general and Sikhs in particular; and (2) a concerted effort by Indian civilians beginning in the late 1960s to create a more representative armed forces at the expense of Sikhs and other privileged communities. These prominent cases are surprisingly absent from Stephen Peter Rosen's important account of the Indian armed forces.⁹⁰ Rosen's focus on social structure—notably, caste—cannot make sense of them, for social

⁸⁸ On the tension between Israel as a democratic and as a Jewish state, see Baruch Kimmerling, “Between the Primordial and the Civil Definitions of the Collective Identity: *Eretz Israel* or the State of Israel,” in *Comparative Social Dynamics: Essays in Honor of S. N. Eisenstadt*, ed. Erik Cohen, Moshe Lissak, and Uri Almagor (Boulder: Westview, 1985), 262–83; Yoav Peled, “Ethnic Democracy and the Legal Construction of Citizenship: Arab Citizens of the Jewish State,” *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 2 (June 1992): 432–43; Sammy Smooha, “Ethnic Democracy: Israel as an Archetype,” *Israel Studies* 2, no. 2 (fall 1997): 198–241; and Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

⁸⁹ Non-Druze Arabs, as well as some Jews, have, in recent years, demanded that Israel become a “state of *all* its citizens”—posing an even more direct and explicit challenge to Israel's identity. This claim, framed more according to liberal than to republican terms of citizenship, has proven less politically effective than have Druze claims. Both, however, imply a vision of an Israel that is more than just a Jewish state.

⁹⁰ In the imperial period, Rosen focuses exclusively on the early nineteenth century, stopping at the mutiny of 1857, and he presents the Indian military after independence as a story of continuity. See Rosen, *Societies and Military Power*.

structures are not as stable and exogenous as Rosen imagines. Rather, they are themselves the ever-fluctuating products of ongoing political contestation.

THE PUNJABIZATION OF THE IMPERIAL INDIAN ARMY

Although the British professionalized the imperial Indian army through specialized training and long service, it remained unprofessional in a deeper sense. By the 1890s its central organizing principle was “class,” a vague term that encompassed social divides ranging from caste to ethnicity to religion. Rather than recruit individuals on the basis of merit and nurture a common spirit, the army organized companies and even regiments along class lines and recruited heavily among certain classes. By the turn of the century, greater Punjab alone supplied more than half of the combatants in native regiments. Sikhs—a mere 8 percent of the population of Punjab, and a much smaller percentage of the total Indian population—themselves furnished some 20 percent of the army’s soldiers. During the First World War, Punjab, Nepal, and the Northwest Frontier Province—all in the northern and western parts of the British Indian empire—supplied nearly 70 percent of Indian troops.

The British believed that they were simply creating the most effective military possible given a society marked by tremendous linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity. “Martial race” theory asserted that certain groups were, by dint of geography, climate, history, tradition, and perhaps genetics, unusually well suited to military service.⁹¹ As Lord Roberts of Kandahar, the commander in chief of the Bengal Army between 1885 and 1893, stated, “except Gurkhas, Dogras, Sikhs, the pick of Punjabi Mohammedans, Hindustanis of the Jat and Ranghur castes, and certain classes of Pathans, there are no native soldiers in our service whom we could venture with safety to place in the field against the Russians.”⁹² After the Russian scare of 1885 and the Burma war of 1887–89, the British felt increased pressure to create an effective native fighting force, and they turned to the martial races.⁹³

⁹¹ The British applied martial race thinking to other parts of the empire as well, and the French thought in similar ways about their African troops, the *Tirailleurs Sénégalais*. On the British, see Diana M. Henderson, *Highland Soldiers: A Social Study of the Highland Regiments, 1820–1920* (Edinburgh: J. Donald, 1989); Anthony H.M. Kirk-Greene, “*Damnosa Hereditas*: Ethnic Ranking and Martial Race Imperatives in Africa,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 3, no. 4 (1980): 393–414; and Timothy H. Parsons, “Wakamba Warriors Are Soldiers of the Queen: The Evolution of the Kamba as a Martial Race, 1890–1970,” *Ethnohistory* 46, no. 4 (autumn 1999): 671–701. On the French, see Myron Echenberg, *Colonial Conscripts: The “Tirailleurs Sénégalais” in French West Africa, 1857–1960* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1991), 32–38 and passim.

