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The Limits of Alliance: Conflict, Cooperation, and Collective Identity

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On the hustings in 1996 President Bill Clinton trumpeted the Atlantic Alliance's virtues—not its capacity for deterrence proven during the Cold War, nor its growing ability to project military power out of area, but its internal conflict resolution mechanisms. In Detroit, a traditional stop on the election tour of ethnic America, Clinton, who had become an ardent supporter of NATO enlargement several years before,¹ declared, "through NATO, Western Europe became a source of stability instead of hostility. France and Germany moved from conflict to cooperation. . . . I came to office convinced that NATO can do for Europe's East what it did for Europe's West."² The conventional wisdom, widely shared in both the policy and scholarly worlds, is that alliances are useful means of promoting cooperation and even collective identity among their members. That claim, more often asserted than systematically argued, is not as much wrong as it is crude. Relations between allies—both in NATO and in the less deeply institutionalized alliances of the past—have historically been associated with both cooperation and conflict, for "allies often clash with each other more than they unite in common cause."³ The facts of intra-alliance competitive dynamics and violent conflict suggest the need to examine critically the validity and scope of the belief that alliances are magically transformed over time into zones of peace in which war is unthinkable.

It is indeed tempting to consider alliances as unproblematically producing cooperation (the coordination of behavior) and collective identity (the convergence of interests). Decision makers understandably find it far more difficult to justify membership in an institution with cross-cutting consequences and trade-offs than in one whose effects flow in only one, fully salutory and desired direction. Scholars have an additional incentive to engage in a selective reading

of the history of intra-alliance relations: simplifying assumptions about alliances are useful tools in social scientific model building. But such insensitivity to history and complexity leads to ill-considered policy and poor theory.

This chapter ranges widely across theory, history, and policy discourse in offering several arguments about the consequences of alliance membership. First, I take issue both with structural realists, who see alliances as epiphenomenal, and with neoliberal institutionalists, who view alliances, like other institutions, as promoting cooperation within their boundaries. Alliances have independent causal impact: they critically shape their members' patterns of interstate interaction. But, drawing on the insights of collective action theory, I argue that, under particular conditions, alliances can make possible and even exacerbate tensions and heighten the possibility of intra-alliance conflict. These hypotheses suggest the limits of neoliberal institutionalist logic and take tentative first steps toward a "realist institutionalism."⁴

In the second half of the chapter, I evaluate the general claim that alliance is conducive to the emergence of a security community and critically review six causal mechanisms proposed within recent constructivist literature. Some are deeply flawed at the level of theory, others are plausible but remain theoretically underdeveloped and hence unfalsifiable, and others fail on empirical grounds in the crucial most-likely case, NATO. At best, constructivist scholars have a great deal of work ahead of them in specifying scope conditions to their broad claim about the power of alliance to shape identity. At worst, they—and policy makers who have endorsed similar views—have overstated their case and have placed far too much explanatory weight on common alliance commitments.

This chapter proceeds in four sections. First, I provide a few examples of the tendency to exaggerate the harmony of alliance, drawing on the statements of political leaders as well as on academic writings. Sections two and three assess the causal logic and empirical evidence linking alliances with international cooperation and collective identity. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications both for international relations theory and for American foreign policy in the uncertainty and flux that continue to characterize international politics a decade after the end of the Cold War.

FRIENDS BUT ALSO FOES

When states band together, whether to promote aggressive or defensive goals, their joint commitment presumes some common interest, but that hardly precludes the possibility that other conflicting aims, perhaps no less important in the hierarchy of objectives, will undermine the alliance. This

seems an obvious point, yet scholars and policy makers alike have tended either to assume that the shared interest overrides all other concerns or to overestimate the degree of common interest.⁵ Bill Clinton was hardly alone in treating an alliance as the panacea for the ills of European great power competition. In a speech to the French Senate in 1911, the French Foreign Minister Alexandre Ribot proclaimed that the alliance between his nation and Russia reflected a wide range of shared interests beyond defense: "When two great nations enter into a permanent bond of friendship they join forces in foreign policy, not merely with the object of maintaining the peace of the world, but also of dealing jointly with all sorts of eventualities which cannot at the moment be foreseen. . . . They accordingly keep a watchful eye on events with a view of framing a suitable joint policy."⁶

Students of international relations, rooted in a variety of theoretical traditions, have equally fallen prey to such fallacies. In constructing his expected-utility theory of war, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita assumes that allies have absolute utility for their partners, that they lack any conflicting objectives. Seeking to account for the counterintuitive empirical finding that allies have engaged in war with each other a surprising fifteen times between 1816 and 1974—nearly 20 percent of all interstate conflicts in that period—he argues that any change that might affect the other's foreign policy signals a forthcoming deterioration in relations and generates incentives to war. However, Bueno de Mesquita provides no evidence that would substantiate his causal story, and the logic of his explanation is entirely dependent on the patently unrealistic assumption that allies possess identical goals across the board.⁷ Jonathan Mercer's work on reputation formation, grounded in psychology, is explicitly counterposed to rationalist theories of deterrence, but he implicitly agrees with Bueno de Mesquita's formulation of intra-alliance relations. One key to Mercer's argument is that allies always find desirable each other's demonstrations of resolve (and that antagonists are necessarily displeased with such behavior), but this assumption cannot be justified unless one accepts an idealized view of allied and adversarial dynamics, in which cooperation (or conflict) on a limited set of security questions leads to agreement (or disagreement) on all issues.⁸

Realist statements on the nature of allied relations have also been ambiguous.⁹ Focused on alliance formation and dissolution, realists have generally regarded alliances as epiphenomenal and paid little attention to the politics within them. Often alliances are in this view merely fleeting agglomerations of military capabilities, "only temporary marriages of convenience, where today's alliance partner might be tomorrow's enemy, and today's enemy might be tomorrow's alliance partner."¹⁰ With relative gains concerns as powerful in alliance as they are for states unsheltered from the buffers of anarchy, states pass the buck, forcing their allies to bear the costs of confronting a common threat. However, at times realists have implied that once

states enter alliance, their behavior exhibits a near-identity of interest and residual clashes do not arise. Although Kenneth Waltz famously noted that states "are compelled to ask not 'Will both of us gain?' but 'Who will gain more?'" he also explained European integration as a consequence of the Soviet menace. Bound together by their common fear, Germany, France, and the other former great powers of Europe overcame centuries of hostility and strife, and even welcomed their fellows' growth and development. Among these consumers of security, "not all impediments to cooperation were removed but one important one was—the fear that the greater advantage of one would be translated into military force to be used against the others."¹¹

Alliances are tools for achieving common ends, but conflict can nonetheless creep into their members' relationships from two directions. First, insofar as states continue to seek aims beyond the *casus foederis* of the alliance, they often remain competitors in other dimensions, blurring the distinction between allies and adversaries. Even at the height of the Cold War, France was suspicious of American diplomacy in Indochina as a threat to the integrity of its overseas empire. Agreement on the broad outlines of containment obscured the allies' divergent regional priorities and "the subtle competition for spheres of influence that often underlined their diplomacy toward the Third World."¹² Moreover, states have often sought to control an adversary by enmeshing it in an alliance. Alliances, Paul Schroeder has observed, are "associative-antagonistic relationships": they are as often devices that unite rivals as they are means of linking friends.¹³ Thus conflict may exist within alliance for the same reasons that it had before the allied states made common cause. Second, it is also possible, and I shall argue on behalf of this view, that under certain conditions alliance can itself exacerbate states' conflictual relations. Conflict may arise then not despite, but because of, alliance.

ALLIANCE, COOPERATION, AND CONFLICT

The Atlantic Alliance's greatest achievement in its first forty years lay in the realm of the invisible, in scenarios avoided, in communism averted. But, in the eyes of many, Franco-German reconciliation—the process by which these two long-standing continental rivals became the cornerstone of peace in Western Europe, "the alliance within the alliance"¹⁴—places a very close second. When policy makers and scholars ascribe such healing powers to NATO, they often conflate the distinct propositions that the alliance promoted "cooperation" between these two former great powers and that it fostered the emergence of a "collective security identity." The first describes mutual policy coordination between actors whose interests are, for theoretical purposes, treated as exogenous, while the second denotes that states' in-

terests themselves have converged.¹⁵ This section of the essay focuses on the relationship between alliances and cooperation, while the next examines the contribution of alliance membership to the formation of collective identity.