⁹² Quoted in Tan Tai Yong, “Sepoys and the Colonial State: Punjab and the Military Base of the Indian Army, 1849–1900,” in *The British Raj and Its Indian Armed Forces, 1857–1939*, ed. Partha Sarathi Gupta and Anirudh Deshpande (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), 28.

⁹³ See Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, 2d ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 35–54; J. S. Grewal, *The Sikhs of the Punjab*, rev. ed.

Martial race theory was “more a symptom than a cause of a restricted recruiting policy,” however.⁹⁴ The British did not entirely fabricate martial traditions: Indian society has long recognized *kshatriya* (warrior) castes, and Indians had long debated among themselves whether *kshatriya* status should be limited to high-caste groups or be open to all.⁹⁵ The British register of martial races, however, did not reflect the customary social hierarchy, for the authorities ignored traditional recruiting grounds to the south and east in favor of those to the west and north. Selective recruitment was more a response to threats from abroad than to threats from within, but which groups were considered martial reflected considerations of imperial management.⁹⁶ It is not accidental that those who had allied with the British in the Mutiny of 1857 found their martial status affirmed, and those who had rebelled were stripped of their martial traditions. It is not accidental that the favored were located at the periphery, in terms of both geography and identification with the incipient nationalist movement. Like the kaiser when faced with social democracy, the British consciously recruited from among the less educated and less politically conscious.⁹⁷ Manpower shortages during the First World War eventually compelled the British to draw from many previously unexploited classes, but, despite evidence that “nonmartial” groups could perform well when properly trained and equipped, afterwards the army swiftly returned to its prewar practices.⁹⁸

In short, the imperial Indian army of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was representative neither of the diversity of Indian society nor of the communal balance of power. Its composition was driven by imperial political considerations as much as, if not more than, international strategic ones. To speak of the Indian Army simply as a tool of imperial management, however, does not do justice to the larger ramifications. Highly selective recruitment was intended to undercut the nationalist movement by co-opting certain populations and thus fragmenting the subcontinent, and, to the extent that it succeeded, it bequeathed to independent India its problematic identity politics.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers, and Men* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974); and David Omissi, *The Sepoy and the Raj: The Indian Army, 1860–1940* (London: Macmillan, 1994), 1–46.

⁹⁴ David Omissi, “Martial Races’: Ethnicity and Security in Colonial India, 1858–1939,” *War and Society* 9, no. 1 (May 1991): 8.

⁹⁵ Philip Constable, “The Marginalization of a Dalit Martial Race in Late Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Western India,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 60, no. 2 (May 2001): 439–78.

⁹⁶ The preference for Punjabis also reflected the experiences of imperial decision-makers: the army’s most recent campaigns had all taken place in the north and northwest, and the better British officers had gravitated to those areas, where the opportunities for active battle and career advancement were greatest.

⁹⁷ For critical assessments of imperial military recruitment, see Pradeep Barua, “Inventing Race: The British and India’s Martial Races,” *Historian* 58, no. 1 (1995): 107–16; Cohen, *Indian Army*, 45–54; Omissi, “Martial Races”; and Tan, “Sepoys and the Colonial State.”

⁹⁸ S. D. Pradhan, “Indian Army and the First World War,” in *India and World War I*, ed. Dewitt C. Ellinwood and S. D. Pradhan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1978), 54–65.

Not only were British recruitment decisions not reducible to Indian social structures, they had a profound impact on those structures. Through the early twentieth century, the boundaries between Sikhism and other religious traditions were fluid: Sikhs went on pilgrimage to their most prominent shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar, but many also visited the shrines of Muslim saints or dipped alongside Hindu devotees in the Ganges. The 1870s saw the emergence of the Singh Sabha movement, however, which sought to propagate a narrower definition of Sikhism, separate the Sikh and Hindu communities, and nurture a distinct and unified Sikh identity. Part of the credit for the eventual success of the Singh Sabhas must go to the colonial authorities. Believing that “pure” or “true” Sikhs were the most disciplined and the bravest, the British obligated soldiers in the Sikh regiment to wear the symbols of the Khalsa, or initiated, Sikh.⁹⁹ Not only did the British privilege one Sikh tradition and thus shape Sikh identity, but their preference for Sikhs in the armed forces precipitated rapid growth in the community as Hindus “rediscovered” their Sikh heritage.¹⁰⁰