The most developed set of theoretical arguments on behalf of alliances' ability to nurture cooperation derives from institutionalist reasoning. Although Robert Keohane insisted a decade ago that "alliances *are* institutions,"¹⁶ few of his disciples have turned their analytical lenses in that direction, preferring to focus on institutions of low politics such as international economic regulatory agencies or environmental regimes. The occasional exceptions to this rule, rather than employ the framework to explain patterns of cooperation among allies as a function of institutionalization, have generally focused on questions such as the persistence of alliance policies or the search for new missions as old ones become obsolete.¹⁷ Nevertheless at first glance institutionalists should be capable of offering several coherent arguments as to how alliances, like other institutions, promote international cooperation among their members.¹⁸

First, institutions are characterized by rule-governed interaction, which encourages an increased number of transactions among participants, thereby discouraging cheating among states that are reasonably sensitive to the "shadow of the future." Second, by providing a framework for further agreement, institutions reduce the costs associated with the bilateral negotiation, monitoring, and verification of individual accords, making cooperation more profitable and attractive.

Third, institutions link issue areas, different zones of state interaction, creating greater opportunities for side payments and raising the price of defection. As Keohane explains, "Clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side payments among these issues: more potential *quids* are available for the *quo*. Without international regimes linking clusters of issues to one another, side payments and linkages would be difficult to arrange in world politics."¹⁹ Such linkages also make cheating more costly, for they provide the victim with multiple issue areas in which to exact revenge. Fourth, institutions increase the level of transparency among members, raising the expected cost of cheating within an institutional context, as the likelihood of detection and retaliation increases. Moreover, the expected gain decreases, since transparency permits prospective victims to take protective measures.

If in a neorealist world states are reluctant to remain in alliances longer than they must because they do not trust others, institutionalists expect that formalized, well-integrated alliances help their members overcome incentives to internal mobilization, attenuate the fear of unequal gains, and foster numerous cooperative ventures.²⁰

Upon closer inspection, however, such institutionalist hypotheses are, without emendation, indeterminate with regard to the consequences of alliance membership for cooperation.²¹ First, repeated interaction under a long

shadow of the future does not logically produce cooperation. As James Fearon points out, "though a long shadow of the future may make *enforcing* an international agreement easier, it can also give states an incentive to *bar-gain harder*, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal."²² Where the stakes are unusually high as when war, rather than the mere failure to achieve a mutually beneficial accord, is the possible outcome one would expect to observe especially intense bargaining: under such circumstances, the costs of not reaching an agreement would certainly be quite high, but the terms would consequently also be more important.²³ Among states with a potentially militarizable conflict of interest, the rule-governed interaction sponsored by alliance therefore seems likely to encourage tough bargaining rather than mutual concessions.

Second, the additional issue areas supplied by the institution can give states more to fight over, exploding the boundaries of an initially limited conflict. Rather than generate cooperation, institutions may, through issue-linkage, contribute to the deterioration of the relationship.²⁴ Keohane has himself acknowledged, though only in a footnote, that in highly conflictual situations "linkages . . . may well impede cooperation."²⁵ Practitioners and specialists have also argued that the presence of multiple issue areas has often served as a hindrance to cooperation, broadening and deepening conflict, and they have consequently suggested decoupling issues. A former American ambassador to Greece has observed that instead of enabling Greece and Turkey "to reconcile their differences by direct negotiation, their common alliance with the United States and Western Europe often appears to act as an impediment. Bilateral disputes acquire a multilateral dimension."²⁶

Third, transparency may improve the quantity and quality of information available, but the question remains: information about what? In a modern alliance, high levels of coordination demand that allies keep each other informed of their respective military capabilities, but inferring intentions and projected use is hardly straightforward. The same resources that can be justified on the basis of alliance tasks can also be turned profitably against an allied adversary. In such cases, estimates regarding intent derive less from accurate information regarding forces than from worst-case analysis and the weight of the past. Moreover, such information may not improve a state's defensive capabilities against a surprise attack in a limited campaign; protective measures may simply be impossible in the face of surprise, and the expected gains from cheating will then be unaffected.

Perspicacious policy makers have at times grasped institutions' potential to thwart cooperation. After World War I, French statesmen, particularly Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, feared that alleviating German security concerns to the West through the Treaty of Locarno would give rise to German aggression in the East. From that perspective, the accord they eventually negotiated was particularly poorly designed. Although the pact permitted

France to assist its allies in East-Central Europe, the circumstances under which it could do so were highly constrained: except in the case of a direct attack on France itself or a League of Nations pronouncement branding Germany an aggressor, a French invasion on behalf of its allies would violate the treaty and possibly force Britain to intervene on the German side. In the words of one historian, thanks to Locarno, "Germany's western flank would receive a measure of protection in the event of a Polish attack on Germany or in case Germany in the distant future were to use force to revise its eastern frontiers—a contingency which neither the Reichswehr nor the Wilhelmstrasse ruled out if attempts at peaceful revision failed." At the end of the day, however, the security of France itself came first, and France did not make evacuation of the Rhineland contingent on an "eastern Locarno."²⁷

British leaders had a different, if related, concern, worrying that a security pact with France would destabilize the continent by giving France further incentive to provoke Germany: as Prime Minister MacDonald warned the Committee of Imperial Defense in 1924, "There was the danger that if we made [the] French secure, thereby we would give her a free hand to work out her own political and economic policy in Europe and relieve her of all military implications which might result from her policy."²⁸ Similarly, in the early years of the Cold War, John Foster Dulles repeatedly cautioned that the short-term exigencies of American security policy, which demanded an alliance with ravaged Western Europe, might impede the long-run aim of American military withdrawal from the continent, which depended on European unity and recovery. As early as 1948 Dulles warned George Marshall and Robert Lovett that the agreement that would become the North Atlantic Treaty "might seem to guaranty the status quo and make it less likely, rather than more likely, that the western European democracies would unite as to create strength between themselves."²⁹

Such nagging fears have not proved entirely unwarranted, as alliance membership has at times convincingly resulted in perverse consequences. Elsewhere I have argued that the Atlantic Alliance had a destructive impact on the Greco-Turkish relationship. Made enemies by a long history of mutual exploitation and cycles of revenge, the two countries brokered a rapprochement in 1930 when faced with aggressive threats from Bulgaria and Italy, and the bonds grew tighter after World War II despite Greek resentment at perceived Turkish betrayal during the war. In the early 1950s the Turkish premier paid a visit across the Aegean, and the Greek royal couple did the same; meanwhile leading policy makers floated the idea of confederation. But, shortly after the pair's accession to NATO, nearly a quarter-century of warm relations dissolved in bickering over the fate of Cyprus.³⁰

Neither institutionalist nor structural realist logics can explain why and under what conditions alliances might undermine cooperation and even spur conflict. The theory of collective action, which has been applied in limited

fashion to alliances, can prove helpful in this regard. Drawing from his home discipline of economics, Mancur Olson pointed to the difficulty of cooperation among rational egoists with regard to public goods, which are characterized by (1) nonexcludability (those who do not purchase or pay for the good cannot be kept from consuming it, from enjoying its benefits), and (2) jointness of supply (additional consumption of the good does not diminish the amount available to others).³¹ Although the actors share an interest in provision of the public good, each also wishes to minimize his or her own contribution and shift the onus primarily onto others. As each shirks, collective action fails, and all suffer. That actors seek to gain benefit from a public good without bearing proportional costs, that they might ride free on the efforts of their partners, is a phenomenon familiar to anyone who has ever engaged in a collaborative enterprise. Grounded in economics, Olson spoke the language of costs and payments, and his work had obvious application to burden sharing within alliances: soon thereafter a vibrant research program sprung up examining the distribution of costs within NATO and averting that the Europeans were, as Olson had expected, exploiting the United States and contributing less than their fair share.³² But the narrowness of this research has been unfortunate, for collective action theory has implications that extend beyond burden sharing to the broader question of alliance commitment.