“DERECRUITMENT” OF MARTIAL RACES

After partition, the Indian army remained true to its British heritage. About once per decade, with a nod to the Congress party’s commitment to secularism, it ritualistically pledged to broaden recruitment, but in practice it retained the pre-independence communal distribution. Newly created units were representative, but the vast majority of the army’s units retained their class composition and continued to draw personnel from the north and northwest. In 1962 six of the army’s lieutenant-generals were Sikh, as were 13 out of 28 major-generals and 30 out of 79 brigadiers. Long after independence, Sikhs still accounted for over 20 percent of the ranks and an even higher percentage of the officer corps.¹⁰¹

In the early 1970s, however, a conscious effort to reduce the over-representation of martial races appears to have emerged.¹⁰² In 1974 Punjab

⁹⁹ Sikhs historically fell into two categories. The Keshdhari (or Khalsa) Sikhs followed the edicts of the tenth guru, Gobind Singh: they wore their hair long, dressed in knee-length breeches, sported a steel bracelet on the right hand, and carried a ceremonial comb and dagger. The Sahajdhari Sikhs did not adopt these rituals and were therefore harder to distinguish from the Hindu population.

¹⁰⁰ See Grewal, *Sikhs of the Punjab*; Rajiv A. Kapur, *Sikh Separatism: The Politics of Faith* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 16–32; Harjot Oberoi, *The Construction of Religious Boundaries* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994); and Giorgio Shani, “The Construction of a Sikh National Identity,” *South Asia Research* 20, no. 1 (2000): 1–17.

¹⁰¹ Stephen P. Cohen, “The Military and Indian Democracy,” in *India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations*, ed. Atul Kohli (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 105; and Cohen, *Indian Army*, 189–92, 210.

¹⁰² For similar periodizations, see Cohen, “Military and Indian Democracy”; Cohen, *Indian Army*; and Chitra Sudarshan, “Continuity and Change: The Story of Integration in the Indian Army,” *Strategic Analysis* 12, no. 12 (March 1989): 1379–96. Because of the political sensitivity of military manpower,

was formally assigned a quota equivalent to its proportion of the total population (around 2.5 percent).¹⁰³ Although this has not been strictly enforced, the Sikh military presence seems to have declined in relative terms. Between 1968 and 1971, Punjab supplied on average 15.3 percent of recruits to all-class regiments,¹⁰⁴ placing a close second to Uttar Pradesh, a much larger state which was slightly under-represented; by the early 1980s, that number had fallen to perhaps 10 percent; and in 1996–97, Punjab contributed just 7.6 percent of the army's recruitment class, one of four states in that range and far behind Uttar Pradesh's 20.6 percent.¹⁰⁵ Between 1978 and 1982, areas with large Sikh populations (Punjab, Haryana, and Chandigarh) continued to be vastly over-represented in Indian Military Academy cadet classes, but their numbers had, in relative terms, waned: Punjab, for example, contributed just under 10 percent of IMA cadets in those years.¹⁰⁶

The grievances of Sikhs are also revealing. They began in the early 1970s to complain regularly about "derecruitment." The 1973 Anandpur Sahib Resolution, adopted by the Akali Dal (a political party that has since the 1920s been the primary avenue for Sikh political mobilization), protested the distribution of river waters, the status of Chandigarh, the territorial status quo, and the nature of federal-state relations. In one of its central planks, the Akalis also demanded that "keeping in view the special aptitude and martial qualities of the Sikhs[,] the present ratio of their strength in [the] Army should be maintained." The party further promised that it would "endeavour to maintain the traditional position of the Sikhs in all the wings of the defence

India does not make available data on the representation of communal groups in the armed forces. Scholars are consequently forced to use state-level data as a problematic proxy and to rely on informal "turban-counting." The numbers thus remain highly contested, and some suggest that Sikhs are today as over-represented as ever. See Apurba Kundu, "The Indian Army's Continued Overdependence on Martial Races' Officers," *Indian Defence Review* (July 1991): 69–84; and Kundu, "The Indian Armed Forces' Sikh and Non-Sikh Officers' Opinions of Operation Blue Star," *Pacific Affairs* 67, no. 1 (spring 1994): 46–69.