Actors, in this case states, ride free because they believe that they will enjoy the same amount of the good, in this case security, regardless of their behavior. States spend less on defense because allies will pick up the slack. But the further implication is that they can devote less attention to the common objective, for others are guaranteeing their security (or, in the case of an offensive alliance, ensuring that their shared goals are attained). Free-riding applies not just to tangible monetary burdens, but even to interests, as allies shift the focus of their foreign policy to secondary goals. Consequently revisionist states enjoy an opportunity to further their ends, which may run counter to those of fellow allies, and, for status quo states, the traditional rival replaces the alliance's target as the primary threat, even if that rival is an ally. And since states are very often satisfied with respect to some issues and less content with respect to others, they can simultaneously exhibit both patterns of behavior.

However, this logic applies only to those allies, typically small powers, whose national efforts are relatively inconsequential for the coalition's effectiveness. Olson noted that perverse effects were somewhat mitigated in an intermediate case, when "the contribution or lack of contribution of any one individual in the group will have a perceptible effect on the burden or benefit of any other individual or individuals in the group."³³ The incentive to ride free is vastly reduced when that actor's *individual* behavior would cause insufficient provision of the good. If a single great power or even an important mid-sized state were to shift its foreign policy away from the pri-

mary goal, the credibility and capacity of the alliance would be markedly diminished. In contrast, a small state may aid the alliance by sitting along a vital strategic corridor or by serving political and symbolic purposes, but its actual military contribution remains largely insignificant to the project's success. With the deterrence of the primary security threat, or achievement of the offensive goal, no longer falling on their shoulders, small-state decision makers turn inward and focus more intently on secondary concerns, particularly their long-standing conflicts with regional adversaries. When that adversary also happens to be an ally, as in the Greco-Turkish case, accession renders possible intra-alliance conflicts that had previously been put aside.

Membership in a multilateral alliance, therefore, thrusts small allies back into a world in which unequal gains are feared, in which the security dilemma operates. Once accession to the alliance has prompted the rivals to turn their attention to secondary foreign policy objectives and thus to their conflicts of interest with each other, the very means that contemporary alliances adopt to bolster their collective strength—economic and military assistance, technology transfer, and so on—transform a bounded dispute into a sweeping threat. Such arms transfers are a mixed blessing, simultaneously reassuring and threatening. Although the larger patrons provide arms to the allied enemies to meet shared objectives, their plans for using them remain partly inscrutable. Weapons intended for use against opposing forces can be turned against an ally. Alliance military assistance compounds intra-alliance suspicion as it provides the capacity for offensive action and thus contributes to a broader sense of insecurity.

Finally, under these conditions, the features of institutions that supposedly promote cooperation serve to ratchet up the conflict. Rivals link issues not to offer side payments, but rather to seek greater gains across the board. Transparency yields just slight gains against the uncertainty of anarchy, and of course inhibits cooperation when improved information reveals that suspected wolves really are wolves. Last, institutions are themselves not apolitical venues through which states achieve agreement, but are sources and instruments of power; rather than cultivating cooperation, institutions become the site and object of contest as states have significant incentives to capture them for their own ends. The argument is not that alliances spur only competitive dynamics, for certain features do undeniably promote cooperation.³⁴ Rather alliance institutions can promote effects that cut in both directions, simultaneously making possible and exacerbating, yet also moderating the rivalries within.

A Brief Case Study: NATO, France, and Germany

This framework yields insight not only into important cases of intra-alliance conflict, as in Greece and Turkey, but even into the Atlantic Alliance's

great triumph: Franco-German reconciliation. Unlike among the far smaller allies in the southeast Mediterranean, NATO as an institution was the key-stone supporting future cooperation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany. The terms of West Germany's accession to NATO and the Brussels Treaty Organization (later, the Western European Union), enshrined in 1954 in a series of agreements, placed strict limits on the size of its armed forces and on the weaponry in its arsenal, particularly with regard to non-conventional arms, long-range missiles, strategic bombers, and large warships. With its troops operating exclusively under NATO authority and without a national general staff, West Germany could pose little military threat to its neighbors. Finally, and most important, the United States committed itself to stationing forces in the country, thereby guaranteeing the peace in Western Europe.³⁵ When, after several years of tenacious opposition, the French finally did put aside their fears and accept German rearmament, these particular institutional arrangements that enmeshed West Germany in a restrictive web made it palatable. That the alliance engaged in monitoring, sponsored information exchange, and otherwise nurtured transparency was critical to ensuring these agreements' long-term stability and survival.

The NATO regime laid the foundation for the Franco-German rapprochement, but it exerted a differential impact on these two European powers, as a perspective informed by the collective-action problem would expect. At the close of World War II, France played a classic zero-sum game, laboring hard to keep Germany small, weak, and demilitarized, but as the Soviet threat emerged, French fears of German revanche took a back seat. Such concerns sprang up again only after the militarization of the Cold War and the deeper institutionalization of the Atlantic Alliance, after the American military commitment to the continent had been solidified in the wake of the Korean War; manifest in French opposition to German rearmament, these qualms led to the defeat of the European Defense Community, which France had initially proposed. While Germany stood, divided, astride the continent's central cleavage line, France was, thanks to NATO, relatively sheltered and could afford to maintain its independent Gaullist priorities. With Germany and allied forces a buffer between its borders and the Soviet bloc, France had the luxury of resisting integration into the alliance's joint military structures and eventually withdrawing its forces from NATO's military wing. French involvement in its military was so skewed toward its (post-)imperial needs that, as time passed, the armed forces' ability to defend against a Warsaw Pact assault declined substantially.³⁶

In contrast, especially under Konrad Adenauer, West Germany was the model ally, identifying its own fate with that of the alliance as whole. Confronted daily with the threat posed by the Soviet bloc, Germany was an integral member of the alliance and could not afford to realign its foreign policy priorities, as had France; with 30 percent of its population and 25 percent

of its industrial capacity located within sixty miles of the border, only West Germany exceeded the American contribution to the forward defense of Western Europe.³⁷ When West Germany was dissatisfied with the alliance's policy-making processes, as in the case of the United States' refusal to share nuclear targeting and strategy information in the 1950s, it sought solutions within the organization, through nuclear control-sharing arrangements and later the Nuclear Planning Group; similarly discontent, France chose a different path, striking out on its own and developing an independent nuclear force. France's foreign policy reflected its peculiar insulated position that permitted it to decrease its devotion to alliance aims without undermining provision of the public good—that is, security from the Soviet menace. Meanwhile, Germany had less leeway for riding free, for a reduced German commitment would have undermined alliance effectiveness and contributed to marked underprovision of security.³⁸

Moreover, the larger pattern of Franco-German cooperation during the Cold War is explained less by the abstract mechanisms highlighted by institutionalist theory (issue linkage, side payments, heightened iteration, reduced transaction costs) than by a combination of domestic politics (the ideology of state leaders, the limits imposed by coalition politics) and fears of American abandonment. Whereas a structural realist would have expected improving superpower relations to have undermined European integration and bilateral cooperation, the effect was in fact the opposite. European statesmen recognized that whether the elephants were fighting or making love, the grass was sure to be crushed; their fears of abandonment and entrapment were simply two sides of the same coin.³⁹ When Soviet-American relations seemed to portend that the collective good that NATO and the United States had supplied would no longer be plentiful, France and Germany found security cooperation far easier to attain.

As the superpower détente approached its zenith, a pervasive sense of isolation drove the French desire for cooperation with Germany, particularly in military affairs. Even though it had achieved warmer relations with the eastern bloc through *Ostpolitik*, Germany also found the U.S.-USSR rapprochement worrisome and sought to bind itself more closely to its neighbor to the west. The ascendance to power of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in France and Helmut Schmidt in Germany paved the way for renewed progress in their countries' integration, in defense no less than in economics. The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 fueled European skepticism about American reliability, and Germany's Schmidt was particularly worried as Carter suddenly decided in 1978 to cancel the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons after Schmidt had, at great personal political risk, promised to deploy them. Close cooperation between France and Germany emerged not as part of a broader American-led effort to counter the Soviet threat or as a happy consequence of NATO's institutional design, but out of a growing fear that the United

States was not committed to Western Europe's defense and might seek a separate solution with the Soviets.

The aspirations of Giscard and Schmidt went unfulfilled as they could not overcome domestic political weakness, and thus the next great wave of Franco-German security cooperation got under way roughly as Soviet-American relations began to undergo a sea change in the mid-1980s. That Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, despite different general ideological predilections, shared similar views on NATO and the Soviet Union was certainly important, and they began to move their countries closer even before the transformation of the Cold War environment, but these leaders also recognized that changing geopolitical conditions might lead the United States to renege its global commitments and withdraw its forces from the continent. To Europeans nervous about American abandonment, the signing of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was but the culmination of a longer process whose roots lay in the early years of the Cold War and that Ronald Reagan had reinvigorated. The Franco-German bilateral advances came fast and furious in the middle years of the decade as Reagan's obsession with the Strategic Defense Initiative raised the specter of a new isolationism, as growing American budget deficits seemed to bode ill for future levels of defense spending, as American attention seemed to shift from the European theater to Latin America and the Pacific Basin, as Reagan appeared willing at the 1986 Reykjavik Summit to trade the nuclear umbrella over Europe, and as the ink dried on the INF Treaty. As a French parliamentarian rhetorically posed the question in 1987, "Do you think 320 million Europeans can continue forever to ask 240 million Americans to defend us against 280 million Soviets?"⁴⁰

The steadily deepening cooperation of the 1980s—from the institutionalization of meetings at all levels to improved French capabilities for participation in the forward defense of West Germany to unprecedented joint exercises to the French decision to consult Germany on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons—was remarkable. Differences still persisted between French and German security policy, particularly over whether bilateral cooperation would serve as the central pillar of a European security community that would replace NATO and largely exclude the United States (France) or would be at most a European complement to the older transatlantic partnership (Germany). But by the late 1980s these two major European powers had indeed become close collaborators in security affairs. However, the common wisdom on NATO's role in effecting the transformation seems wrong. NATO did lay the foundation for Franco-German reconciliation, but the institution cannot account for the ebb and flow of their security relationship. The brief account here is only suggestive, and far greater research would be required for firmer conclusions. But at first glance it would seem that the supposed feather in the neoliberal institutionalists' cap has been blown away by the empirical winds.

ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

Narrowly crafted institutionalist arguments regarding cooperation are less popular, however, than the far grander claim that NATO has contributed in substantial fashion to the formation of a transatlantic security community: a group of states that share a social identity, a sense of "we-ness," and whose interactions are marked not by short-term self-interest and self-help, but by diffuse reciprocity, trust, and even altruism.⁴¹ Within this community, "dependable expectations of peaceful change" reign; war has become inconceivable. Rooted in the seminal work of Karl Deutsch and his collaborators, this argument has more recently been articulated by theorists of a constructivist bent, who have begun to place the initial insight on firmer footing and who have sought to craft more generalizable causal chains.⁴² Evaluating this newer literature, I maintain that careful examination of the mechanisms purportedly linking alliance to collective identity reveals that the transformative capacity of alliances has been exaggerated. Moreover, NATO, a critical test of the general hypothesis, cannot bear the bulk, if much at all, of the explanatory burden, suggesting the emphasis on alliance has been misplaced.

The constructivist claim is that, through common membership in a deeply institutionalized alliance, states forge a collective identity, reflected in what Deutsch termed a security community. Such states would not escape anarchy and self-help—the international system would continue to lack a dependable means of enforcing commitments—but they would expand the boundaries of the self to include their allies. The allies would no longer define their interests by themselves alone, but would positively identify with "the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive expression of the self." The result would be "empathetic rather than instrumental or situational interdependence between self and other."⁴³ Proceeding from an ontology that stresses the social construction of reality, the importance of inter-subjective in addition to material structures, contemporary students of security communities have distanced themselves from Deutsch's behavioralist underpinnings and emphasis on quantitative measures of transactions and have instead devoted attention to the emergence of an imagined, cognitive region.⁴⁴ The existence of a collective security identity does not imply that interstate relations are completely harmonious, but rather that when disputes arise, they are resolved peacefully, even when strategically rational actors might opt for war.

Two strategies assist in assessment of this argument. First, I cull from the literature six proposed causal mechanisms linking alliances and collective identity and critically evaluate their *theoretical* plausibility as either useful generalizations or contingent explanations. Second, I offer preliminary *empirical* evidence drawn from the history of NATO regarding those hypotheses that are sufficiently well-developed to permit falsification and that seem minimally rea-

sonable. The depth of NATO's institutionalization and the intensity of the interstate interactions it sponsored renders it a most-likely case for the alliance-collective identity connection, and not surprisingly NATO has been widely cited as having just such effects. If NATO should prove less influential than most have thought, it would raise serious questions about the hypothesis.⁴⁵

1. *Powerful States and Ideational Influence.* At the level of structure, it has been asserted that great powers, and especially hegemonic powers, nudge others toward and compel them to adopt and maintain a collective stance. Stated in more ideational terms, "because of the positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and successful states, security communities develop around them."⁴⁶ Whatever the plausibility of this hypothesis or the extent to which it captures the imagining that surrounds the emergence of a security community, it has little to do with the institutionalized features of an alliance and much to do with the relations between the powerful and the weak; both the alliance and the security community would then independently be products of the gap in relative power, and the causal relationship between them would be spurious. The alliance might provide the hegemon with an additional means of coercion, with a lever over its allies, but the institution would hardly account for the bulk of the action, except possibly in moments "after hegemony."

2. *The Interstate Contact Hypothesis.* Constructivist scholars have argued that collective experiences and social identities follow from an impressive level of interstate transactions, from high "dynamic density." The greater the quantity, velocity, intensity, and diversity of exchanges of various kinds, the more likely they are to give rise to collective interstate identities,⁴⁷ and deeply institutionalized alliances are important sponsors of such influential interactions. This proposition bears close kinship to the venerable "contact hypothesis," which has roots stretching back to Montesquieu, and extends its domestic logic to the international level. However, the simple contact hypothesis—which suggests that intense and extensive interaction among individuals and groups would, as a function of increasing knowledge about the other, eventually eliminate prejudicial attitudes and behavior and reduce consciousness of difference—has been conclusively rejected. In his studies of prejudice, the social psychologist Gordon Allport formulated a more sophisticated version to distinguish "casual contact" from "true acquaintance," proposing three additional criteria that would break down the barriers to meaningful communication.⁴⁸ But, despite a highly active research program that has flourished for decades, the causal claims of the contact hypothesis remain unverified, and even the sophisticated variant has received little empirical support.⁴⁹

Constructivists therefore stray awfully close to the liberal fallacy, and they know it: in tortured language, they have sought desperately to distinguish themselves from the liberals of yesteryear. While Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett caution that "not all transactions will produce a collective identity; after all, interactions are also responsible for creating an 'other' and defining threats," they also state, without caveat, that "increased interactions . . . encourage the development of new social institutions and organizational forms that reflect diffuse reciprocity, shared interests, and perhaps even a collective identity."⁵⁰ Constructivists are well aware of, but have not found a satisfactory reply to, the truism that although contact with others may foster friendship, harmony, and a sense of common destiny, familiarity may also breed contempt. As distances narrow and contact increases, cooperation may become profitable, but conflicts of interest that sharpen the lines of demarcation are equally likely to arise. True understanding of the other's aims, demands, fears, and methods of operation may just as easily contribute to deadlock, to the recognition that goals are entirely incompatible, as it will to the feeling of commonality. As Andrew Sullivan has observed, "it is one of the most foolish clichés of our time that prejudice is always rooted in ignorance, and can usually be overcome by familiarity with the objects of our loathing."⁵¹