¹⁰³ Jagjivan Ram (Indian defense minister), quoted in Gurmit Singh, *History of Sikh Struggles*, vol. 2 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers, 1991), 33; see also Cohen, "Military and Indian Democracy," 133. Others date this change to 1980 or 1989. See Melinda W. Cooke, "National Security," in *India: A Country Study*, ed. Richard F. Nyrop (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 524–25; Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr., "The Northeast, the Punjab, and the Regionalization of Indian Politics," *Asian Survey* 23, no. 11 (November 1983): 1181; and Bhagat Singh, "Demolition of Class Edifice in the Army and Its Consequences," *Indian Defence Review* 8, no. 2 (April 1993): 86–87.

¹⁰⁴ Note that this is separate from the Punjabi contribution to single-class and fixed-class regiments. When those are taken into account, Punjabis would presumably be even more over-represented in the Indian armed forces.

¹⁰⁵ These statistics come from Sudarshan, "Continuity and Change," 1389–90; Omar Khalidi, "Ethnic Group Recruitment in the Indian Army: The Contrasting Cases of Sikhs, Muslims, Gurkhas, and Others," *Pacific Affairs* 74, no. 4 (winter 2001–2): 540–41; and Cohen, *Indian Army*, 210–14. For other estimates, suggesting that Sikhs have not suffered a relative decline, see Lt. Gen. S. S. Brar and Air Vice Marshal Manjit Singh, "Armed Forces and the Sikhs: The Future Perspective," *Sikh Review*, January 1997, 28–31; Cooke, "National Security," 524–25; and Rajesh Kadian, *India and Its Army* (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1990), 94.

¹⁰⁶ Kundu, "Indian Army's Continued Overdependence on Martial Races' Officers," 73.

departments.”¹⁰⁷ The following year, eight Parliament members from Punjab formally voiced their opposition to government plans to impose recruitment quotas on states.¹⁰⁸ Punjab’s chief minister raised the issue with the prime minister and defense minister in the mid-1970s, and the Akali Dal included the matter in its 1977 election manifesto.¹⁰⁹ When in 1985 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Akali leader Harchand Singh Longowal concluded a settlement to end Sikh agitation, the second substantive item in their declaration proclaimed, “All citizens of the country have the right to enroll in the Army[,] and merit will remain the criterion for selection.”¹¹⁰ Even those who have vigorously denied that the Sikhs suffer socioeconomic discrimination have acknowledged derecruitment—though they argue that it is justified on the basis of equality and justice.¹¹¹

What explains this apparent decline in Sikh representation in the army? Some have argued that the Green Revolution—the great increase across the developing world in the production of grains due to the introduction of new, high-yield strains and of Western agricultural techniques and technologies, which came to India in the late 1960s through the 1970s—afforded Sikhs more lucrative opportunities outside the armed forces and that the army has ever since had difficulty filling Sikh recruitment quotas.¹¹² Yet it is hard to square this assertion with the persistence of the issue among Sikh grievances. Moreover, although it is true that farmers in Punjab disproportionately, if unevenly, benefited from the Green Revolution,¹¹³ its net effect was to yield a reservoir of educated and unemployed youth who might have entered the armed forces had the opportunity existed. This frustrated population became the backbone of the Sikh rebellion of the 1980s.¹¹⁴

Others have suggested that the decline was the unintended product of the army’s post-1962 expansion. By this account, the proportion of Sikhs fell in relative terms, even as it may have remained steady or increased in absolute terms.¹¹⁵ There is probably some truth to this argument, but it implies that

¹⁰⁷ This resolution served as the dominant articulation of the Sikh political platform into the 1980s. Several slightly different texts are in circulation. The above quotes come from the 1977 version authenticated by Akali Dal president Sant Harchand Singh Longowal, reprinted in *White Paper on the Punjab Agitation* (New Delhi: Government of India, 1984), 73, 83–84.

¹⁰⁸ Singh, *History of Sikh Struggles*, 145.

¹⁰⁹ Cohen, “Military and Indian Democracy,” 133; “Akali Dal Election Manifesto,” *Times of India*, 10 February 1977, 9: 3–6.

¹¹⁰ Accord reprinted in Satya M. Rai, *Punjab since Partition* (Delhi: Durga Publications, 1986), 405–8.

¹¹¹ Satyapal Dang, “Sikhs: Is There Discrimination?” *Mainstream*, 6 March 1982, 30–33.

¹¹² S. K. Sinha, “Class Composition of the Army,” *Indian Defence Review* 1, no. 1 (July 1986): 83.

¹¹³ T. R. Sharma, “Political Implications of the Green Revolution,” *Punjab Journal of Politics* 5, no. 2 (July–December 1981): 66–71.