Realist writers on international relations have convincingly rebutted such liberal claims. John Lewis Gaddis concludes that "the conquest of distance" over the course of the latter half of the nineteenth century "did not strengthen Russian-American friendship; instead it worsened matters by injecting disputes over geopolitics and human rights into a relationship in which remoteness had heretofore encouraged the appearance of complementary interests."⁵² An ironic, if somewhat tendentious, example also dates from the end of the nineteenth century, when two languages that aspired to universality, Esperanto and Volapük, rapidly descended into a bitter feud. A common language could not even bind together the disciples of Volapük, who split after a quarrel over grammar.⁵³ Even Alexander Wendt has observed that "the vulnerabilities that accompany interdependence may generate perceived threats to self-control, and rising similarity may generate fears that the state has no *raison d'être* if it is not different from others. States may respond to these systemic processes, in other words, by redoubling their efforts to defend egoistic identities."⁵⁴

Although even manifold and diverse transactions would appear not to be related in any straightforward fashion to the emergence of collective identity, they may make the participants aware of underlying similarities they had not previously recognized or serve as a multiplier.⁵⁵ Colin Kahl, for example, adds that only under conditions such as "the

positive nature of interdependence" and "a *proper* foundation" will intense contact yield a shared sense of identity and purpose; these caveats are clearly reminiscent of Allport's version of the contact hypothesis, but Kahl does not go even as far as Allport in identifying the factors that render high levels of interaction conducive to the varied outcomes.⁵⁶ Other proponents have retreated from the strong form of the proposition, admitting that "increasing interaction, whether of groups or individuals, intensifies and magnifies processes already underway."⁵⁷ These more plausible, and more humble, forms of the contact hypothesis are, however, unverifiable and hence unassailable in the absence of further theoretical development. Without a priori specification of the "proper foundation," such arguments tend toward committing the *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy, asserting the existence of this basis and the operation of the causal mechanism whenever a collective identity appears to have taken shape. Nor can one measure interaction's causal effect as a multiplier without specifying precisely what impact such ongoing processes would have had if such interaction had not taken place.

3. *Monitoring and Trust.* Alliances, like other international organizations and institutions, establish behavioral norms, monitoring mechanisms, and sanctions that are the basis for the trust that lies at the heart of the security community. However, the process linking such features of institutional design to the emergence of deep-seated trust is highly undertheorized. Not only do such structural inducements not always successfully engender cooperation, but few such cooperative enterprises blossom into the full-fledged, almost unthinking trust one would associate with a security community. What are the intervening factors that encourage or impede the transformation of cooperation into trust? Is trust simply an extreme form of cooperation such that differences in degree become differences in kind, as this mechanism implies? Or is it perhaps an entirely different phenomenon produced by entirely different processes? Since interstate relations, even among allies, are rarely composed solely of cooperative episodes but usually entail both cooperative and competitive interactions, states must somehow pick and choose from among the mounds of contradictory data when composing their portrait of the other. Why are some events accented and others ignored? Institutions may be sites of learning, but whence the content of the lessons?⁵⁸

The answers to these questions have been at best suggestive. Adler and Barnett, for example, characterize trust as the product of "a lifetime of common experiences and lemergingl through sustained interactions and reciprocal exchanges, leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations, trial-and-error, and a historical legacy of

actions and encounters that deposit an environment of certitude notwithstanding the uncertainty that accompanies social life."⁵⁹ This is roughly equivalent to saying: trust emerges when it emerges; we are not quite sure how; but we are sure monitoring must be a major piece of the puzzle. Until such insights are recast and formulated as testable hypotheses, it is impossible to know whether monitors and sanctions are themselves sufficient for trust and identity. It is not even clear that international institutional monitoring mechanisms are necessary for trust: for instance, today a liberal democracy cannot conceive of being attacked militarily by a fellow liberal democracy, regardless of the pair's current or past institutional memberships.

4. *Socialization (D)—Domestic Structures.* Collective identity may also emerge as states become increasingly similar in their domestic political structures, ideologies, or cultures. Insofar as international institutions, and more particularly alliances, help engineer a transnational convergence of values and regime types, they figure centrally in the formation of collective identity. The chief mechanism is socialization—that is, the internalization of a given social community's constitutive beliefs and practices by embedding them in domestic decision-making processes. Part of NATO's purpose has been to spread and support democratic institutions, and the recent NATO enlargement was widely justified as assisting in the transition to and consolidation of democracy in East-Central Europe.⁶⁰

How effective alliances, and particularly NATO, prove at this task is an empirical question, but there are reasons for skepticism. Alliances are, first and foremost, politico-military tools of statecraft that aggregate military capability to counter external threats, constrain the at times hostile power of allies, or pursue revisionist ends. In principle and in practice, other functions may be and often are grafted onto alliance, notably reshaping their members' domestic political and cultural systems. But precisely in those moments when alliances are most necessary and most important and therefore most influential, when the stakes are high and momentous questions of security are at issue, states are unlikely to allow the core role to suffer. Policies aimed at inducing homogeneity will be more successful if pursued bilaterally or through other institutional webs.

NATO's record in this regard is mixed. The Atlantic Alliance seems to have played relatively little role in establishing and consolidating democracy in the largest such project on the European continent—the transformation of postwar Germany; accounts that stress NATO's socialization function in the German case typically conflate alliance and American factors and policies.⁶¹ Students of democratic transitions have routinely credited NATO with preventing particularly Spain, and some-

times even Greece and Portugal, from slipping back into military rule by giving support to military missions and identities based on enhanced professionalism.⁶² This claim is suspect, however, as the Spanish armed forces had little formal interaction with NATO, as, soon after the country's accession to the alliance in 1982, the new Socialist Prime Minister Felipe González, who had been swept into office in large part on the strength of his anti-NATO stance, immediately froze integration into NATO's military command structures. To the extent that the Spanish armed forces learned the meaning of professionalism from their foreign counterparts, it seems probable that the bilateral relationship with the United States, which dated from 1953, was more consequential than the alliance. And Greece had been active in the alliance for some fifteen years before the 1967 coup; although the military's integration into the alliance since the resumption of civilian rule in 1974 has been relatively limited as a consequence of the conflicts with Turkey, the country has remained coup-free. Finally, Turkey, a member of the alliance since 1952, is home to a shaky democracy in which coups have been frequent and in which the military still operates relatively autonomously. Relatedly, if anything the alliance, by way of expansion, has slowed the transition to liberal democracy in post-Cold War Russia by strengthening the political hand of antidemocratic forces.

NATO does seem able to claim one recent and important success, however. For the former Soviet bloc states of East-Central Europe, membership in NATO is highly attractive: it provides a guarantee against attack by their hulking neighbor to the East, signals to investors a certain stability, and, beyond such strategic rationales, indicates that one's country falls within the boundaries of the West. Over the last decade, NATO has held out the prospect of membership to induce these states to undertake democratic and economic reforms and to settle their outstanding territorial and ethnic conflicts.⁶³ How critical NATO was to this process is contested,⁶⁴ and how permanent and deep-seated are these agreements and institutions remains to be seen. Not participation in NATO forums (which is what is usually implied by socialization), but simply the possibility of Western acceptance (for which NATO was a proxy) was the operative mechanism assisting in the process of democratization.

5. *Socialization (II)—Security Experts and Epistemic Communities.* A number of observers have argued that alliance institutions more effectively foster a convergence of member interests by socializing security-policy elites toward a common set of norms. Under the auspices of the alliance, particular groups in member states—such as military officers and civilian security analysts—engage in intensive, structured interaction and collaborate to achieve shared corporate goals. Alliance forums

provide numerous opportunities to persuade other actors and change their beliefs, and over time the institution comes to serve as the home for an epistemic security community: a cohesive transnational group of civilian and military experts on international security who agree broadly on the definition of central concepts, cause-and-effect relationships, methods of truth-testing, and the objective of maximizing intra-alliance coordination.⁶⁵ Such expert communities have great influence because they are key suppliers of information to central state decision makers and work to reshape their states' interests in ways that promote trust and collective identity. In support of this socialization process, there is some evidence that American and European military officers serving in NATO forces have developed a unique alliance perspective and some degree of loyalty to the collective body.⁶⁶

Underlying this argument, however, are two questionable premises. First, by envisioning that an expert consensus gradually evolves within alliance circles, this socialization hypothesis ignores the high political stakes that accompany alliance decisions. A more deeply political perspective recognizes that even as members' civilian and military representatives seek to further their common purpose, they also compete to control the alliance agenda, to devote greater collective attention to their own pet projects, to reduce their share of the burden, to conduct military operations in a fashion that accords with their own capabilities and strategic culture, and so on. Persuasion may certainly take place even within such a political environment, but it is more a rare and contingent outcome than a regular and predictable one.

Second, the epistemic community hypothesis presumes that the experts in question have unique and virtually unchallenged access to central state decision makers and consequently have great influence over the latter's policy preferences (and, presumably, in the long run over the state's conceptions of the self). When the epistemic community resides within the government as it largely does in the case of alliance, rather than within academia or the world of political activism, this argument certainly carries greater weight. Nonetheless, at least in democracies, a wide range of views from a variety of sources both within and outside government clamor for attention, and usually no one group will be able to monopolize decision makers' ears. While epistemic communities might dominate governmental decision making with regard to seemingly technical questions about, for example, the consequences of pollution or the details of military force employment, the mechanism seems less accurately to describe how state leaders acquire their information about basic issues in international relations. Unless equipped with a more powerful theory of domestic politics than any in the political scientist's tool kit, the hypothesis cannot explain who will triumph

in the contest that inevitably surrounds such important policy decisions. Thus while the hypothesis may still have explanatory power in cases in which the community of experts does possess unparalleled access and influence, it cannot serve as the basis for a broader generalization about alliance and collective identity.

6. *Social Identity Theory.* Finally, numerous social-psychology experiments, associated most closely with Henri Tajfel, have established that group identity is often rooted in nothing more than framing the group as such, in the classification itself. Psychologists have found that the simple act of placing an individual in a minimal group leads to in-group preference and out-group prejudice: a person will believe his or her group better, friendlier, more competent, and stronger than others. Tajfel has argued that viewing the group in positive terms enhances one's self-esteem (social identity theory, or SIT), while John Turner has suggested that such framing yields perceptions of similarity (self-categorization theory).⁶⁷ Applying this finding to the question at hand, it seems plausible that alliance members would, especially over time, consequently develop a special affinity for their fellow allies.

The problem is that individuals (and states for that matter) are enmeshed in overlapping and cross-cutting webs of loyalties. Not only members of group A, they may also be children or parents, workers or industrialists, Democrats or Republicans, pro-choice or pro-life; when such identity commitments come into conflict with each other, social identity theory ceases to yield a distinctive set of predictions. Countries that have joined an alliance to achieve particular aims may find themselves at odds over other issues and thus subject to a different, conflicting set of in-group-out-group biases, and their formal adversaries may on occasion be informal allies. Social psychologists have not explored the consequences of cross-cutting cleavages for SIT and have not offered a coherent explanation for which identity triumphs in this competition or whether both are abandoned in favor of a third.⁶⁸

Collective Identity in Conclusion

Much discussion of the consequences of alliance membership has implied a powerful, generalizable link with the formation of collective identity. By carefully evaluating the proposed causal mechanisms, I have argued that this claim is not sustainable. At best, alliance may prove a critical piece of the causal story in particular cases. When the "proper" foundation is present, intense alliance-sponsored interaction may help generate expansive definitions of the self, perhaps more quickly and more deeply than in its absence. When the alliance itself homogenizes states' domestic political structures, perceptions of similarity and collective identity may follow. When epistemic communities have achieved consensus within alliance forums and have un-

rivaled access to decision makers at home, they influence leaders' policy preferences and state identity. These paths remain open, but they are highly contingent. Perhaps further theoretical development will provide clearer scope conditions as to when a common alliance gives rise to collective identity and when it does not, but the difficulty of further specifying the hypotheses may also simply reflect the uncertain nature of social reality. Such indeterminacy is deeply problematic for those who seek nomothetic explanation, but those who are sensitive to powerful interaction effects, to the reflexivity of social subjects and the possibility of learning from experience, to the impossibility of holding everything else constant, will find less troubling accounts that stress "can" rather than "will." The capacity of alliance to reshape state identities is not universal, but it is also not, at least in principle, nonexistent.

Neither the constructivist project nor the concept of a security community has been the target here. War does seem to have become unthinkable among major advanced industrialized countries in a way that transcends calculations of costs and benefits, and approaches that bring states' definitions of interests to the heart of the analysis are most likely to provide satisfying answers. That the boundaries of the "European" security community are not coterminous with NATO may point the way: On the one hand, Greece and Turkey share little trust and certainly lack dependable expectations of peaceful change, while several states that are not members of the alliance, such as Australia and New Zealand, would seem to belong.

At least two candidates deserve further consideration. First, it may be no accident that the security community is most firm among those states whose regimes are consolidated liberal democracies and that the non-NATO members of the security community also fall into that category. The attributes that define relations within a security community—shared identity, diffuse reciprocity, trust—overlap in large measure with the nature of foreign relations among democracies.⁶⁹ The roots of the security community may lie not in alliance, but in the interactions among states of a particular regime type. Second, it is possible that the security community is far broader still. John Mueller has argued that a norm has developed against major war, at least among those states most likely to engage in it—that is, advanced industrialized states.⁷⁰ As an increasing number of states falls into this rank, the security community may go global. These hypotheses may be right or wrong, but they are noted here merely as two constructivist alternatives that place far less weight on alliance.

ALLIANCES: THEORY AND POLICY

Students of international relations have not been particularly sensitive to the complexity of alliances and their politics. Like many debates, that surrounding

international institutions has developed into a sterile dichotomy: For some, institutions matter and are associated with cooperation, whereas others counter that they are epiphenomenal, only products of the distribution of power. Drawing on collective action theory, I have sought to articulate a third position that (1) argues institutions have independent causal impact; (2) suggests that alliance membership may, under particular conditions, make possible and even exacerbate conflictual dynamics; and (3) specifies the scope of neoliberal institutionalist hypotheses. Thus put, the question is no longer whether, but how, institutions matter, and the structural realist response to the neoliberals gives way to a realist institutionalism that is more consistent with realism's philosophical core.⁷¹ But such system effects cannot account fully for the flux of relations among allies, from near-war to moments of rapprochement. Further research would, I hope, marry the hypotheses suggested above to other systemic factors as well as to domestic politics to arrive at more complete explanations of intra-alliance conflict and cooperation.

The constructivist turn in international relations in the last decade has drawn attention to previously ignored phenomena, distinguishing even regular cooperative behavior from the patterns associated with collective identity. Constructivist writers on security communities have identified a prior alliance as a key sufficient causal factor in effecting the emergence of a collective social identity among a given group of states. In particular, they have credited NATO with giving birth to the transatlantic security community. Carefully examining the theoretical logic and empirical plausibility of the proposed causal mechanisms, six in all, and drawing on preliminary evidence from the NATO case, I argue that constructivist scholars have vastly overstated the alliance-security community connection and have failed to supply sufficiently well-specified hypotheses that identify when alliance is conducive to collective identity and when it has little causal impact. At the end of the analysis, several pathways remain open, but much theoretical and empirical work remains to be done before any firm conclusions can be reached.

Unrealistic assumptions and contentions about the consequences of alliance have equally been a part of American policy discourse. Unlike Europeans schooled in *Realpolitik*, American statesmen have typically not been attracted by the mere *management* of conflict, but rather have sought to *resolve* disputes. Perhaps as a consequence of their professional training, perhaps for reasons deeply rooted in American history and culture, they have, in their efforts to bring to an end international competition and conflict, often placed undue faith in legalism and in formal institutions.⁷² The confidence of these two tendencies has made American leaders particularly susceptible to espousing the fallacy that alliances, by their very nature, breed cooperation and reshape fundamental interests. This unwarranted belief has certainly not been confined to Americans, nor to our own age, but it has

shaped American political debate to an unusual extent. It informed the discussions surrounding the establishment of the Atlantic Alliance, and it played a prominent role in the discourse of NATO enlargement. Alliances are often useful tools of statecraft and valuable means of expressing common interests, but very rarely do all good things go together. They generate pressures in multiple directions and have cross-cutting consequences for their members. They are marked by moments of cooperation for which they can take credit, but also by competition and conflict for which they must accept blame. They may coincide with the emergence of a zone of peace, a security community, but their causal role is likely to be small.