¹¹⁴ See Harnik Deol, *Religion and Nationalism in India: The Case of the Punjab* (London: Routledge, 2000); Dipankar Gupta, “The Communalising of Punjab, 1980–1985,” *Economic and Political Weekly*, 13 July 1985, 1185–90; and Hamish Telford, “The Political Economy of Punjab: Creating Space for Sikh Militancy,” *Asian Survey* 32, no. 11 (1992): 976–81.

¹¹⁵ Dr. Sunil Dasgupta, personal communication, 11 August 2003.

all Sikhs who wanted posts in the army received them, which is belied by Sikh grievances. Moreover, the Indian government's very public emphasis on a conscious policy change undermines the claim that it occurred as a matter of course as the armed forces grew.

Finally, others have asserted that widespread violence in traditional recruiting grounds in the 1980s—in Punjab as well as in other regions—highlighted the dangers of overdependence on any single population group and prompted the central government to take meaningful action for the first time.¹¹⁶ This, too, seems plausible, but these processes commenced nearly two decades before the unrest arose. Events in the late 1980s and early 1990s may have convinced remaining holdouts in the armed forces, increased the motivation of civilian leaders, and accelerated reform, but they cannot explain changes that began to occur some fifteen years before.

Again the explanation is more deeply political. In the late 1960s, as the Congress party saw its influence waning, the center embarked on an ambitious state-building campaign, centralizing functions that had long been left to the states. As Paul Brass has argued, this undermined the basis for stable state politics and ultimately necessitated ever more intrusive and desperate intervention by the center. In Punjab, the Congress covertly supported Sikh extremists, notably Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, in the hope of weakening the Akali Dal, which not only had defeated the Congress in the 1977 state elections but also had led the nation's only sustained resistance to the Emergency regime of 1975–77. Forced to compete for their Sikh base, the Akalis abandoned any pretense of secularism and embraced a more nationalist-religious agenda. The center's meddling tragically culminated in Operation Bluestar in 1984, when Indian forces clashed with Bhindranwale's supporters at the Golden Temple and seized control of the holy site. The bloodshed as well as the affront to Sikh pride further radicalized the Sikh community.¹¹⁷

Around the same time, the Congress began to invoke ethno-religious themes, even as it maintained a veneer of secularism. This bid “to keep the nation-state together in the face of the so called ‘internal’ enemies whose loyalties are ‘outside’”¹¹⁸ sparked an upsurge of Hindu consciousness that would later sustain the BJP's rise to power. The tension between this *Hindutva* discourse and official secularism had long been a feature of Indian politics. According to Brass, however, there was, beginning in the 1970s, a “pervasive and subtle” effort to shift the balance in favor of the former, “to secularize the meaning of the term Hindu by going back to its earlier meaning of ‘native of India’ and identifying India as the nation of Hindus without,

¹¹⁶ Singh, “Demolition of Class Edifice.”

¹¹⁷ See Paul R. Brass, “The Punjab Crisis and the Unity of India,” in Kohli, *India's Democracy*, 169–213; and Paul R. Brass, *The Politics of India since Independence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

¹¹⁸ Dipankar Gupta, *The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh Identity in Comparative Perspective* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), 130.

however, eliminating from it all the religious associations which are offensive to true Muslim, Sikh, and other believers.”¹¹⁹ In Punjab, the Congress’s cultivation of Bhindranwale served to solidify its Hindu base: by driving moderate Sikh politicians into the extremist camp, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi could portray her party as the defender of the state’s Hindus.

Within this context of vigorous centralization and ethnoreligious manipulation, derecruitment of the martial races begins to come into focus. On the one hand, even as the Congress increasingly departed in practice from the rigid secularism of India’s founders, the elimination of all forms of discrimination from one of the central state institutions reaffirmed its secularist credentials. On the other hand, by closing off an expected avenue of socioeconomic mobility, the policy increased the frustration of Sikh peasant youth.¹²⁰ They were ripe for the charismatic Bhindranwale’s message and thus played into the Congress’s political strategy. In post-independence India, as in the other cases examined above, military manpower policy was wrapped up with political maneuver over the definition of the political community. Given the paucity of evidence, this story is necessarily speculative, but it fits nicely with what we do know.