This chapter does not, therefore, contain a simple lesson for American policymakers as they continue to confront the problem of order in the post-Cold War world. Alliances, as well as other international institutions, have their place and can make important contributions to achieving our foreign policy ends, but they should be neither overestimated nor oversold. Coming to terms with complexity is never comfortable, for individuals dealing with everyday life or for policy makers facing challenges on the international scene. But recognizing the full range of costs and benefits associated with alliance membership is essential for wise policy. Foreknowledge of the consequences that joining NATO would have for Greco-Turkish relations would probably not have changed Dean Acheson's calculations, but it might have led the United States and its partners to design more carefully the modalities of accession, and it most certainly would have prevented American statesmen from reaching with as little understanding as they did. The most recent expansion of NATO may very well not have such perverse consequences for East-Central Europe, perhaps because most states there seek membership not to protect themselves from a revival of Russian imperial ambitions but to send a message to potential investors, perhaps because larger allies will refuse to foot the bill to modernize their militaries and they cannot on their own afford new sophisticated armaments, perhaps because the Western commitment to their security is so obviously tenuous. These issues remained absent from the rancorous debate on enlargement and will probably not be addressed as future waves are considered. But these questions deserve a hearing if the costs of enlargement are not to prove far greater than anyone had anticipated.

NOTES

1. James M. Goldgeier, "NATO: Expansion: The Anatomy of a Decision," *Washington Quarterly* 21:1 (Winter 1998): 85–102; Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

2. *New York Times*, 23 October 1996, A20. As early as 1994, Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared that "now our challenge is to extend the zone of security

- and stability that the Alliance has provided to extend it across the continent to the east." See "NATO: Extending Stability in Europe," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5:48 (28 November 1994): 790.
3. Paul W. Schroeder, "Alliances, 1815–1945: Weapons of Power and Tools of Management," in Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1976), 256–257.
 4. Portions of this chapter, particularly in the section on alliances and cooperation, draw on Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," *International Organization* 53:2 (Spring 1999): 343–377.
 5. On these tendencies, see Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," *World Politics* 20 (1968): 463.
 6. Quoted in Glenn Snyder, *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997), 356–357.
 7. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981). For a similar critique, see Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence," in Philip E. Tetlock et al., *Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War*, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 249, 306. James Lee Ray refines the coding and empirical analysis, but fails to move theoretically beyond Bueno de Mesquita's explanation. See Ray, "Friends as Foes: International Conflict and Wars between Formal Allies," in *Prisoners of War?* Charles Gochman and Alan Ned Sabrosky, eds. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1990), 73–92.
 8. Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
 9. By realism in this context, I mean structural realism. Classical realists would find my perspective quite familiar.
 10. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security* 19:3 (Winter 1994/95): 11.
 11. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 105, 70–71.
 12. Steven Hugh Lee, *Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949–1954* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 7.
 13. Schroeder, "Alliances." See also Patricia Weisman, "Intimate Enemies: The Politics of Peacetime Alliance," *Security Studies* 7 (Autumn 1997): 156–192.
 14. David G. Haglund, *Alliance within the Alliance? Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991).
 15. For this widely accepted view of cooperation, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses," *World Politics* 44 (April 1992). On collective identity, see Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88:2 (June 1994): 384–396.
 16. Keohane, "Alliances, Threats, and the Uses of Neorealism," *International Security* 13:1 (Summer 1988): 174.
 17. Such exceptions include John S. Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace in Europe: The Contributions of Regional Security Regimes," *Review of International Studies* 20 (1994): 369–388; Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109:5 (Winter 1994–95): 763–787; Duffield, *Power Rules: The*

- Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995); Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence After the Cold War," *International Organization* 50:3 (Summer 1996): 445–475; Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in Helga Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 21–47; Steve Weber, "Shaping the Postwar Balance of Power: Multilateralism in NATO," *International Organization* 46 (1992): 633–680. Focusing directly on alliances and cooperation is Fred Chernoff, *After Bipolarity: The Vanishing Threat, Theories of Cooperation, and the Future of the Atlantic Alliance* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
18. The following discussion draws on Keohane, *After Hegemony*; Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); Keohane with Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security* 20:1 (Summer 1995): 39–51. See also Mearsheimer, "False Promise," 342–353; Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation"; Kenneth Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
 19. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, 91.
 20. See Christian Tuschhoff, "Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO," in Haftendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions*, chapter 5.
 21. Of the four mentioned above, I will not discuss one popular institutionalist mechanism—the implications of reduced transaction costs. Transaction costs are very difficult to specify ex ante, and the importance of reducing them has typically figured in institutionalist accounts as a post hoc explanation lacking empirical referents; they offer, in other words, a just-so story of cooperation.
 22. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation," *International Organization* 52:2 (Spring 1998): 269–305, at 270.
 23. On the differences between security and nonsecurity areas, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *Regimes* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), 174–176; Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs," *World Politics* 37 (1984): 1–23.
 24. On the weakness of the logic connecting issue-linkage and cooperation, see James Sebenius, "Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties," *International Organization* 37 (Spring 1983): 281–316; and Joanne Gowa, "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups," *World Politics* 42:3 (1989): 307–324.
 25. Keohane, *International Institutions*, 18, n. 20.
 26. Monteaige Stearns, *Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), 5. See also Van Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations, 1973–1983: The View from Athens," *International Security* 9:4 (Spring 1985): 215.
 27. Jon Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and the West, 1925–1929* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), 41, 29–30, 40–41, 155–156, and passim. While this seems hardly to have concerned the British, Polish and Czechoslovakian elites were understandably worried that security guarantees in the West would produce insecurity in the East. See Piotr S. Wandycz, *France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919–1925* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), 328, 335,

341–368, and passim. In Wandycz's estimation, "It stood to reason that an abandonment by France of her offensive powers on the Rhine would facilitate German expansion to the east, a fact emphasized by the French during the Paris Peace Conference and recalled over and over again by [Polish Foreign Minister Count Aleksander] Skrzynski" (360).

28. Cab 2/4/188(2), Committee of Imperial Defense (CID), Minutes of Meeting 188, 2 October 1924, Public Records Office (PRO), Winston Churchill, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, raised similar arguments a few months later; see Cab 2/4/195, CID, Minutes of Meeting 195, February 13, 1925, PRO. I am indebted to Timothy Crawford for suggesting these examples and providing the PRO materials. See also Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France Between Two Wars: Conflicting Strategies of Peace Since Versailles* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940), especially 237–239, and Jacobson, *Locarno Diplomacy*, 18.

29. Dulles expressed the same concern to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a year later. See James McAllister, "The Reluctant Pacifier: America, the German Question, and the Future of Europe," Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1999, 234, 238. On American policy makers' wish to withdraw from the continent, see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).

30. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism." Accounts of the Greco-Turkish relationship are not surprisingly often biased depending on the author's personal predilections and ethnic origins. With this caveat in mind, for useful discussions of Greco-Turkish relations from the late nineteenth century through the postwar period, see Tozun Bahcheli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990); James Brown, *Delicately Poised Allies: Greece and Turkey* (London: Brassey's, 1991); and Coufoudakis, "Greek-Turkish Relations."

31. Mancur Olson Jr., *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). In contrast to many economists, Olson, however, argues that "jointness of supply" is not a necessary attribute of public goods.

32. For the theory's initial application to burden sharing in alliances, see Mancur Olson Jr. and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," *Review of Economics and Statistics* 48 (August 1966): 266–279. For a recent, representative empirical test of the hypothesis, see John R. Oneal, "Testing the Theory of Collective Action: NATO Defense Burdens, 1950–1984," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34 (September 1990): 426–448. For a challenge to the collective-action alliance literature, see Charles A. Kupchian, "NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior," *International Organization* 42 (Spring 1988): 317–346.

33. Olson, *Logic*, 45.

34. For an empirical analysis, albeit largely from a realist noninstitutionalist perspective, see Christopher Gelpi, "Alliances as Instruments of Intra-Allied Control," in Hafendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions*, chapter 4.

35. See Stephen A. Kocs, *Autonomy or Power? The Franco-German Relationship and Europe's Strategic Choices, 1955–1995* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995), 17–18; Duffield, "Explaining the Long Peace," 384.

36. Kocs, *Autonomy or Power?*, 253.

37. David Garnham, *The Politics of European Defense Cooperation: Germany, France, Britain, and America* (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1988), 2, 12.

38. The differing French and German attitudes toward the alliance persisted throughout the Cold War period. For good discussions of the two countries' strategic concepts, see Kocs, *Autonomy or Power?*, and Philip H. Gordon, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995).

39. See Haglund, *Alliance within the Alliance*, 5. For general discussions of abandonment and entrapment, see Snyder, *Alliance Politics*; and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 101–112.

40. On these points, see Gordon, *France, Germany, and the Western Alliance*; David S. Yost, "Franco-German Defense Cooperation," *Washington Quarterly* 11:2 (Spring 1988): 173–195; Garnham, *Politics of European Defense Cooperation*, 16–22, quote at 33; Robbin F. Laird, ed., *Strangers and Friends: The Franco-German Security Relationship* (London: Pinter, 1989).

41. Even Glenn Snyder, whose work has been unusually sensitive to the political bargains at the core of alliance, asserts that allies "acquire each other's interests to some extent as a result of allying." Conflicts between allies "will be weaker when the parties begin to think of themselves as friends rather than enemies." See his *Alliance Politics*, 25.

42. See Karl W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1969 [1957]); Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., *Security Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

43. Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," 386. Wendt's language here is a bit confusing, as there may still be many "others" who remain outside the construction of the self, but his intention is to argue that state interaction can collapse such boundaries. I cannot review here the foundations of constructivist ontology and epistemology, nor can I contest constructivists' definitions of terms such as identity and security community. For an important perspective on identity, rooted not in phenomenology but in social networks, see Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise," in Adler and Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*, chapter 12.

44. See Emanuel Adler, "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations," *Millennium* 26:2 (1997): 249–277; Adler, "Europe's New Security Order: A Pluralistic Security Community," in Beverly Crawford, ed., *The Future of European Security* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 287–326.

45. Except where noted, the following discussion draws on Adler and Barnett, "A Framework for the Study of Security Communities," in Adler and Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*, chapter 2; Deutsch, *Political Community*; Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation." Further notes refer only to particular passages in these texts.

46. Adler and Barnett, "Framework," 39–40. See also G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchian, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44:3 (Summer 1990): 283–315.

47. On Durkheim's concept of dynamic density, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," in Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 131–157. Communication lay at the heart of Deutsch's intellectual project; see *Political Community*, and also his *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality* (New York: Wiley, 1953). For a summary of this argument, see Colin H. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace: Constructivism,

- Collective Liberal Identity, and Democratic Peace," *Security Studies* 8:2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999): 120–122.
48. See Gordon W. Allport and B. M. Kramer, "Some Roots of Prejudice," *Journal of Psychology* 22 (1946): 9–39; Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Reading, Penn.: Addison-Wesley, 1954). The contextual conditions held to be conducive to eliminating prejudice through increased communication have changed little during the half-century of research that has followed. See D. M. Taylor and F. M. Moghaddam, *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International Social Psychological Perspectives*, 2nd ed. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), at 180.
49. See Walter G. Stephan, "The Contact Hypothesis in Intergroup Relations," in Clyde Hendrick, ed., *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1987), 13–40; J. W. Jackson, "Contact Theory of Intergroup Hostility: A Review and Evaluation of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature," *International Journal of Group Tensions* 23 (1993): 43–65; and Hugh D. Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture, and the Contact Hypothesis* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997).
50. Adler and Barnett, "Framework," 47, 53.
51. Sullivan, "What's So Bad About Hate," *New York Times Magazine*, 26 September 1999.
52. John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 4.
53. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988 [1973]), 21–22; see also all of his classic chapter, "Paradise is a Bazaar."
54. Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," 390.
55. I am grateful to Aaron Lobel for helpful discussion on this point.
56. Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace," 120, emphasis added.
57. Thomas F. Pettigrew, *Racially Separate or Together?* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971), 275; cited in Forbes, *Ethnic Conflict*, 22–23.
58. Students of security communities might, for example, draw on social psychology for answers to some of these questions. Mercer, *Reputation*, addresses similar issues of data aggregation.
59. Adler and Barnett, "Studying Security Communities in Theory, Comparison, and History," in Adler and Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*, 414.
60. See Mary N. Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," *Security Studies* 4:3 (Spring 1995): 610–656; Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-Atlanta," *Security Studies* 8:2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999): 235–269; and Frank Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation," *Security Studies* 8:2/3 (Winter 1998/99–Spring 1999): 198–234.
61. For good examples of this problem, see Hampton, "NATO at the Creation," and Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States."
62. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 245–247; Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 219–220. This claim is, with little evidence, also commonly made by regional experts. See, among others, Angel Viñas, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in John Chipman, ed., *NATO's Southern Allies* (London: Routledge, 1988), 140–194; and various essays in Federico G. Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Spain's Entry into*

- NATO: *Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988); and Kenneth Maxwell, ed., *Spanish Foreign and Defense Policy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991). Noting the absence of hard data demonstrating this link is Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy," *Adelphi Papers* 204 (Spring 1986).
63. See Schimmelfennig, "NATO Enlargement," 217–225.
64. According to some accounts, the CSCE/OSCE has been more successful along these lines. See Gregory Flynn and Henry Farrell, "Piecing Together the Democratic Peace: The CSCE Norms, and the Construction of Security in Post-Cold War Europe," *International Organization* 53:3 (Summer 1999): 505–535; and Emanuel Adler, "Seeds of Peaceful Change: The OSCE's Security Community-Building Model," in Adler and Barnett, eds., *Security Communities*, chapter 4.
65. On the concept of the epistemic community, see Peter Haas, *Saving the Mediterranean* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and Haas, ed., *Knowledge, Power, and International Policy-Coordination, International Organization* 46 (Winter 1992).
66. On German military elites, see Hampton, "NATO, Germany, and the United States," 249; more broadly, see Tuschhoff, "Alliance Cohesion and Peaceful Change in NATO," 148–150. On the socialization of Chinese bureaucrats within ASEAN, see Alastair Ian Johnston, "The Myth of the ASEAN Way? Explaining the Evolution of the ASEAN Regional Forum," in Hafendorn, Keohane, and Wallander, eds., *Imperfect Unions*, 287–324.
67. See Hent Jafel and John C. Turner, "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior," in S. Worchel and W.G. Austin, eds., *Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), 7–24; and John C. Turner, *Rediscovering the Social Group* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). For discussions with application to international relations, see Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization* 49 (1995): 229–252; and Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective," *Mershon International Studies Review* 38 (1994): 48–50.
68. I am grateful to Rose McDermott for helpful discussion on this subject.
69. See Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996); John Owen IV, *Liberal Peace, Liberal War: American Politics and International Security* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). For explicitly constructivist explanations, see Thomas Risse-Käppen, "Democratic Peace—Wahlike Democraties? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument," *European Journal of International Relations* 1:4 (1995): 491–517; and Kahl, "Constructing a Separate Peace."
70. John Mueller, *Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
71. See Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions," *International Organization* 52:4 (Fall 1998): 729–757; and Randall L. Schweller and David Pries, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, supplement 1 (Spring 1997): 1–32.
72. For an insightful analysis, see Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver's Troubles: or The Setting of American Foreign Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968).

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Essays on International Relations
in Honor of Richard H. Ullman

Edited by
Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek

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Preface and Acknowledgments

Neither of the editors of this volume particularly enjoys salesmanship. But, unlike normal efforts to create a volume of essays, getting people to contribute to a volume honoring Richard Ullman involved neither persuasion at the outset nor nagging at the conclusion. Quite the contrary: Everyone we contacted asking if they would be interested in participating in this effort—the authors, the Council on Foreign Relations, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, the Harris and Eliza Kempner Fund, and the Center for International Studies at Princeton—all expressed their eagerness to participate, and, when it came time, all made good on their promises of support. If one measure of a life well lived is the respect and admiration of one's friends, then Dick has lived very well.

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