AN AGENDA FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The existing literature suggests three hypotheses to explain the adoption of more liberal manpower policies: when a major security threat looms, as the armed forces professionalize, and when the surrounding society grows more tolerant of difference. This article has argued that all three are theoretically and empirically problematic. They are not sufficiently appreciative of the importance of political motivations and processes in shaping manpower policy. They may have much to contribute to our understanding of where manpower policies come from and why they change, but only in conjunction with a more deeply political perspective—as the cases presented here suggest. Lasting reform of the armed forces, particularly with regard to sensitive questions such as manpower, is rarely initiated by the officer corps to satisfy the institution’s functional imperative and maximize battlefield effectiveness. Rather, enduring change in the military’s participation policies is more productively viewed through the lens of the struggle over national and communal identity. In any account of the military’s manpower policies, the politics of identity must be brought front and center.

¹¹⁹ Brass, *Politics of India since Independence*, 17.

¹²⁰ On derecruitment’s contribution to the Punjab crisis, see Brass, “Punjab Crisis,” 172; Cohen, “Military and Indian Democracy”; Kadian, *India and Its Army*, 94; and Raju G.C. Thomas and Bharat Karnad, “The Military and National Integration in India,” in Dietz, Elkin, and Roumani, *Ethnicity, Integration, and the Military*, 133.

In other words, this article calls for a refocusing of the research agenda regarding the study of comparative military institutions. Where to go from here? If the literature on the classic concern of civil-military relations—who guards the guardians?—is any guide, such a reorientation would be followed by a plethora of case studies.¹²¹ Yet the study of civil-military relations has stagnated for decades in political science because these empirical applications, though useful, came at the expense of theoretical development. That imbalance must be rectified.

This article's unanswered questions can serve as a template for future theoretical inquiry and empirical analysis. Under what conditions does contestation over national identity take the form of debates over military service? How can we productively integrate the politics of identity with more traditional arguments focused on threat, professionalization, and social structure? Under what conditions might military leaders themselves serve as agents of change? How is change in manpower policy similar to and how does it differ from more-studied areas of military innovation, such as doctrine and technology? The answers should be of great importance not just for scholars of civil-military relations and strategic studies, but for policymakers and for students of politics in general.

Since ancient times, scholars and statesmen alike have often shared a faith that the design of the armed forces would dramatically reshape society, for good or for ill. Once the conventional wisdom, such a claim would today meet with some skepticism. The spread of liberal democracy, the costs of industrialized warfare, the specter of nuclear war, the consequences of an increasingly global economy, the demise in the West of the mass army and of the citizen-soldier ideal, the rise of professional volunteer armed forces and private military contractors—all of these allegedly contribute to an emerging “post-militarist” world in which relative peace lies on the horizon and the social and political ramifications of military service are attenuated.¹²²

What is most striking, however, is that, despite these supposed trends, public debates over military service have run hot in the past decade. France and Germany abandoned conscription in the 1990s, but only amid deep concern over the ramifications for the political socialization of the next generation. In Israel, draft exemptions for ultraorthodox seminarians have aroused the ire of the country's secular majority; the refusal of Israel's Arab citizens to volunteer for or be conscripted into the IDF or even to perform nonmilitary

¹²¹ Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 211–41.

¹²² See Martin Shaw, “Theses on a Post-Military Europe: Conscription, Citizenship, and Militarism after the Cold War,” in *Social Change and Political Transformation*, ed. Chris Rootes and Howard Davis (London: UCL Press, 1994), 55–71; Eliot A. Cohen, “Twilight of the Citizen-Soldier,” *Parameters* 31, no. 2 (2001): 23–28; Haltiner, “Decline of the European Mass Armies”; and Matthew J. Morgan, “The Reconstruction of Culture, Citizenship, and Military Service,” *Armed Forces and Society* 29, no. 3 (spring 2003): 373–91. See also Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” *American Political Science Review* 96, no. 1 (March 2002): 1–14.

national service figures prominently in national discussions over their citizenship status. Operation Iraqi Freedom—the first sustained, large-scale U.S. military action since Vietnam—has reinvigorated old debates about the viability and especially the equity of the all-volunteer force. Beyond the industrialized democracies, the question of who serves is of even greater import, for who serves is often who rules.

Prophets of globalization aside, the nation-state and national citizenship remain relevant to most people across the globe. Pockets of stable peace aside, the world does not generally seem to have escaped from the zone of conflict. Indeed, the armed forces' participation policies are still viewed as having important implications for citizenship and national identity. The burden of proof would seemingly lie with those who argue to the contrary.